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Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to explain the differing levels of rural activism in Brazil and 
South Africa. As both countries are plagued with similar land and poverty disparities, the 
varying intensity and national organisation of rural movements is striking. In Brazil a strong 
and nationally organised rural movement, the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem-
Terra (MST), established itself as the leading rural movement; whereas South Africa’s 
National Land Committee (NLC) remained weak and ultimately collapsed. Today, South 
Africa is characterised by a complete lack of a national representation of rural interests and 
shows only timid attempts at the local level. In order to address the issue systematically and 
comprehensively, the thesis first provides a historical outline of both countries, thereby 
discerning similarities and differences in social, economic and political development. 
Subsequently, and based upon these findings, a systematic comparison of the NLC and MST 
is conducted. Utilising contemporary social movement theory, a synthesised theoretical 
framework of political opportunities, resource mobilisation and framing processes is proposed 
to methodically compare movement dynamics. Applying this synthesised framework the 
protest cycles of the NLC and the MST are compared, namely the emerging phase, the 
stabilisation and decline/resurgence phase.  
 The study points to a complex network of reasons for varying rural activism. In South 
Africa an overall demobilising constellation of important movement dynamics led to the 
collapse of the NLC and the weakening of the rural grassroots. Political opportunities changed 
from overly exclusive to overly inclusive in South Africa whereby the NLC’s resource 
mobilisation became narrowly institutionalised; containing most oppositional forces at the 
national and local level. In Brazil, in contrast, political opportunities remained ambivalent 
throughout MST existence; thereby providing enough loopholes to achieve partial success and 
yet maintaining the critical distance and constraints which necessitates and legitimates 
grassroots mobilisation. In Brazil, land distribution has been singled out early as the prime 
source for deprivation and consequently served as a vantage point for framing processes 
which stimulated a coherent idea of landlessness and the legitimation of land occupations. 
The exclusive/inclusive dichotomy of the South African society with its strong racial 
overtones led to framing processes which interpret land reform as an exclusive state affair; 
thereby discouraging land occupations and merging land with the broad context of social 
injustice in South Africa. The thesis concludes that the historically constructed and 
contemporarily continued racial dichotomy of South Africa’s society has ultimately hampered 
rural movement dynamics in South Africa. 
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Opsomming 
Die doel van die tesis is om die verskille in aktivisme dinamiek van 
grondhervormingsbewegings in Suid-Afrika en Brasilië te verduidelik. Die verskillende in 
terme van nasionale organisasie en intensiteit is merkwaardig gegewe dat beide state 
gekenmerk word deur soortgelyke grond en armoede ongelykhede. In Brasilïe is ’n sterk en 
nasionaal georganiseerde beweging, die Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais-Sem Terra 
(MST) gevestig as die leidende grondhervormingsbeweging, terwyl Suid-Afrika se Nasionale 
Grond Komitee (National Land Committee, NLC) swak gebly het en eindelik as ’n beweging 
verval het. Suid-Afrika word vandag gekenmerk deur die afwesigheid van ’n nasionale 
artikulasie van die belange van grondloses met gebrekkige pogings om hul belange op 
plaaslike vlak te verteenwoordig. Ten einde die kwessie sistematies en omvattend aan te 
spreek, verskaf die tesis eerstens ’n historiese konteks van die politieke ekonomie van grond 
in beide state ten einde verskille en soortgelykhede uit te wys. Hierna word die MST en die 
NLC sistematies vergelyk. Deur gebruik te maak van kontemporêre sosiale bewegingsteorie 
word ‘n gesintetiseerde teoretiese raamwerk – wat fokus op Politieke Geleenthede, Hulpbron 
Mobilisering en Orienteringsprosesse – voorgestel om metodologies die dinamiek van die 
bewegings te ontleed. Deur die gesintetiseerde raamwerk toe te pas, word die protes siklusse 
van die NLC en die MST vergelyk, naamlik die ontstaan fase, die stabiliseringsfase en die 
verval/herlewingsfase.  
 Die studie ontrafel ‘n kompleks netwerk van redes vir gedifferensieerde grondaktivisme. 
In Suid-Afrika het ‘n reeks demoboliserende faktore gelei tot die verval van die NLC en die 
verswakking van plattelandse organiasies op voetsoolvlak. Politieke geleenthede het verander 
van eksplisiet eksklusief na eksplisiet inklusiewe prosesse waardeur die NLC se basis vir 
hulpbron mobilisering baie nou geinstitusionaliseerd geword het en waardeur meeste aktiviste 
op nasionale en plaaslike vlak gekoopteer is. In Brasilïe in teenstelling het politieke 
geleenthede tydens die MST se bestaan ambivalent gebly en as gevolg daarvan voldoende 
ruimte gebied om ‘n kritieke afstand teenoor die staat in te neem. In Brasilïe is 
grondhervorming reeds lank gelede geidentifiseer as die oorsaak vir ontneming en het 
gevolglik gedien as die basis vir mobilisering rondom grondbesit en die legitimering van 
onwettige grond okkupasie. Die eksklusief/inklusief dichotomie van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
samelewing met gepaardgaande ras-kompleksiteit het gelei tot prosesse waardeur 
grondhervorming as ‘n ekslusiewe staats kwessie gesien is wat daardeur onwettige grond 
besettings verminder het en die debat rondom grondhervorming vetroebel het as net nog ‘n 
geval van sosiale ongeregtigheid. Daar word tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die historiese 
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konstruksie en voortgesette rasse konteks waarbinne grondhervoming in Suid-Afrika 
plaasvind, die moontlikheid vir ‘n soortgelyke aktivistiese grondhervormingsbeweging soos 
in Brasilïe kniehalter. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Research question     
This study is guided by the question: why do two countries with similar rural disparities 
experience a very different outcome of rural activism? South Africa and Brazil are both 
known for their inequality in land distribution and its associated problems. Yet, both have 
shown completely different developments in terms of rural organisation; with the result that 
today there exists a strong nationally organised rural movement in Brazil lobbying for land 
reform and associated services, whereas South Africa is characterised by a complete lack of a 
national representation of rural interests and shows only timid local attempts to address land 
inequality.  
 In South Africa and Brazil, land distribution is a legacy of colonial practices and the 
present agricultural sector is characterised by a dual agrarian economy, with large 
commercialised holdings producing mainly export crops versus community or family farms 
working at the subsistence level on the margins of society. Land ownership in both countries 
remains highly distorted and is historically tied to power politics and violence. Brazil has an 
extremely concentrated landholding structure. According to the 2006 Agricultural Census, 
0.91% of landowners have holdings large than 1 000 hectares and occupy 43% of the total 
farm land, while 84.4% who have less than 100 hectares occupy only 24.3% of the 
agricultural area in Brazil1 (Globo, 2009; IBGE, 2006). In South Africa, land inequality has a 
strong racial background. Available figures that illustrate the racially skewed distribution of 
land go back to 1936, as land distribution between white and black South Africans was fixed 
and apparently not altered substantially until 1990. According to these figures, 600 000 white 
farmers occupied 87% of agricultural land in South Africa, which left black African people, 
who constitute the large majority of South Africa’s population, with 13%.2 Since 1994 there 
have been efforts to redistribute 30% to black African people; of which only 6.7% have been 
transferred so far (Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, 2009: 1, Hall, 2009:4).  
                                               
1 In 1995, 1% of landholders held more than 1 000 ha and controlled 52.7% of the private land. Eighty-three per 
cent of landholders held less than 100 ha and controlled 11.3% of all agricultural land. 
2 There are national agricultural censuses of 2002 and 2006, yet none of them provide figures on farm size and 
ownership structure. They instead focus on income, debt and crop patterns.  
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 The existence of these dual and highly skewed agricultural economies is regarded by 
many scholars and practitioners as one reason for South Africa’s and Brazil’s persistently 
stark economic inequalities despite their growing and increasingly advanced economies 
(Cliffe, 2009; Greenberg, 2009; Hall, 2009a; Pithouse, 2009). These relatively positive 
economic developments were based on rapid industrialisation, the inflow of foreign capital 
and the establishment of a strong export sector in the 20th century, and enabled South Africa 
and Brazil to assume leading positions on their respective continents, which also made them 
to important middle powers in world politics. The economic inequality has however remained 
characteristic for both countries despite recent positive changes. According to the 2009 UN 
Human Development Report, Brazil’s Gini-coefficient3 has decline slightly from 56.7 in 2005 
to 55.0 in 2008. The Gini-coefficient for South Africa has declined from 65 in 2005 to 57.8 in 
2008 (United Nations, 2009). The scale of the discrepancy also becomes evident when 
comparing the income or expenditure share of the richest 10% of the population to that of the 
poorest 10%. Brazil’s richest 10% constitute 40% of Brazil’s gross national product, while in 
South Africa it is 35.1%. In comparison, in India this percentage is 8.6 and in China 13.2 
(United Nations, 2009).  
 The highly skewed agricultural sector is generally regarded as one hindrance to a more 
even development. It is argued that a productive and balanced agrarian sector in the long term 
will provide a springboard for rural populations to gradually integrate into the secondary and 
tertiary sector of an economy, while in times of recession it can to some degree absorb the 
surplus of labour and thereby avoid impoverishment (see for instance Bezemer & Heady, 
2008; Lipton, 2005; Ravallion, 2009). It is generally acknowledged, however, that a country 
can grow and have a striving agricultural sector without the more even distribution of 
resources. Yet, equal human development in terms of the just distribution of income and equal 
chances to development requires attention to mechanisms that ensure durable resource 
distribution. Land constitutes such an economic resource that can empower people in the long 
term. Land reform, in terms of redistributing land, is therefore regarded as a mechanism to 
address poverty and inequality, in particular in countries with such persistent disparities as 
South Africa and Brazil.4  
 Both countries have implemented land reform, but, as seen above, without convincing 
success, leading to what scholars call the ‘unresolved land question’ (Greenberg, 2004; Hall, 
                                               
3 The Gini-coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households 
deviates from perfect equality. A value of 0 represents absolute equality; a value of 100 is absolute inequality. A 
Gini-coefficient above 50 is considered as ‘unacceptably high’ by the United Nations.   
4 The relationship between land distribution and economic and human development will be reviewed again in 
Section 1.2. 
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2009; Wolford, 2003). Consequently, in both countries land distribution remains factually 
acute amid a highly stratified society. Nevertheless, non-governmental activism, which raises 
awareness of this issue, remains highly unequal in South Africa and Brazil. South Africa did 
experience a period of moderate activism between 1985 and 2005, which was organised 
nationally and focused specifically on land reform and associated services. Throughout its 
existence, however, activism in South Africa remained very much detached from the 
grassroots. Presently, there is no national organisation in South Africa that focuses on land 
reform and rural issues. Activism is limited to local campaigns with very diverse agendas. In 
contrast, Brazil experienced the growth and consolidation of a large national grassroots 
organisation with a strong focus on land reform and presently widespread activism.  
 One might argue that over time the economic need for land has become less acute in South 
Africa, since more people are able to generate sufficient income in urban centres or in 
established rural businesses. This is however not the case. Rural poverty is more widespread 
in South Africa than in Brazil. According to 2003 data of the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD), 41% of the rural population in Brazil live below the 
national poverty line, which constitutes a decrease of 10.4% since 1998 (International Fund 
for Agricultural Development, 2009). In South Africa, 65% of the rural population still lived 
below the national poverty line in 2004 (Machete, 2004). Overall, Brazil has made much 
better advances in poverty reduction than South Africa. In Brazil, 12.7% of the population 
lives below two dollars a day; in South Africa, this percentage is 42.9 (United Nations, 2009). 
Furthermore, the Human Development Index5 (HDI) indicates that South Africa falls behind 
Brazil in terms of overall human development. The HDI for Brazil increased from 0.694 in 
1985 to 0.813 in 2007. In South Africa it remained somewhat stagnant with 0.680 in 1985 and 
0.683 in 2007 (United Nations, 2009). Furthermore, urban-rural population distribution would 
in fact favour rural activism in South Africa, as its rural population still accounts for 42% of 
the total population (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2006). In contrast, Brazil’s rural 
population has diminished sharply to only 16% (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2006). 
This disparity becomes even more evident when looking at the economically active 
population in agriculture. While in South Africa, 42% live in rural areas, only 8% are active in 
the agricultural sector, whereas in Brazil, 15% are economically active in agriculture (Food 
and Agriculture Organization, 2006). Accordingly, the Human Sciences Research Council 
(HSRC) of South Africa has placed rural unemployment between 40 and 50% in 2005 
                                               
5 The HDI is a composite index measuring average achievements in three basic human achievements – a long 
and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. With 0.971, Norway maintains the highest 
rank.  
 14 
 
(Human Sciences Research Council, 2005). This translates into a relative larger amount of 
rural surplus labour in South Africa than in Brazil.  
 While figures can never provide a full picture, one can reasonable deduce from these 
statistics that from an economic need perspective, land activism should be lower in Brazil 
than in South Africa, as Brazil has been relatively more successful in absorbing labour from 
its countryside and in improving its overall as well as rural poverty rate. Having concluded 
that land inequality remains an issue in both countries and that rural South Africans are even 
much stronger affected by it since their economy cannot sufficiently provide for non-
agricultural income opportunities, rural activism should theoretically be higher in South 
Africa as the associated grievances are stronger. Yet, the fact remains that rural activism is 
much more prevalent and active in Brazil than in South Africa. Based on these considerations, 
one can conclude that activism does not necessarily depend on grievances, but on other 
dynamics that cause activism to emerge, to organise and to sustain. Accordingly, this study 
aims to explore this question of differing rural activism in South Africa and Brazil by looking 
at other influential dynamics of rural activism. 
  
1.2 Rationale of study 
1.2.1 Land reform and rural movements 
The important role of agriculture in human development and overall economic growth is a 
generally acknowledged fact today. There is a truly substantial body of academic work on 
economic theory, economic history and contemporary empirical analysis that strongly 
supports this claim. Dorner (1972) and Ghimire (2001) have, for instance, shown that 
agriculture is a relatively labour-intensive source of employment and therefore creates 
additional employment with low entry barriers. A growing agriculture sector provides cheap 
food,6 raw material and demand for non-agriculture goods and rural infrastructure, triggering 
the growth of rural non-agricultural businesses that can gradually absorb rural surplus labour. 
This gradual spiral facilitates overall economic growth and poverty reduction in the long term. 
In terms of economic history, Adelman and Morris (1988) have put forward an argument that 
those Western countries that experienced strong agricultural performance in the 19th century 
subsequently developed most rapidly. The more recent experiences in Taiwan, South Korea 
and China also point to the importance of pre- or concurrent agricultural development for 
                                               
6 It needs to be noted however that there is a tradeoff. If food prices stay too low, disposable income of the rural 
population and thereby their demand for non-agrarian goods is negatively affected.  
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their industrialisation (Laffont & Qian, 1999). Contemporary empirical analyses have 
attempted to measure the multiplier effect7 of the agricultural sector. Bezemer and Heady 
(2008:1345) conducted an extensive literature review on cross-country comparisons of 
multiplier effects and state that all studies find that “agricultural gains have the strongest 
linkage of all sectors to growth in other sectors and to aggregate growth”. Due to agriculture’s 
important external effects, discussed above, its contribution to growth and poverty alleviation 
is significantly larger than its mere gross domestic product share would suggest.  
 Yet, this positive contribution of agriculture to poverty alleviation is conditional on 
distributional patterns. There are numerous contributions of scholars and practitioners that 
show that an egalitarian land distribution favours a pro-poor development path in a multitude 
of ways. Wegenast (2009) has shown in a study on Brazil that states characterised by a more 
egalitarian land distribution and less dominance of powerful landlords exhibit better 
educational coverage. According to Lipton (2005), productivity growth on small family farms 
is particularly pro-poor due to their lower labour-related transaction costs and more family 
workers per hectare. For developing countries with a general low capital per unskilled worker, 
this represents opportunities to gradually (and cheaply) integrate large amounts of people into 
the economy. Other scholars point to small farmers as the key to regional food security. Most 
basic food crops are grown by small farmers, often in polycultures, which reduces the need 
for pesticides and makes more efficient use of water, light and nutrients (Altieri, 1999a). 
Deininger (1999) and Altieri (1999) further argue that small farms are effectively more 
productive than large farms. “By managing fewer resources more intensively, small farmers 
are able to make more profit per unit of output, and thus make more total profit – even if 
production of each commodity is less” (Altieri, 1999:n.p.). In Brazil, 4.4 million 
establishments are described as family farms in 2006. They account for 84.4% of all farms 
and occupy only 24.3% of the agricultural area. However, they were responsible for 
producing 70% of beans consumed in the country, 87% of cassava, 58% of milk, 46% of corn, 
and 34% of coffee and rice in 2006 (Globo, 2009; IBGE, 2006). This makes small family 
farms in Brazil the most productive agricultural entity in Brazil and key players in regional 
food security.  
 In order for family farms to substantially contribute to poverty reduction and food 
security, Lipton (2005:viiii) stresses the importance of eliminating binding land and water 
constraints in the agrarian sector. Rural poverty alleviation “depends on availability, quality, 
                                               
7 The multiplier effect gauges the impact of a sector’s growth rate on other sector’s growth rates, or each sector’s 
growth contribution to the total growth rate. 
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and distribution of farmland (and water)”. This land/water distribution precondition for family 
farming is largely violated in Latin America and Southern Africa, where large parts of 
farmland and agricultural growth are not in labour-intensive smallholdings. Land reform 
consequently remains urgent as a growth-enhancing and poverty-reducing long-term measure 
(Lipton, 2005).  
 Redistributive land-reform approaches found in the world can be imperfectly summarised 
in two kinds: state-led and market-led agrarian reform (often referred to as MLAR). MLAR 
attempts to create or maintain private property rights for the purpose of establishing a rural 
market. The transfer of land is based on the willing buyer–willing seller principle, where 
seller and buyer agree on a price determined by demand and supply of land. Therefore, 
MLAR inherently follows free-market principles and represented the development policy of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank during the 1990s. In order to assist 
poor buyers to acquire land, the state as well as the financial sector is asked to provide credit 
options and post-settlement assistance (Deininger, 1999; Wolford, 2007). State-led land 
reform, on the other hand, is conceived and implemented by a national government through 
bureaucratic top-down modalities. Depending on the political and legal system, state-led 
agrarian reforms can range from forceful expropriations without compensation to state 
purchases of freely available land at market prices (Sikor & Mueller, 2009; Wolford, 2007). 
 The effectiveness of the two approaches in transforming land patterns is still a source of 
much discussion in the scholarly community. Market-led approaches are accused of being too 
expensive, despite state assistance, for the rural poor and of facilitating indebtedness. 
Furthermore, critics note that the market mechanism does not utilise the poverty-reduction 
function of land reform, as it inherently favours ‘economically viable’ beneficiaries 
(Greenberg, 2004). Market-oriented land reform is also prone to price fluctuations and may 
come to a complete standstill if property prices are sky-rocketing (Sauer, 2006, Wolford, 
2007). State-led land reform, on the other hand, is described as an inflexible and overly 
bureaucratic top-down affair (Pereira, 2007). Consequently, they do not find support from the 
relevant local actors and cannot sufficiently provide for varying meanings of land and socio-
economic contexts (Sikor & Mueller, 2009). 
 Notwithstanding the limits of the land-reform approaches described above, it is generally 
acknowledged in the academic and practitioner community that to stimulate and direct land 
reform towards establishing a prosperous smallholder sector amid commercialised agriculture, 
an organised and eloquent voice of the landless and poor ought to be present. If land reform, 
whether market- or state-led, is to venture beyond modernising agriculture and address rural 
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poverty as a long-term target, constant input from the rural population is required (Hall, 
2009a; Lahiff, 2008; Weideman, 2004). Lahiff, for instance, argues with reference to South 
Africa that without popular participation in the land-reform process, the selection process of 
beneficiaries is distorted and therefore largely ineffective in establishing successful farmer 
communities. Furthermore, Wolford (2003) points out that credit, infrastructure assistance and 
other kinds of settlement support are designed and allocated more efficiently when rural 
organisations actively participate. In terms of post-settlement assistance, rural organisations 
can also play a very important part in training settlers. This important role in land reform has 
been taken over by the MST in Brazil, for instance (Wolford, 2003). As this requires close 
contact with beneficiaries, regular feedback on progress or failures is established, which may 
lead to progressively better adjustments in land policy and local livelihood strategies (Sikor & 
Mueller, 2009).  
 Malawi is cited as a successful community-based land-reform project, where the early 
involvement of communities in designing and implementing the reform resulted in a striving 
smallholder sector that turned the country from a maize importer to a maize exporter 
(Kanyongolo, 2005; Lahiff, 2008). The case of the Philippines also illustrates the impact of 
nationally organised peasant movements, which, despite powerful landholding elites, 
pressured the government to redistribute 80% of the agricultural land to the landless (Feranil, 
2005).  
 Despite the above-mentioned positive contributions of rural activism, a word of caution is 
required. One cannot argue that rural activism automatically leads to successful land reform. 
Examples such as Zimbabwe, where productive farms were invaded, causing widespread 
famine and violence, illustrate the absolute opposite effect. Brazil also shows that the 
existence of a highly organised rural movement does not necessarily lead to extensive and 
rapid changes in land distribution, but nevertheless has contributed to reviving and directing 
land reform in a pro-poor direction, as is outlined below. Instead of seeing rural activism as 
the ultimate condition for a ‘good’ land reform, the argument of this section is that rural 
activism is only one important component of land reform, in particular with reference to 
equity concerns. Many other dimensions play a part and may, despite rural activism, cause 
land reform to fail.  
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1.2.2 Land-reform policies in South Africa and Brazil 
South Africa’s and Brazil’s land-reform policies include elements of state-led and market-led 
land reform, yet the weighting of the respective policies is different in the two countries. 
South Africa’s democratic government in 1994 opted for a three-pronged land-reform policy, 
which includes a tenure reform programme, land restitution and land redistribution. Only the 
last two forms represent an actual change of land-ownership structures. Land restitution 
involves the transfer of land dispossessed by the apartheid regime after 1913 or the equivalent 
cash payment to the previous owners. This process is largely state-led, as the South African 
government buys land at market prices through the Land Claims Commission. However, 
equity share arrangements have also been established, where the owners continue their 
respective businesses and the claimant(s) obtains profits shares and a voice in management 
affairs (Greenberg, 2009a). While initially relatively successful, recent restitution claims are 
stagnating due to very high property prices and controversial claims including business 
districts and mining areas.  
  Land redistribution follows market rules, as it is fully based on the willing seller–willing 
buyer principle. The government assists the landless through acquisition grants. The 
Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) provided a once-off payment of R16 000 per 
household for purchasing land from a ‘willing seller’. The relative low grant resulted in large 
groups (up to 500 households) buying farms that were far too small to support all of the 
beneficiaries as full-time farmers, which led to a very high failure rate (Hall, 2004:215) From 
2000 onwards, this grant was replaced by the Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development programme (LRAD), which requires an individual contribution and targets 
qualified farmers (Weideman, 2004:220). Land redistribution in South Africa has therefore 
taken the form of supporting black commercialised farming enterprises. Of the 6.7% of 
agricultural land transferred in South Africa, 46% was transferred through the restitution 
programme and 54% through redistribution. Hence, state-led and market-led land-reform 
policies assume approximate equal weights.  
 Brazil’s land-reform policy shows a different picture. The first component of Brazil’s 
land-reform policy is the market-led initiative, introduced during President Cardoso’s years 
(1995–2002) in cooperation with the IMF. Called cedula or land credit, it provided credit to 
landless families and poor smallholders prepared to form associations and buy property 
collectively, specifically for the north-eastern region (Sauer, 2006:180). Later on, a 
nationwide Land Bank was established to expand the project. Cedula was stopped temporarily 
during the reign of President Lula da Silva, but in 2004 it was reintroduced as the National 
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Programme of Land Credit. In Brazil the dominant form of transferring land follows the state-
led approach based on expropriations. Eighty-five per cent of land transfers in Brazil take 
place through expropriations (Navarro, 2009:8). Large private farms, called latifúndios, need 
to meet certain productivity criteria in order to fulfil their legally required social function. If 
they fail to do so, they become targets for expropriation. Expropriations are solely carried out 
by the National Institute for Colonisation and Land Reform (Instituto Nacional de 
Colonização e Reforma Agrária [INCRA]). Landowners are compensated with cash or public 
bonds at market prices, which may only fully be redeemed in 20 years (Navarro, 2009:3). 
Beneficiaries generally also receive post-settlement grants for seed, housing and equipment.  
 It is interesting to note that a study conducted in 2004 found that 86% of land beneficiaries 
initiated the expropriation process through movement activity (Leite, Heredia, Medeiros & 
Palmeira, 2006). Rural activism plays a fundamental role in regularly reviving Brazil’s state-
led land-reform process and in directing it to pro-poor initiatives, as historically, INCRA has 
been extremely slow and corrupt in its duties and the landowning elite frequently blocks 
reform projects. It is a general acknowledged fact that in Brazil “very little land redistribution 
would have been accomplished in the absence of substantial mass protest” (Ondetti, 
2008:229). It has even been argued the market-led land reform was implemented “in order to 
introduce a market mechanism that could compete with the MST for the support of landless 
rural workers, and thus reduce the political pressure caused by land occupations and the 
political ascension of the MST” (Pereira, 2007:7).  
 As stated in Section 1.2, official figures show that land distribution in Brazil has not 
changed substantially since 1995, despite a reported total of 60 689 941 hectares of 
transferred land through land reform, which represents roughly 16.2% of Brazil’s arable land8 
(Ondetti, 2008:229). Ondetti (2008:229) argues, however, that in the Latin American context 
with a history of violent undemocratic land reforms, which have also partially been rolled 
back, Brazil’s democratic and ongoing land reform must nevertheless be considered a 
“significant political achievement”. Notwithstanding the scanty redistributive results, the 
MST has not only kept a democratic process of land reform alive by repeatedly bringing it 
back on the political agenda, it also directed land reform on a pro-poor path.  
 The MST has succeeded in actively providing and stimulating extensive post-settlement 
service to land beneficiaries (Ondetti, 2008; Rosset, 2001). Thereby they fill a gap, which is 
                                               
8 Pacheco (2009) notes that is difficult to assess the impact of land reform on land distribution in Brazil since 
there is no detailed information available on how much public land in relation to private land was in fact 
transferred, in particular with reference to the Amazon frontiers, which have historically served as a source of 
‘free’ land. 
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considered a major issue in contemporary land reform, as is the case in South Africa, where 
the failure to provide infrastructure, market access and agricultural training to beneficiaries 
has resulted in a 50% failure rate of land-reform projects (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 
2008; State bungling threatens to turn land reform into a national crisis, 2008). Furthermore, 
the MST has substantially contributed to the establishment of a nation-wide family-based 
agriculture sector which, as stated before, contributes considerably to Brazil’s regional food 
security (Navarro, 2009:7). In some cases, villages have developed into small commercial and 
service-providing centres, attracting other people and businesses (Leite et al., 2006). The 2004 
study shows that land-reform settlements provide an important source of rural employment, 
with 79% only working on the plot and 11% on the plot and elsewhere (Leite et al., 2006). 
 The MST has been crucial in maintaining state-support in the form of credit programmes, 
and technical assistance to the rural poor (Wright & Wolford, 2003). The 2004 study has 
shown that 81% of settler families benefited from development credit, 72% from housing 
credit and 75% from food credit (Leite et al., 2006). South Africa’s land reform, on the other 
hand, has overly focused on commercially viable farmers and approximately 200 000 small- 
and medium-scale producers in South Africa have “attracted the least agricultural (and 
infrastructural) support and investment” (Hall, 2009a:3). In terms of income, most settlers are 
still considered poor in Brazilian standards. Yet, when asked to assess the change in their 
overall living conditions, 91% stated that they are substantially better off than they were 
before being settled (Leite et al., 2006). Despite still belonging to the poorest of Brazil’s 
population in terms of income, evidence suggests that land beneficiaries are eating better, 
have better housing and schools and have attained a level of security – very important 
preconditions for future human development.      
 Compared to South Africa’s land reform, Brazil’s land reform has maintained a pro-poor 
outlook by being substantially more effective in settling people on small-scale family farms 
and providing them with post-settlement assistance (International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, 2009). One can reasonably argue that the MST’s influential activism has 
contributed to Brazil’s increased overall human development, as reported in Section 1.1. The 
lack of an organised and influential rural voice in South Africa has in this regard been raised 
by scholars as one reason for land reform deviating from its pro-poor function as well as for 
losing its political urgency in South Africa (Cliffe, 2009; Greenberg, 2009a; Hall, 2009; 
Lahiff, 2008). Why rural mobilisation has, despite obvious grievances and delivery 
stagnation, remained weak and eventually collapsed in South Africa will be the focus of 
chapters 3 and 4.  
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1.3 Research methodology 
Based on the issues raised in section 1.1 one can conclude that activism does not necessarily 
depend on grievances, but on other dynamics which cause activism to emerge, to organise and 
to sustain. Scholars have in this regard pointed to the important role of history in shaping the 
context within which activism takes place (McAdam, 1996:xiii). Thus a historical study 
provides insights into the trajectories of rural activism. In particular, the analysis of protest 
cycles of rural activism, namely emergence, growth and decline, allow tracing processes and 
changes over time. The histories of Brazil and South are without a doubt different and 
therefore provided different environments for activism to flourish. Yet, this conclusion 
remains too broad and therefore unsatisfactory for social scientists wishing to detect more or 
less specific similarities and differences between countries that may explain different 
trajectories for activism despite similar grievances. Charles Tilly (1984) has in this regard 
brought some theoretical rigor to the scholarly community wishing to compare social 
phenomena such as activism across countries and across time. When comparing large 
structures and huge processes, Tilly states that a fruitful comparison is a “generalised 
comparison” where one “[establishes] a principle of variation in the character or intensity of a 
phenomenon by examining systematic differences among instances” (1984:93).  
 Since I wish to explore the variation in character and intensity of rural activism in South 
Africa and Brazil, I have followed a generalised comparison by examining systematic 
differences between instances in South Africa and Brazil. In this regard, I have selected a 
specific instance or case of rural activism, namely rural movements. There are very different 
understandings of what a movement characterises. Some scholars draw a strict distinction 
between non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and grassroots groups, arguing that NGOs 
are completely different expressions of activism due to their hierarchical structures and 
tactical professionalism (Nauta, 2004; Petras, 2001). Grassroots groups, it is argued, rely 
more on spontaneous activism, are detached from governmental structures and therefore more 
radical in their tactics. While acknowledging these differences in movements in the analysis, 
this study does not categorise movements from the outset but rather adapts the perspectives of 
Tarrow (1998) and McAdam (1996). They argue that in order to compare movements across 
countries and across time, scholars should view movement form as a variable. Therefore, they 
array movements along a continuum from the narrowest institutionalised groups on the one 
pole to revolutionising efforts on the other. This perspective facilitates an analysis that views 
movement character and intensity as responding to differences “in the nature of opportunities 
that set movements in motion” (McAdam, 1996:29). Their definition of movements is 
 22 
 
therefore broad and focuses on the interactive as well as cooperative element of movements. 
They describe movements as “[c]ollective challenges based on common purposes and social 
solidarity, in sustained interaction with elites, opponent and authorities” (Tarrow, 1998:4).  
 Employing this definition of movements, I selected two specific movements: for South 
Africa the National Land Committee (NLC) and for Brazil the Movimento dos Trabalhadores 
Rurais Sem-Terra (MST). Both movements have the broad characteristics outlined above. 
The NLC emerged during the democratic opening of South Africa in 1985 and was based on 
the common purpose of lobbying for land reform and rural advancement in South Africa. It 
was a union of separate land movements that collaborated on a national level and interacted 
extensively with elites and authorities. In 2005 the NLC was dissolved, leaving no nationally 
organised successor movement behind. The MST emerged during Brazil’s turn to democracy 
in 1985. Its struggle is based on the common purpose of land reform and post-settlement 
assistance. Its nucleus can be found in grassroots groupings of the landless organising their 
protest in nationwide camps and strike actions. In this way they interacted in a multitude of 
ways with opponents, elites and authorities.  
 In my effort to conduct a generalised comparison of these two case studies of rural 
movements in South Africa and Brazil, I needed to examine differences in a systematic way. 
This meant to identify generalised triggers of movement activity other than grievances and to 
contrast them in both countries in a methodical way. For this aim, it was useful to turn to 
exiting knowledge on social movement theory, which suggests a variety of generalised 
triggers for movement activity. In Section 1.5 of this introductory chapter I provide a detailed 
literature outline of this existing theory, evaluate it according to its applicability and arrive at 
a synthesised approach, which will structure and direct the study on the NLC and MST in the 
subsequent chapters 3 and 4. Applying the synthesised theoretical framework, the study will 
utilise qualitative and occasionally statistical data in order to present the empirical cases. A 
substantial amount of scholarly work of secondary literature has been reviewed. Additionally, 
annual reports and newsletters of the NLC and to a lesser degree of the MST were used as 
primary literature sources. Also information obtained from personal email communications 
with Stephen Greenberg a former NLC activists augmented the study.   
 The entire study is essentially a cross-national comparison of rural movement history 
between South Africa and Brazil, with particular methodical emphasis on two specific 
movements. It is therefore a very extensive analysis, as comprehensiveness and method is 
required to minimise bias and to successfully extract some insights into rural mobilisation in 
general. 
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1.4 Perspectives on social movements: A literature review  
How can one examine differences systematically in order to explain variations of social 
movements and, in this regard, rural movements? In order to approach this question, the more 
elementary question of why movements emerge in the first place needs to be addressed. This 
can provide insights into the constellation of dynamics that motivate people to engage in 
collective actions. The unpacking of this constellation of dynamics has been a subject of 
interest for many sociologists and economic and political scientists, as it is a social 
phenomenon that essentially impacts on all areas of life. For the same reason, social 
movement theory is enormously complex and diverse, appearing rather as a puzzle than a 
coherent theory. Attempts to identify and categorise dynamics or mechanisms of social 
movements have given rise to numerous controversies about the appropriate paradigm. In 
view of the complexity of the subject, it is understandable and one might deduce from it that it 
is unreasonable to make such an attempt at all. Consequently, one could argue for a mere 
focus on specific cases of social/rural movements, explaining their origin, development and 
outcome within their particular system. Yet, the very essence of social science is to detect 
mechanisms of social change that apply broadly to different areas of society and therefore can 
be used to judge or even predict social evolution. The advancement of social theory depends 
ultimately on our ability to identify such mechanisms without daring to declare them a 
complete theory. The development of theories that are generalisable, but acknowledge their 
limits and thereby leave space for further theorising, is one of the goals of science after all. In 
line with this argument, Campbell reasons “[a]lthough no social mechanism is likely to 
operate in every situation, some mechanism may operate in several situations, so their 
specification enable us to generalise beyond atheoretical descriptions of a single case but 
without necessarily making claims about universal laws” (Campbell, 2005:43). 
 
1.4.1 Grievance perspective 
Scholars have suggested several general mechanisms that led to the emergence of social 
movements. One of the earliest was the grievance perspective, which explains the rise of 
discontent due to the collective deprivation of goods or resources. This perspective emerged 
largely in response to the experiences of industrialisation and proletarisation in the 19th 
century. Marxism views workers’ protest mainly, but not exclusively, in this perspective. The 
increasing exploitation of workers and the underlining class structures were seen as reasons 
for the emergence of organised social struggles. Yet, although Marx and Engels rightly saw 
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the social structure as the root of the problem, they underestimated the importance of 
resources needed to engage in collective action as well as the unifying frame that pools 
people’s energies (Tarrow, 1998:11). Post-World War II social movement theory, often 
referred to as ‘collective behaviour theory’, also tended to view protest actions as responding 
to ‘structural strain’ (Smelser, 1962) and feelings of frustration and anger due to socio-
economic isolation (Kornhauser, 1959). Likewise, the ‘relative deprivation theory’ developed 
in the 1960s and 1970s emphasises feelings of grievances; yet it also points to the importance 
of the difference between expectations and actual treatment of people. Relative deprivation 
theorists argue that people feel deprived when they do not receive the treatment or rewards 
they merit compared to other sections of the population (Gurr, 1970). This theory developed 
amid the American civil-rights movement, which fought against the racial discrimination of 
African Americans in the USA. In South Africa, the liberation struggle against the apartheid 
regime gave impetus to this movement theory.  
 The grievance perspective has also been central to the study of rural movements. With the 
rise of industrialisation in developing countries such as Latin America and Africa, studies on 
rural activism have been inspired by Marx’s ideas of increasing peasant proletarisation and 
exploitation by land owners and industrialists. Wolf (1969) and Scott (1976), for instance, 
have explained peasant activism in general terms as a response to the commercialisation of 
agriculture, which disrupts the traditional ways of subsistence agriculture and local social 
hierarchy. Tilly (1964) and Migdal (1974) have also argued that peasant discontent may also 
grow due to penetration of the state into former isolated areas and may subsequently introduce 
new regulations such as taxation. At this point it needs to be noted that only a few scholars, 
writing in the tradition of grievance theory, referred to the actual reasons that sparked protest, 
as most studies were concerned with the long-term analysis of shifting rural situations fuelling 
discontent. Scott (1976), for instance, attributed peasant revolts not only to underlining social 
changes, but to the short-term breakout of famines. Likewise, the emergence of the Shining 
Path guerrilla movement was due to an immediate food crisis in Peru, as has been argued by 
McClintock (2001). While these explanations of long-term as well as acute pressure appear 
logical as one reason for collective action, they can neither suffice as a generalised condition 
for the emergence of movements, nor account for movements’ different growth trajectories. 
As people feel deprived in one way or another at many moments and in many locations, 
grievance theory has difficulties explaining why some of these people form movements and 
others do not. In addition, grievance theory traces different growth trajectories of movements 
primarily to the varying impact of grievances on people. Yet, South Africa’s and Brazil’s 
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situations illustrates that rural activism can differ substantially despite grievances, in this case 
unequal land distribution being similar and rural poverty being relatively worse in South 
Africa compared to Brazil. 
 
1.4.2 Resource-mobilisation theory 
In response to these conceptual dilemmas, a second influential theoretical perspective 
emerged during the 1970s and 1980s, which focused mainly on the capacity of groups to 
organise social struggles. The central idea of the resource-mobilisation theory is that the 
ability to organise and maintain collective action is facilitated by the presence of certain social 
structures and resources (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996). Scholars of this school 
distanced themselves from the idea that grievance is the only variable in explaining movement 
activity. By analysing the means available to actors, they shifted the scholarly attention from 
why movements emerge to how they accomplish it. McCarthy and Zald (1977) pioneered 
research into the ‘professionalisation’ of collective action by demonstrating how movements 
can organise and expand their activities through external financial resources and skills as well 
as increasing formalisation of their protest actions. In essence, their theory did not specifically 
address the emergence of movements, but mapped a new social movement form – the 
professional social movements – which particularly became active in America during the 
1970s and 1980s.  
 In contrast, McAdam (1982) emphasises the importance of pre-existing grassroots 
structures in facilitating movement organisation. Small-group associations such as churches, 
clubs, neighbourhood associations and tribal groups can create incentives to participate in 
movements. McAdam (1982) reasons that established social networks can facilitate a group 
consciousness through ‘cognitive liberation’ that attributes present grievances to the broad 
social order and thereby strategically directs micro-mobilisation. Furthermore, social 
networks can contribute with existing skills, a membership base and leadership experience. In 
this regard, existing organisational structures can be critical in explaining why some groups 
mobilise and others do not. There are numerous studies demonstrating this often crucial 
relationship. Houtzager (2001), for instance, has shown how the Catholic Church, through its 
local mission stations, was very influential in organising rural workers in Brazil before and 
during the years of military dictatorship.  
 It has been argued by scholars that in the absence of non-peasant activists such as middle-
class intellectuals or party activists, spontaneous rural uprisings are unlikely to be sustainable, 
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in particular if the movement’s base is constituted by poor, uneducated individuals (Huizer, 
1972). For example, Bundy (1987), in his study on rural uprisings in South Africa during the 
1920s, attributes their weakness to a lack of support by intellectuals of the liberation 
movements, as their focus was on urban centres and the struggle for civil rights. However, 
scholars have also pointed out that the influx of intellectuals’ skill and finances can lead to an 
increased institutionalisation of the movement, which might be detrimental to its success 
(Piven & Cloward, 1977). Nauta (2004) has shown in a detailed account of a small rural 
organisation in South Africa, the Monti Rural Association, how the increased incorporation of 
donors, party officials and legislators caused the organisation to lose touch with its local 
community and hence became dysfunctional.  
 In this regard, movement analysts have argued that the choice of organisational structure is 
critical for the long-term prospects of the movement. However, there is no agreement on 
whether centralised formal structures or decentralised grassroots organisations are more 
efficient. Tarrow puts forward an argument that “the most effective forms of organisation are 
based on partly autonomous and contextually rooted local units linked by connective 
structures, and coordinated by formal organisations” (Tarrow, 1998:124). Tarrow and his 
colleagues also stress in this respect the importance of tactical repertoires (McAdam, 1982; 
McCarthy, 1996; Tarrow, 1998). Tactical repertoires are in essence the modes of operation 
employed by the movement to attain its goals. Rucht (1996) has argued that different 
organisational structures rely on different modes of operation, claiming that grassroots 
organisations more frequently refer to disruptive measures, while formalised movements rely 
on conventional tactics and alliances with politicians. Yet, Rucht also points out that 
“movements tend to provide ample space to the mushrooming of different structures, ongoing 
organisational experiments, and flexible forms of cooperation” (Rucht, 1996:185–186). A 
number of scholars have argued that relative disruptive tactics are more likely to gain 
adherents and force authorities to cooperate. Conventional tactics, on the other hand, can 
easily be ignored by authorities (McAdam, 1982; Piven & Cloward, 1977; Tarrow, 1998). 
However, McAdam also argued that too violent actions may alienate supporters, divide the 
movement and unite the opposition to resort to more repressive measures. McAdam therefore 
advises that movements must “chart a course that avoids crippling repression on the one hand 
and tactical impotency on the other. Staking out this middle ground is exceedingly difficult. 
Yet failure to do so almost surely spells the demise if the movement” (McAdam, 1982:57). 
 Resource-mobilisation theory has contributed greatly to understanding the internal and 
external structures and resources that make a movement ‘work’. Furthermore, it demonstrates 
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how organisational structures, operation modes and existing social networks can have a 
substantial impact on the long-term development trajectory of a movement. Critics argue, 
however, that this theory has not sufficient explanatory leverage to account for rapid changes 
in the intensity of movement activity over time. Social structures emerge only gradually and 
barring the effects of overwhelming repression, natural disasters or war, they are also 
changing slowly (Ondetti, 2008). One could argue, however, that movements can relatively 
quickly change their tactical repertoires by, for instance, forming a radical wing that exerts 
pressure on authorities. Hence, the debate remains open as to the extent to which resources, 
structures and repertoires account for movement activity.  
 
1.4.3 Political opportunities 
Parallel and in response to the resource-mobilisation theory, a third perspective on movements 
established itself. The concept of political opportunity has so far been the most influential and 
controversial theory on the emergences and development of movements. There is still a great 
variety of definitions, but Tarrow has put forward a description of political opportunity that is 
widely recognised. Political opportunities are “consistent – but not necessarily formal or 
permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to 
undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow, 
1994:85); in other words, a situation of or a change in a governmental structure that makes 
authorities more receptive or vulnerable to the protest actions of movements, which translates 
into increased interests of movement supporters to invest time, effort and other resources in 
the struggle. In contrast, when authorities become more repressive or uninterested, protest 
activities will dwindle as only the most dedicated members will continue to invest into the 
movement. 
 Elements of political opportunity have never been completely absent in the analysis of 
social movements, yet only in the late 1970s it emerged as an elementary analytical 
components of movement activity. In particular, the work of Tarrow (1994; 1998) and 
McAdam (1982) has singled out this perspective. Just like resource theorists they questioned 
the single validity of grievances as reason for the emergence of movements. In contrast to 
resource theorists they however place emphasis on the wider political environment, rather 
than on organisational dynamics. Political opportunity theorists focus particularly on 
explaining the emergence of movements by expanding political opportunity structures. Some 
theorists even claim political opportunity to be the most important reason for the appearance 
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of movements. Tarrow, for instance, declares “movements are created when political 
opportunities open up for social actors who usually lack them” (Tarrow, 1994:35). Yet, 
Goodwin and Jasper (1999), for instance, have strongly argued against this assertion, stating 
that protest often grows under hostile and extremely oppressive authorities and fails to emerge 
where the political opportunities appear to be open. Also other researchers have presented 
evidence showing that repression can lead to increased protest activity (Goldstone & Tilly, 
2001; Oberschall, 1993). The contradictory findings led scholars to assert that the analytical 
task should not be to determine whether repression encourages or suppresses protest, but 
rather to establish “which effect is to be expected under what conditions” (Opp & Roehl, 
1990:523). 
 Scholars have identified numerous possible shifts in the structure of political systems that 
affect the political opportunity structure of movements and hence their conditions for 
mobilisation. Gamson and Meyer (1996) describe these shifts along a continuum, ranging 
from gradual shifts in basic structures to volatile, sudden changes. Opportunities can further 
be narrow and have an effect only on a certain group of people or region, or they can be very 
wide and affect the entire polity (Ondetti, 2008). Therefore, the scope and time scale that are 
under consideration when analysing political opportunity structures can differ substantially in 
studies. The level of analysis ultimately depends on which variation in protest activity – short 
term or long term, local or national – one wishes to address. Researchers often attempt to 
compile lists of political dimensions that contribute to movement activity. McAdam (1996) 
suggests four broad dimensional shifts particularly for the comparative study of movements: 
the relative openness or closeness of political systems; the stability or instability of elite 
alignments; the presence or absence of elite allies; and the state’s capacity and propensity for 
repression. Scholars writing on rural movements have tended to emphasise grievance 
structures and organisational capacities of rural activism, yet recent studies have started to 
incorporate political opportunity structures that stimulate or depress rural activism. Ondetti’s 
2008 study on the Brazilian MST is in this regard a milestone in illustrating how the 
organisation has successfully interacted with the political opportunities present in Brazil. For 
South Africa, Mngxitama (2006) has provided an interesting case study on how political 
opportunity structures have shaped the activities of the NLC. Both studies, among others, 
have greatly informed this thesis.  
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1.4.4 Framing processes 
The 1980s saw a growing discontent among movement theorists over the lack of attention that 
scholars had paid to the significance of shared ideas and sentiments in the mobilisation of 
groups. Erwin Goffman’s 1974 book on frame analysis initiated a process that shifted some 
scholars’ focus away from the underlining structural causes for movement activity to the 
concept of shared ideas that give meaning to action. While Goffman analysed the construction 
and meaning of ideas within the broad society; Snow and Bendford (1988) applied this 
concept specifically to movement theory and thereby expanded the theory of movement 
dynamics substantially. Snow and Bendford argue that the interplay of political opportunities 
and mobilising structures provides groups with a certain structural potential for action. Yet 
this structural potential cannot account for the surfacing and maintenance of collective action, 
since people need to define and perceive the situation collectively as a potential for action. 
People need to feel aggrieved about some aspects of their lives and be optimistic that it can be 
addressed collectively. If this is not the case, mobilisation is unlikely to occur even though 
factual opportunities are present. Creating and maintaining such perceptions is the social 
psychological mechanism that Snow and Bendford have referred to as framing processes. 
McAdam et al. (1996:6) skilfully summarise his conception as follows: “[Framing processes 
are] conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the 
world and themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action”. According to Snow and 
Bendford (2000:614), framing is a proactive process that includes agency and contention. It is 
proactive in a sense that something is being done and is evolving over time. It involves 
agency through the work of movement members and supporters and entails contention in the 
sense of “generating interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones but that may 
also challenge them”. The products of these framing processes are referred to as collective 
action frames.    
 According to Snow and Bendford (2000), collective action frames are constituted by two 
characteristic features. The first one refers to its action-oriented focus. The collective action 
frames have the prime purpose of gathering and mobilising people for a specific cause. By 
strategically linking opportunities to actions, people begin to perceive a situation as a 
potential and therefore are motivated to participate. This mental linking process is the “core 
framing task” of movements (Snow & Bendford, 2000:615). Snow and Bendford (1988) 
unpack this core framing task into three important stages: diagnostic framing, prognostic 
framing and motivational framing. Diagnostic framing essentially entails the identification 
and agreement on common grievances and the respective source of it. This stage of the 
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framing process has also been widely referred to as ‘injustice framing’, a term coined by 
Gamson. He asserts that “it is insufficient if individuals privately adapt a different 
interpretation of what is happening. For collective adaption of an injustice frame, it must be 
shared by the potential challengers in a public way” (Gamson, 1992:73, as cited in Tarrow, 
1998:111). But, as Snow and Bendford (2000) point out, the collective adaptation of injustice 
frames can entail controversies regarding who exactly is to blame for the respective 
grievances and thereby led to inconsistencies in collective action frames, which in the long 
run can demobilise or split a movement. In this sense, ‘spin-off’ movements can emerge, 
which draw their impetus from the initiator movement, but construct an alternative frame 
(McAdam, 1995). The second stage of the framing task, the prognostic framing, proposes and 
diffuses solutions. These solutions can take the form of an alternative to proposed solutions or 
actions of the respective opposition to the movement. In this sense, movements engage in 
“counter-framing” (Hunt & Bendford, 2004). The last stage, the motivational framing, 
provides a rational for collective action, which includes the development of appropriate 
vocabularies and tactics that regularly communicate the salience of the problem and the way 
to overcome it (Snow & Bendford, 2000).  
 These three stages conceptualise the action-oriented component of framing processes and 
help to unpack the dynamics behind collective frames. However, framing processes have a 
second important feature, namely the interactive negotiated dynamic of finding agreement 
within the different stages outlined above. Several scholars have underlined the analytical 
importance of this discursive component (Kladermans, 1997; Snow & Bendford, 2000 
Steinberg, 1998). Discursive processes refer to “the talk and conservations – the speech acts – 
and written communications of movement members that occur primarily in the context of, or 
in relation to movement activities” (Snow & Bendford, 2000:623). This discursive process 
involves the selection and accentuation of certain issues, events and beliefs that have special 
salience to the movement. These ‘slices of experience’ are then strategically reassembled in 
order to present a novel, but culturally entrenched interpretation of the situation. Snow and 
Bendford (2000) point to two strategic types of framing processes: frame bridging and frame 
extension. Frame bridging includes the linking of two “ideologically congruent but 
structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” (Snow & Bendford, 
2000:624). Frame extension involves the inclusion of new interests and frame(s) that are 
deemed salient to the movement and potential new supporters within the existing collective 
action frame. In order for collective actions frames to function over a long-time period, they 
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need to be constantly reconstituted through interactions in meetings, campaigns and 
statements.  
 Kladermans (1997) has furthermore stressed that the discursive character of framing 
processes, while initiated and fuelled by the movement, cannot be reduced to the movement 
alone. He states that “it is a process in which social actors; media and members of a society 
jointly interpret, define and redefine states of affairs” (Klandermans, 1997:44). In this context, 
movements also engage in ‘frame contests’ with other societal institutions such as the media, 
the government, parties and other movements. External actors can discredit or favour a 
movement by engaging in framing processes that target the public image of a movement. 
External actors may also construct alternative frames that address the same issue, but the 
diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing processes construct different approaches. 
Although movements are aware of these external framing processes and respond to them, they 
are not independent of them. The level of movement mobilisation is highly influenced by the 
internal and external discursive framing processes.  
 One way of analysing effectiveness and mobilising the potential of frames is the concept 
of resonance. this concept evaluates how much collective action frames resound with peoples’ 
lived realities and cultural historical milieu. According to Snow and Bendford (2000), this 
firstly depends on the credibility and relative salience of the topic addressed. When proposed 
claims embedded in the frames do not consistently match with the factual situation on the 
ground, frames become illusionary. Secondly, collective action frames need to target salient 
and central issues of its potential constituents, which has to do with “how essential the beliefs, 
values, and ideas associated with movement frames are to the lives of the targets of 
mobilisation” (Snow & Bendford, 2000:621). In this context, the cultural resonance of frames 
also plays a significant part. People need to be able to identify with collective actions frames; 
hence frames need to be congruent and evolve with the values, believes, meanings and 
narratives that underline a society or the targeted part of it. In this regard, some frames can 
attain a highly inclusive scope as they are based on broad values and concerns shared by a 
majority of people. Snow and Bendford (1992) have referred to such frames as master frames 
in contrast to movement-specific frames that may derive from master frames, but focus on 
specific, controversial aspects. 
 There is still only a small number of studies on rural movements that highlight framing 
processes. This might be due to the amorphous nature of the subject matter. Understanding 
the evolution and effects of frames requires not so much the analysis of topics or issue 
contained in the frames but rather the discursive processes that led to them. This in turn 
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necessitates long-term fieldwork as well as access to documents and recordings. In her work, 
Wendy Wolford (2003), for instance, has provided scholars with details on internal and 
external discursive processes of the MST in Brazil. Although she does not explicitly refer to 
framing processes, her work provides a starting point.      
 
1.5 A synthesised comparative perspective 
Recent studies on movements such as that of McAdam et al. (1996), Snow, Soule and Kriesi 
(2004) and Tilly and Tarrow (2007) have jointly emphasised the importance of all three 
theories in analysing the emergence and development of movements: political opportunity, 
resource mobilisation and framing processes. The theory of grievances has lost its analytical 
significance in explaining movement activity, yet it is certainly not disregarded, as it runs like 
a red thread through all three frameworks. Grievance, as it was outlined at the beginning of 
this section, is a feeling of deprivation and can lead to riots and sudden conflicts, yet it cannot 
fully account for the organisation of sustained movement activity. Grievance is certainly an 
explosive device in mobilising people and therefore lends itself particularly to framing 
processes, yet it does not suffice to maintain an effective movement that is recognised as a 
unified actor in society. Consequently, contemporary scholars generally agree that grievances 
can lead to collective action, but political opportunities, resource mobilisation and framing 
processes sustain a movement by giving it structure, protest repertoires, shared meanings for 
action and political and economic access points for interactions that might lead to social 
change. The configuration of these dynamics constitutes a movement and accordingly shapes 
a movement’s character and development course. A synthesised framework (see Figure 1) that 
combines all three theories and detects links between them is therefore a suitable tool to 
explain variation in size, form and degree of success of movements. In particular, this 
framework allows a systematic study into differences of political systems, socio-economic 
conditions and cultural aspects of groups, regions and countries and thereby lends itself to 
comparative studies of movements’ dynamics. 
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Figure 1. Graphic of synthesised framework 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, this study employs the theories of political opportunities, resource mobilisation 
and framing processes in its attempt to explain the great variance of rural activism of the NLC 
in South Africa and the MST in Brazil. The study specifically analyses the trajectories of the 
rural movements at the national level and over a specific time frame (1978–2009) and thereby 
pays attention to key differences that led to variances in contemporary movement activity. 
Admittedly, this ultimately leads to an aggregation and possibly simplification of complex 
reasons. Yet it is believed that in a cross-national comparative study the focus should remain 
on broad developmental differentials that trickle down to the actual rural movement and its 
power and mobilisation potential. As the study has shown, specific differences in form and 
course of rural movements can essentially be traced to structural differences, which guided 
political opportunities, resource structures and framing processes of the movement. For this 
purpose, the study presents in Chapter 2 a historical overview of land issues in South Africa 
and Brazil in order to embed the concrete movement analysis into the record of history. 
 Having laid the theoretical foundation and traced the history of South Africa and Brazil, 
broad developmental variations affecting the dynamics for rural activism in the respective 
countries have emerged. Building on these variations a comparative analysis of the NLC and 
the MST takes place in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The two chapters are divided into three 
sections according to the movements’ protest cycles, namely emergence, stabilisation and 
decline/resurgence. Following the trajectories of the NLC and the MST, movement dynamics 
are traced by employing the synthesised framework. Each protest cycle is analysed according 
to political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes. In a short summary at 
the end of each section, the effect of three interrelated movement dynamics in shaping the 
protest cycle is presented. Following McAdam’s (1996) suggestion, political opportunities are 
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firstly assessed by the relative openness or closure of the political and legal systems; secondly 
by the presence of elite allies; thirdly by the stability or division of the political elite; and 
fourthly by the state’s capacity and propensity for repression. When looking at mobilising 
structures, the internal structures of the respective movements and their tactical repertoires are 
examined. Secondly, grassroots structures and existing social networks are evaluated in their 
contribution to movement activity. With reference to the interrelatedness of dynamics, it 
becomes clear that the organisation and operation of movements is very much shaped by the 
political opportunity structure; a relationship which also applies to framing. When analysing 
framing processes, I specifically address the question whether the movement was able to 
construct resonant collective action frames to corroborate its actions. The associated framing 
process is examined as far as information was available regarding the discursive process. 
Attention is also given to framing contests and how they affected the mobilising potential of 
the movements. The aim was to demonstrate that all three theories put into historical 
perspective are of vital importance in explaining the variation of organised rural activism in 
South Africa and Brazil. By addressing each perspective in the respective country, variations 
in political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes become apparent as 
well as important interrelationships, which illustrates that one theory cannot satisfactorily 
explain the contemporary situation without reference to the other processes.  
 
1.6 Significance of study 
While a synthesised approach to movement analysis is generally accepted in the academic 
community, few scholars have attempted to present a comparative study of movements that 
affords equal weight to all three perspectives and actively seeks to discern interrelationships. 
It is however believed that when conducting a cross-national comparative study it is 
appropriate to approach (at least initially) the topic in a comprehensive fashion. In this way 
the tendency of theoretical bias can, if not completely avoided, at least be considerably 
reduced and thereby the justification for finding generalisable mechanisms of mobilisation is 
substantiated. McAdam’s 1982 study, “Political process and the development of black 
insurgency”, can be considered the first study that included all three movement dynamics in 
an interrelated fashion in order to explain the rise and fall of black civil-rights movements in 
the USA. Tarrow is furthermore a strong defender of the multidimensional view of movement 
theory and has applied this framework in various works, such as for instance in his 
comparative 2005 study “The transnational activism”. Another recent example is Ondetti’s 
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2008 analysis of the MST in Brazil. His study provides very interesting insights into 
movement dynamics and provides this study with invaluable information; in particular on 
political opportunity structures in Brazil. However, Ondetti does not apply the framework in a 
comparative fashion; it is rather a detailed collection of key dynamics that shaped the MST’s 
activism.  
 Overall, the MST as a rather successful rural movement has been analysed by a multitude 
of actors, who attempt to discern its ‘secrets’ (for instance Carter, 2009; Karriem, 2008; 
Veltmeyer and Petras, 2001; Wittman, 2009 and Wolford, 2003) Yet, attempts to contrast the 
MST with other rural movement are sparse. Foweraker (2001), for instance, has in a general 
comparison of grassroots movement in Brazil and Chile applied a synthesised framework in 
order to analyse their varying effects on social service delivery. Scoones (2008), in a study on 
Brazil, South Africa and India, has compared mobilisation against genetically modified crops. 
In his study he focuses primarily on external political conditions, but also makes reference to 
tactic and framing processes within the movements.  
 South Africa’s rural movements have been of little interest to scholars, let alone attempts 
to analyse movement dynamics. There are comprehensive studies on South Africa’s land 
reform, focusing on political and administrative implementation failures (for instance Hall, 
2009 and Ntsebeza & Hall, 2007) Academic studies on the NLC are extremely rare, but there 
is some interesting secondary literature on rural movements. Walker (2002), for instance, has 
published widely on gender equality and women movements in the rural sector. There is also 
one detailed personal account of the local rural movement AFRA (Association for Rural 
Advancement, 1999), which served as a source of information for this study, since AFRA was 
once part of the NLC. Nauta (2004) has provided a comprehensive overview of another small 
rural movement, namely the Monti Rural Association. In his analysis he focuses on the 
political environment and the structural changes within the association, thereby also providing 
some input to this study. Lastly, Greenberg (2003; 2004; 2004a) and Mngxitama (2006), 
former activists of the NLC, have published personal studies of the movement, providing 
valuable information. 
 In terms of comparing the MST with the NLC, the researcher is aware of only one article 
that partially addresses the question of differing rural activism. Wolford, Balleti and Johnson 
(2008) compared the MST and the South African Landless People’s Movement (LPM), a 
radical movement that quickly emerged and declined between 2001 and 2005 in South Africa. 
The LPM will also receive some attention in this study. Wolford, Baletti and Johnson’s study, 
in this regard, presents an interesting comparative analysis of the Brazilian MST and a South 
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African rural movement. Yet, it needs to be noted that the LPM was a short-term spin-off 
movement, wholly dependent on its parent the NLC. Therefore, a valid comparison needs to 
start with the NLC. Furthermore, Wolford, Baletti and Johnson focus on the MST’s tactical 
repertoires, but political opportunities and framing processes received only passing attention. 
This study attempts to broaden the comparative scope much further by systematically 
exploring movement dynamics in South Africa and Brazil and how they shaped the 
trajectories of the NLC and the MST differently. In this way the study wishes, on the one 
hand, to provide a cross-national empirical example of movement dynamics and on the other 
hand to explain why rural activism is different in South Africa and Brazil.  
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Chapter 2 
The agrarian question and struggles for land before the NLC and the MST 
 
2.1 South Africa 
2.1.2 The people and land before 1652 
Before the arrival of the first Europeans, two major groups occupied much of Southern 
Africa. The first group, the Khoisan, comprised the San hunter-gatherers and the Khoikhoi 
nomadic herders. The second group was the African pastoralists and cultivators. The San did 
not form permanent settlements, but were skilful hunter-gatherers that roamed the Southern 
African continent. They were marginalised by the Khoikhoi and African farmers long before 
the appearance of Europeans. When the first Dutch settlers arrived at the Cape in 1652, the 
region was predominately occupied by the Khoikhoi. This African group lived as nomads and 
herded long-horned cattle and fat-tailed sheep. The Western Cape is not suitable for 
indigenous grain, millet and sorghum due to the dry summer months in this winter rainfall 
region. As a result, the Khoikhoi did not develop a farming culture.  
 The second group of inhabitants of South Africa was the African people. Bantu-speaking 
people were living along the Limpopo River by approximately AD 500. In the following 
centuries two linguistic groups emerged, the Nguni and the Sotho-Tswana, who gradually 
migrated southwards. The Nguni and Sotho-Tswana people engaged both in arable and 
livestock farming. The more their communities migrated into the interior of South Africa, the 
more their farming activities became dispersed across large distances as deteriorating 
environmental conditions required seasonal movement of animals and extensive as well as 
varied crop cultivation. The traditional grain, millet and sorghum of the African people 
restricted their settlement to the summer rainfall regions of South Africa. In this way a natural 
barrier was created between the African farmers to the north and east of the country with its 
summer rainfall and the Khoikhoi herders to the south and west in the winter rainfall region 
(Feinstein, 2005:13–21; Thompson, 2006:1–30).      
 African farmers owned their cattle individually and looked after them with great care, 
since cattle was the principal means of exchange in non-monetary African societies. Hence, 
large herds were a symbol of wealth and influence. Land was held communally and was 
managed by the chief, the sub-chiefs and the headmen of the community. They controlled the 
distribution of land and resources to the people and regulated the entire agricultural process of 
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tilling, sowing and harvesting as well as the allotment of grazing land. Each married man was 
entitled to obtain land for housing and cultivation from the community. According to tribal 
law, this land could not be sold or rented as a means of generating income; only lending or 
donations were permissible in order to provide a living for other members of the group 
(Feinstein, 2005:18). 
 Arable farming, including tilling, sowing, harvesting and trashing as well as vegetable 
cultivation, were predominantly carried out by women. The handling of livestock was the 
principle task of men. African farming was generally draining for the soil since no crop 
rotation or appliance of manure took place. The extensive availability of land made it possible 
for African farmers to move on when the soil was exhausted. This abundance of land is 
regarded as one of the primary reasons for the high fragmentation and mobility of African 
societies (Feinstein, 2005:20). Aspiring chiefs, dissatisfied tribe members or entire groups 
affected by crop failure could abandon their sites and relocate. Therefore, communities 
typically remained small and political rivalries and divisions within African societies were 
prevailing features in their history as well as an important factor in their later conquest by the 
Europeans.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
2.1.3 Colonisation: Conquest and dispossession  
The Cape colony 
The conquest of South Africa by European settlers started immediately after the first settlers 
arrived at the Cape with the Dutch East India Company. The Khoisan were the first people 
displaced as settlers set up their houses and gardens. Initial cooperation turned quickly into 
conflicts over ownership and usage rights of land. The Khoisan, not accustomed to the 
Western concept of private land titles, were induced into signing treaties surrendering large 
areas of land. Khoisan groups attempted to resist this process of expropriation and 
displacement. However, intergroup organisation was low and the technological capacities of 
the settlers were overpowering. Recurring smallpox epidemics further reduced the number of 
Khoisan and thereby accelerated the process of marginalisation. The widespread belief of 
European superiority among settlers degraded the Khoisan to inferior people. “The tradition 
early took root among the men of the frontier that the Bushmen9 were no better than wild 
animals and that it was justifiable to exterminate them like so much vermin. On their side the 
Bushmen became fiercer and more predatory as their means of subsistence disappeared before 
                                               
9 Bushmen is used here as a general term for the Khoikhoi and San.  
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their eyes” (Marais, 1962, cited in Feinstein, 2005:14). Resistance in the form of open warfare 
and cattle raids in the Cape colony continued up until 1670, when the last war was organised 
and lost by Khoisan groups. Due to the loss of their land, the Khoisan were forced to abandon 
their traditional way of life and to enter into work relationships with the European settlers 
(Feinstein, 2005:50).  
 As the economy grew, the colony required more labourers. The Khoisan population was 
decimated to such an extent that, despite their forceful integration into the colony’s 
workforce, their numbers did not suffice the labour needs. Therefore, in 1658, the first slaves 
were brought in from Ceylon, Madagascar and Mozambique. Over the next two centuries a 
continuous import of slaves took place to supplement the local work force. Mixing with the 
Khoisan they started to form the coloured community in the Cape, working as maids, farm 
workers, artisans and shepherds for the white colonists who predominately owned the land 
and means of production.  
 
Colonisation beyond the Cape Colony 
From the beginning of the 18th century, settlers drifted beyond the mountain range encircling 
the Cape colony. In this new terrain, land was plentiful and cheap, while capital and labour 
were scarce and expensive. Land rights were simply given away by the Dutch East India 
Company. Anyone could claim a large farm in return for a small fee. The abundance of land 
resulted in huge farms with an average size of 6 000 acres. These farms became a typical 
feature of South Africa’s agricultural landscape. Up until the late 18th century, the settlers did 
not penetrate further than the Great Fish River in the east and to the edges of a large dry 
plateau to the north, which later would be known as the Great Karoo. Repetitive violent 
conflicts with the sedentary African communities prevented any permanent settlement there. 
However, with the departure of Dutch administration in 1795 and the permanent installation 
of British governance in 1806, the possibility of a systematic colonisation of South Africa and 
further expansion beyond the Fish River was gradually recognised (Feinstein, 2005:25–30).  
 Responding to social pressure in Great Britain and local wishes of further colonisation, 
Cape authorities initiated and assisted immigration from the United Kingdom, Germany and 
other European countries to areas that where contested by African farmer communities. In 
1830 a movement of Afrikaans farmers, who were descendents from Dutch colonists, began 
to oppose British governance in the Cape and also started to migrate into African territory. By 
1843 some 12 000 Afrikaans farmers had left the Cape and started to infiltrate African 
farming land. It was believed that the African communities would in time decline due to 
 40 
 
European diseases as the Khoisan did in the Cape, thereby facilitating a rather ‘peaceful’ 
colonisation process. But the African people were already conditioned to smallpox and 
formed a much stronger and complex economy and social network than the Khoisan 
(Thompson, 2006:71). Consequently, the initiated settlement process was followed by several 
violent clashes between African farmers and white settlers.  
 In the following section, one particular African farmer group, the Zulu, is used to illustrate 
the dispossession and marginalisation process of African people. It needs to be noted, 
however, that extensive conflicts also took place with other African groups, such as the 
Lesotho Kingdom of Moshoeshoe, the numerous Xhosa tribes and the Southern Tswana 
chiefdoms. Struggles ranged all over the country, differing in form and scale, but towards the 
end of the 19th century the power balance shifted towards the settlers as they successfully 
drove African people away from their traditional land and thereby negated their means of 
independent survival (Thompson, 2006).  
 
The Zulu 
By 1820, Shaka, originating from a small Zulu chiefdom, had built up a militaristic Zulu 
kingdom with a standing army that controlled most of the Nguni territory northeast of the 
country. This Zulu kingdom was the end product of radical changes in northern Nguni society 
in the late 18th century. Changing climate conditions, population growth and diminishing 
possibilities for further expansion had triggered a period of fierce fighting among African 
chiefdoms called the Mfecane wars (meaning time of troubles). Shaka’s Zulu kingdom, 
however, did not contribute to a sedation of the situation as Shaka and his descendents sent 
armies on annual campaigns to disrupt local chiefdoms and capture grain, cattle and people. 
Militant bands of people, displaced by the unrest, began to roam the region and worsened the 
situation. By 1830, organised African village life had virtually ceased to exist.   
 During this time of upheaval and disorganisation, the first Afrikaans farmer, the so-called 
Voortrekker, entered Nguni territory. Local African communities forged several small-scale 
attacks against the invaders; however, the settlers adopted the effective method of lashing 
their wagons together in a circle that the African warriors were not able to break (Thompson, 
2006:88). In this way the settlers continued to penetrate the region, supported by newcomers 
from the Cape colony who restocked their munitions. In 1838, the Zulu king Dingane attained 
a major victory against a settler group led by Piet Retief. Dingane and his Zulu warriors lured 
Retief into a trap, killed him and subsequently his entire settler community, capturing 200 
coloured servants and about 35 000 cattle. However, in the next months the immigrants 
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mustered a powerful commando of 500 men and 57 wagons and invaded into the heart of the 
Zulu kingdom. Lashing their wagons together in a circle, they fought in a strong defensive 
position with guns and cannons against a 10 000-strong Zulu army. The Zulu had to retreat 
with 3 000 dead, while the commando did not lose one member. Known as the Battle at the 
Blood River, it “was a classic example of the superiority of controlled fire … over Africans 
armed with spears, however numerous and however brave” (Thompson, 2006:90). In response 
to this defeat, the Zulu kingdom split and thereby advanced the disintegration of Nguni 
societies. Following their victory, many emigrants settled in this region of Natal, taking over 
the best pastures and water areas. The complete destruction of the Zulu kingdom followed in 
1879 as a British force of 8 000 men invaded the remains of Zululand, culminating in the 
destruction of the Zulu capital Ulundi.  
 In order to prevent any Zulu chief from again assembling a strong community, the 
colony’s administrators set Zulu against Zulu, divided the territory under appointed loyal 
chiefs and made them to salaried magistrates. African people were increasingly compelled to 
move to selected areas with inferior agricultural conditions, where overpopulation forced 
many to abandon their communities and to seek employment on large cattle farms owned by 
white farmers. Church missions started to become centres of refuge for African people. Yet, 
the ultimate intention of the missions at that time was to ‘civilise’ African people and to 
transform them into obedient agricultural workers (Thompson, 2006:120–122).  
 
The problem of abundant land and scarce labour 
The story of the Zulu is one illustration of the process of expropriation and subordination of 
African people in the last decades of the 19th century. There were regional differences in the 
rate and the extent of erosion of African autonomy, depending on the structure and dynamic 
of each African society as well as on the present policy of the administration. Major divisions 
between the African societies leading to reoccurring civil wars accelerated their disintegration 
and dependency on white farm work. In contrast, European settlers were, despite major 
disagreements over other issues, united in their will to conquer African territory and destroy 
independent African farming.  
 According to Feinstein (2005), this common zeal for land expropriation had, apart from 
obtaining land for farming and mining, another important motive. South Africa had an 
agrarian economy that was characterised by an abundance of land and a scarcity of labour. 
Under such conditions, owners of land would have been unable to profit from it as long as 
free land exists elsewhere. Hired labour in this case would have been difficult to obtain, as 
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people preferred to work as independent farmers on the free land. In order to attract hired 
labour, farm owners would have had to pay wages that were at least as much as what 
labourers could have earned as independent farmers. Yet, this wage level would have cut 
considerably into the earnings of the land owner and render his business unprofitable 
(Feinstein, 2005:33). Slavery was a ‘practical’ solution to this problem, because denying 
people freedom of movement and the ability to conduct business independently through a 
system of coercion and oppression forced them to sell their labour to the landowning nobility.  
 In the early history of South Africa, settlers resorted to slavery. But slaves were almost 
always imported from elsewhere and slavery was never imposed on the Indian population, as 
settlers pursued another way to solve their land labour problem. The method of systematic 
closure of the escape route to free land via expropriation forced movements to reserves and 
destruction of African agricultural systems, effectively enabling the settlers to obtain their 
required labour supply without incurring major costs on their side (Feinstein, 2005:34). 
Depriving African and coloured people of any means of independent survival to ensure a 
continued flow of cheap labour to farms and mines became the major policy of the following 
decades. This strategy was nourished by a deep-rooted belief in white supremacy and hence 
racism in South Africa. The process of land expropriation and marginalisation was lawfully 
cemented in 1913 with the Natives Land Act, which limited African land ownership 
exclusively to reserves. The Act went on to become one of the first steps toward the system of 
apartheid in South Africa. By that time, however, organised resistance beyond sporadic 
sabotage and raids had already started.   
 
2.1.4 The segregation and apartheid era 
Land situation during the early and middle 20th century 
The settlers did not immediately take over all land, as they lacked the administrative and 
financial resources to control settlement patterns. But, as population density and trade 
opportunities improved, settlers gradually increased their landownership share. It was 
therefore not a single act of dispossession, but a continuing process, which gained substantial 
momentum after the discovery of gold and diamonds (Feinstein, 2005:43). The Natives Land 
Act of 1913 made it illegal for African people to acquire or rent land outside the existing 
reserves. By 1913, the land officially reserved for African people had been reduced to 7.3% of 
the total; whereas the African population constituted two-thirds of South Africa’s population. 
The practice of communal tenure in the reserves as well as the population density caused the 
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already inferior soil to deteriorate rapidly, causing malnutrition and famines. Recognising the 
inadequacy of available land, additional land was granted in 1936. This brought the figure up 
to a mere 13%, which did not solve the problem of overpopulation. Farming in the reserves 
was rendered completely insufficient to sustain an independent peasant economy, forcing 
people to migrate to towns, farms and mines in order to earn extra cash.  
 At the same time, white settlers continued to form huge farms. In the early and middle 19th 
century, currency was in short supply, so people were often paid with land grants. As a result, 
capable and ambitious men were able to accumulate vast amounts of land and form a 
distinctively superior class (Thompson, 2006:99). A farm’s size was usually determined by 
the farmer walking with his horse east, west, north and south for half an hour from a fixed 
point, resulting into a farm of roughly 2 500 hectares (Feinstein, 2005:25). With ongoing 
colonisation and settlement, the average farm size decreased in the 19th century to about 800 
hectares.10 These large landholdings were often not utilised productively, as most land was 
used as grazing fields for livestock. The cultivation of grain and vegetables was frequently 
done by African people living as rent tenants, sharecroppers or labour tenants on the farms. 
Rent tenancy (also then known as “Kaffir farming”) was a system where white people with 
too much land allowed African people to work on their land in return for rent payment. 
Sharecropping allowed African farmers, having to provide their own equipment, to work on 
the land in return for sharing their harvest with the land owners. Labour tenancy was a 
relationship where land owners allowed African people to occupy a small plot of land for 
housing in exchange for their labour. Apart from paying wages, landowners often resorted to 
payment in kind, such as groceries and alcohol, which in the long run substantially 
undermined the workers’ last remains of an independent lifestyle. African crop sharing and 
rent tenancy still included some form of entrepreneurial freedom, which for many white 
working farmers was not acceptable. Also, groups from industry and mining lobbied for the 
abolishment of rent tenancy and crop sharing, as they were interested in an influx of 
redundant labour. Therefore, crop sharing and rent tenancies were increasingly suppressed by 
the government with the Natives Land Act and by several subsequent regulations. By the end 
of World War II, labour tenancy had become the predominate system on white-owned farms 
throughout South Africa (Feinstein, 2005:62). With the modernisation and mechanisation of 
agriculture beginning in the mid 1960s farm size started to grow steadily. According to World 
Bank data (cited in Van Zyl, Binswanger & Thirtle, 1995:9) average farm sizes increased 
                                               
10 These were nevertheless huge farms compared to Canada or the United States at this time, where a farm was 
typically about 65 hectare (Feinstein, 2005:25). 
 44 
 
from 738 ha per farm in 1953 to 867 ha in 1960 and to 1 339 ha in 1981. In 1970, the Act on 
the Subdivision of Agricultural Land made it ultimately impossible to subdivide existing titles 
on land and thereby essentially froze the land and ownership structure in South Africa (Van 
Zyl et al., 1995:12).   
 
The creation of a colour bar in the South African economy 
Between 1910 and 1948, South Africa weathered the Great Depression, the national income 
of the country increased more than three times and the mining industry made major 
contributions to South Africa’s industrialisation. At the time, the white population 
consolidated its control over the state, strengthened its domination over the African, coloured 
and Asian populations and successfully eliminated British legal power to intervene in South 
African affairs. By 1910, white people had conquered almost all African land and restricted 
African people to demarcated reserves or small plots of land and hostels, where they worked 
for white farmers, manufacturers or mining magnates. During the ensuing years, the 
government implemented a comprehensive programme of racial segregation and 
discrimination that reached far beyond land expropriation and ownership restrictions.  
 Laws such as the Apprenticeship Act (1922) and the Industrial Conciliation Act (1924) 
prevented most African people from entering the skilled and semi-skilled work force and from 
bargaining for better working and living conditions. Wages for African workers were 
notoriously lower than for white workers, and the tax system was discriminating against 
African artisans and the few independent farmers in the reserves. At the same time, white 
farmers and manufactures received continuous financial support and tax breaks to stimulate 
economic growth and self-sufficiency in South Africa. White farmers were able to modernise 
and thereby commercialise their farms, which in turn made African farm labour gradually 
redundant. Many of these former farm workers found work in the mining industry, while 
others migrated to the growing cities in the hope of finding employment. Squatter camps 
started to grow around urban centres and caused fear among the white, affluent population. 
The government tried to limit the flow of African people into the cities with a complex set of 
pass laws designed to prevent African people from living in towns except as labourers for 
whites. Farm workers were only allowed to leave the farm with a special permit issued by the 
farm owner. Despite these regulations, the African population in towns increased steadily 
(Feinstein, 2005:64). 
 When in 1948 the Afrikaner National Party gained a strong majority, white domination 
accelerated and racial discrimination turn into an institutionalised and legal system, termed 
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“Grand Apartheid”. With the enactments of several apartheid laws, racial discrimination was 
institutionalised. The Population Registration Act (1950) classified and officially registered 
all South Africans into one of three categories: white, black (African) or coloured. Many more 
race laws followed that regulated every aspect of social and professional life. Under the 
Group Areas Act and its many amendments, the government divided urban areas into zones 
demarcated for specified races (Thompson, 2005:188). Large-scale evictions of coloured and 
Indian communities followed as well as removals of entire African townships situated around 
urban centres. In 1951, the only official countrywide African institution, the Native 
Representative Council, was abolished and the administration of the African population 
subsequently transformed. The government marked out 10 territories, later known as 
“homelands”,11 in which an African “nation was to develop along its own lines, with all the 
rights that were denied it in the rest of the country” (Thompson, 2006:186). In 1971, the 
Bantu Homeland Constitution Act granted the territories ‘independence’. Collaborative chiefs 
were appointed to govern the homelands and public funding was completely stopped, 
abandoning the African communities to their fate. The government subsequently also began to 
eliminate so-called black spots in the countryside – white areas that were occupied or still 
owned by African people. The aim of the government was to herd all African people into the 
homelands, except those who were needed as workers in industry and agriculture. The 
evictions and removals resulted in a great intensification of the overpopulation problem in the 
homelands. By 1950, 39.7% of the African population lived in these areas; by 1980, 52.7% 
lived there. Despite rigid controls and forced removals, the African populations in the towns 
increased rapidly, as did the coloured and the Asian population. By 1980, the white urban 
population of 4 million was greatly outnumbered by 6.9 million African people, 2 million 
coloured people and 700 000 Indian people (Thompson, 2006:189). 
 Despite these huge numerical differences, the apartheid system was able to concentrate 
economic, political and cultural power in the hands of the white population through the 
institutionalisation of the colour bar. This colour bar is one of the most distinctive aspects of 
South Africa’s economic and social history. Processes of European conquest and 
dispossession have taken place in other countries as well, but no other country has used its 
political and legal framework to create and maintain such an extensive and formal colour bar 
(Feinstein, 2005:74–78). 
  
                                               
11The African reserves were Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.  
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The rise of organised resistance and rural movements 
It was not until the beginning of the 20th century that autonomous, organised African 
resistance and social movements emerged in South Africa. Before that time, African people 
employed merely the ‘weapons of the weak’, including deputations to the British queen, 
petitions and pleading for meetings with the British government, but also acts of theft, 
sabotage and refusal to work (Plaatje, 1916). During the 19th century, churches and mission 
stations played a crucial role in providing African people with schooling and higher 
education. Most mission schools could provide no more than basic education. Some high 
schools, however, were staffed with relative competent teachers, for instance Adams College 
in Natal, St. Peter’s in the Transvaal and Lovedale in the Eastern Cape province (Thompson, 
2006:168). These high schools became centres of early African empowerment, as they formed 
skilled people influenced by liberation theology and Western ideas of participatory 
democracy. School leavers from these schools were among the first to recognise the need for 
African actualisation and organisation in political institutions and movements.  
 Political organisations appeared at the beginning of the 20th century, which drove to 
improve the lot of the subordinated people through negotiation with the government on 
national level. Among these organisations were the African Political Organisation (APO) in 
1902, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) in 1923 and the South African Native 
National Congress, which later became known as the African National Congress (ANC), 
founded in 1912. However, up until 1940, APO, SAIC and the ANC remained under the 
control of lawyers, clergy and journalists, who tried to obtain white support to redress the 
many African grievances by constitutional means. But in the increasingly racist environment, 
they neither won substantial victories nor were they able to mobilise the non-white masses 
(Thompson, 2006:169). With the emergence of liberation movements in the early 20th 
century, the struggle for land rights was intertwined with their general fight against apartheid. 
The existing colour bar, which suppressed non-whites in essentially every aspect of their 
lives, became the prime target of most organisations. 
 Sporadic attempts were made to create more radical movements. The first movement with 
a clear link to the agrarian struggle was the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), 
founded in 1919. Initially it drew its membership from the urban African people, but in later 
years it became a rural protest movement, tapping especially into African sharecroppers’ and 
tenant labourers’ land hunger. The ICU captured the rural population with strong Marxism 
rhetoric, promising land repossession and national liberation. However, the ICU failed to 
design realistic programmes of action, became corrupt and eventually lost touch with the 
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masses (Eveleth & Mngxitama, 2003:158). Nonetheless, the ICU gave impetus to a 
mushrooming of localised peasant movements that were nourished by the increasing land 
evictions and removals to the homelands under the apartheid regime. In 1957, in the 
Lehurutshe area of Bophuthatswana, women burned their passes and boycotted traders and 
schools. The police subsequently raided the village and 2 000 people fled to Botswana. In 
1963, in the Timbu district of the Transkei, resistance resulted in violent actions and rivalry 
among chiefs, cattle was killed, huts burned down and people murdered, yet the disturbances 
remained uncoordinated and collapsed completely during a severe drought in 1965 (Camay & 
Gordon, 2007).  
 In 1949, highly educated and ambitious members of the ANC Youth League were elected 
as members of the national ANC executive. These members were Walter Sisulu, Oliver 
Tambo and Nelson Mandela. The new leadership group started to launch resistance 
campaigns that attracted widespread support. Yet, the rural struggle fell increasingly off the 
agendas of the liberation movements (Eveleth & Mngxitama, 2003:159). In view of increased 
governmental oppression in the 1960s and 1970s, including the outlawing of the ANC and 
other movements, brutal police raids and ongoing evictions in townships, the liberation 
struggle increasingly shifted to urban centres away from rural communities and agricultural 
workers. Although all political movements continued to include land and rural issues on their 
agendas, none of them succeeded in articulating the resolution of the land question as a 
fundamental requirement of national liberation, and none of the various rural uprisings 
succeeded in linking their struggles together at a national level.  
 In the late 1970s, the economic and social situation in apartheid South Africa deteriorated 
substantially. South Africa run into a serious recession and the complex network of apartheid 
laws became economically unbearable as a massive shortage of skilled labour slowed down 
the private industry (Feinstein, 2005:250–251). International economic and diplomatic 
sanctions began to affect the South African economy and public opinion. The killing of 
Soweto school children in 1976 and the murder of Steve Biko by police officials marked a 
new violent peak of the liberation struggle. The late 1970s became the start of a period in 
which the Apartheid state increasingly lost its legitimacy as government and control over its 
segregate system. Hereby new political openings were created, which facilitated micro-
mobilisation and framing processes, slowly eroding apartheid and building a new idea of 
South Africa. 
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2.2 Brazil 
2.2.1 Colonisation: Sugarcane and slavery 
The native Brazilian tribes 
Before the arrival of Europeans in what is now Brazil, the country was inhabited by numerous 
Indian groups. The people were living in tribal groups, mostly semi-nomadic, on the Brazilian 
coast and along the banks of major rivers. They engaged in subsistence agriculture, fishing, 
hunting and gathering (Bakewell, 2004:39). Scholars disagree on the number of native people 
living in the area that is now Brazil. Estimates range from 500 000 to 2 million people 
(Skidmore, 1999:14). Brazilian tribes were different to the Indian population that the Spanish 
colonisers met on the west coast of South America, as they had not reached the complexity of 
civilisation of, for instance, the Inca in Peru or the Aztec in Mexico. Brazilian tribes neither 
possessed the strict social hierarchy of these Mesoamerican empires nor did they engage in 
city building. Hence, social and political cohesion was too low to mount a standing army to 
defend their territory and cultural autonomy (Bakewell, 2004:39–40; Skidmore, 1999:16). 
 In 1500, the first Portuguese expedition led by Pedro Álvares Cabral reached the shoreline 
of Brazil. Historic documents show that the sailors were fascinated by what they saw and 
described the land as exotic and the Indian population as noble savages. The native women 
were depicted as graceful, naked and without shame; the soil as endlessly fertile. This initial 
romanticisation of Brazil assisted in luring adventurers from Portugal to try their luck in this 
new colony (Skidmore, 1999:6–7). Since initial resistance of the Brazilian tribes was 
relatively low and the colonisers were rather fascinated by the exotic people, miscegenation of 
the populations began instantaneously. Up until 1530, Brazil received relatively little attention 
from Lisbon; instead it became a dumping site for Portuguese outlaws who, together with 
sailors and adventures, began to mix with native tribes. The shortage of European women 
facilitated assimilation and acculturation with the native people during these first decades of 
colonisation. With the steady miscegenation, a substantial population of mestizos emerged 
(Bakewell, 2004:172).  
 However, diseases brought from Europe took a heavy toll on the native tribes, decimating 
them drastically within a few decades. Increasingly harsh treatment through forced labour 
further reduced their numbers and caused many tribes to retreat into the rain forests of Brazil, 
where settlers had difficulties tracking them. These tribes fragmentised so extensively, that 
many groups had no contact with one another for the next centuries. Over time the initial 
image of innocent, exotic people changed to one of wild savages that needed to be civilised. 
 49 
 
The discovery of sporadic cannibalism in Brazil triggered a wave of shocking reports to 
Europe, where throughout the 16th and 17th century European illustrations of Brazil were fixed 
on cannibalism. It also gave the state Portugal legitimate reason to eventually subjugate the 
native tribes and to finance extensive church missions (Skidmore, 1999:15–16). The 
remaining Indians in the Brazilian colony dwindled rapidly due to harsh working conditions 
and introduced European diseases such as small pox, measles and influenza. By the end of the 
18th century, the existence of a native population on the eastside of Brazil had essentially 
disappeared. Only small isolated groups survived in the interior of the country. This 
disappearance and scattering of the few remaining people reinforced the historical fact that, 
unlike in Peru and Mexico, “Brazil has not the glories of a native civilisation hovering over its 
modern existence” (Skidmore, 1999:16). 
 
The colonial economy and society 
In the 1530s, the Portuguese king started to recognise the need for a more organised 
colonisation of Brazil. He granted large pieces of land to former sailors and placed the right to 
further distribute land into the hands of local magistrates, called captians, who frequently 
resorted to ad hoc allocations without proper land title documentation (Wright & Wolford, 
2003:xxvii). Enormous plantations, latifúndios, started to develop, mostly in the north-eastern 
region, and sugarcane production became the primary engine of growth in Brazil during the 
16th to 18th centuries. A highly stratified society based on landownership started to evolve. 
Power was concentrated in the white fazendeiro (landowners) residing in the casa grande (big 
houses) and filtered down to the labourers and slaves in the senzalas (slaves quarters) 
(Skidmore, 1999:19).  
 Slavery was introduced in Brazil with the beginning of sugarcane production. As also 
pointed out in the South African colonial history, the abundance of land and the scarcity of 
capital made it necessary for the land-owning class to employ coercive labour techniques to 
obtain the required work force. In Brazil, however, the pre-existing population was 
extinguished to a large extent, as opposed to South Africa, where numerous African farming 
communities survived colonisation and could be forced into labour via expropriation. Brazil’s 
governance therefore reverted to the import of massive numbers of slaves from Africa. By 
1580 the Portuguese were importing more than 2 000 African slaves per year. The African 
slaves were captured from various regions in central and south-western Africa and therefore 
brought to Brazil a wide linguistic and cultural mix, which until the present day is 
recognisable in its society. Brazil imported more slaves in total than any other region in 
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America. Consequently, Brazil today has the largest population of African descents of any 
country, excluding the African countries themselves.  
 In response to the practice of slavery as well as to the aim of civilising the remaining 
Indian people, religious orders had started to infiltrate Brazil since about 1550. One of these 
numerous orders was the Jesuit order of the Society of Jesus. This order became the dominant 
Catholic influence in Brazil through their control of education and the creation of mission 
stations for African people and native Brazilians. In these missions they introduced a mix of 
European and Afro-Brazilian traditions, as the Jesuits blended African and Indian songs, 
dances and language into their liturgy. In this way missions contributed substantially to the 
mixing of cultures and the slow surfacing of a self-assured non-white population (Castagna, 
2000:641–655).  
 In the 16th century, miscegenation with the native people had already produced a 
substantial number of mestizos. Initially, mestizos were just above the slaves in the social 
hierarchy, but as time went on, some of them rose to higher status, serving as interpreters, 
guides and salesmen. At the beginning of the 17th century, miscegenation with African people 
and their descendants started to increase, resulting in a social group called mullatoes. Despite 
existing racial prejudices and discriminating legislation in Brazilian society, the emerging 
mixed-blood population was able to enter job opportunities that were left open in the 
economy due to a shortage of European labourers. There are numerous historical evidences 
that bureaucratic barriers were frequently breached, and that mullatoes and mestizos managed 
to attain status through marriage, cleric work or ownerships of plantations. It has been argued 
that race was seen as a spectrum in Brazil (Skidmore, 1999:24). While in South Africa, racial 
categorisation and targeted discrimination (albeit not immediately formalised) began very 
early, Brazil developed a fluent approach to race that facilitated access to education, wealth 
and status in many cases. This spongy racial system of Brazil allowed the growth and 
establishment of a mixed-blood population that actively took part in shaping the country. 
   
2.2.2 The Brazilian empire, the first republic and the era of Vargas  
In the middle 17th century, newly erected sugar plantations in the Caribbean drove down the 
price for sugar sharply. Unable to compete, Brazilian sugar exports declined and the entire 
colonial economy languished. With the decline of sugar, however, the cattle sector, which had 
evolved to supply the sugar economy, absorbed parts of the idle resources and became a 
flourishing economic sector. Given the extensive cattle-production methods, large areas in the 
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colony’s interior were settled. In addition to the cattle economy, a mining sector started to 
develop in the early 18th century as gold and other minerals were found in the south-eastern 
highlands of Brazil. The subsequent gold rush increased economic activity considerably, as 
demand for consumer goods and infrastructure surged; resulting in a shift of the colony’s 
economic and administrative centre to the southeast region. Yet, unlike in South Africa, 
mineral resources were already exhausted at the end of the 18th century, forcing Brazil to turn 
other valuable export goods, plunging Brazil into the next economic depression (Skidmore, 
1999:35, 49). South Africa could rely on mining as a major source of export earnings until the 
middle 20th century, continuously requiring large amounts of cheap labour, which caused the 
white minority government to establish a system of forced black labour migrating between 
their homes and the mines. This decade-long system contributed substantially to South 
Africa’s uprooted rural population, largely depending on wage remittance of the mine 
labourers.    
 The Napoleonic Wars forced the Portuguese royal family to flee to Brazil and thereby 
made Brazil the seat of the Portuguese empire in 1808. The king remained in Brazil until 
1820. Upon his return to Portugal, he left his son, Prince Pedro, in Brazil, who in 1822, 
answering to the pressure of the Brazilian elite, declared Brazil an independent empire. Apart 
from gaining independence, Brazil also saw a positive shift of its economic situation during 
the 1820s. The rising world prices for coffee turned the small domestic coffee plantations into 
a major export sector, producing more than half of the world’s coffee supply by 1885. As land 
was abundant, coffee production expanded easily. The Brazilian elite frequently acquired or 
added land simply through occupation, as there was a general lack of adequate rules and 
procedures for land allocation. Furthermore, it became common practice not to specify any 
boundary limits in the land titles, which led to frequent violent conflicts (Wright & Wolford, 
2003:20). 
 The state of the Brazilian economy was stronger affected by the expansion of coffee than 
by sugar and mining. The greater complexity of coffee production and trade formed important 
sectoral links within the Brazilian economy. Furthermore, Brazil came under increasing 
pressure to abolish slavery, and a series of decrees were introduced that made it difficult to 
provide the new coffee areas with slaves. In 1888, slavery was officially abolished, but 
already long before that time the shortage of labour had become so critical that immigrants 
from Europe were gradually integrated into the economy. During the early 19th century, 
private colonising companies were common in the southern part of Brazil as state 
governments made territorial colonisation a priority. The state put private companies in 
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charge of selling land to the immigrants who arrived regularly from Europe (Wright & 
Wolford, 2003:414). Those who could afford to buy land became independent small-scale 
farmers; many others turned to rent and sharecropper agreements or wage labour on 
plantations. This substitution of slave labour with wage labour meant an increase in efficiency 
and the formation of a domestic market for consumer goods. Furthermore, a considerable 
number of small-scale peasants started to compete with the powerful Brazilian elite for the 
still available free land. Already in 1850, a land law was passed that discriminated against 
small-scale farmers and favoured large export-oriented plantations. A way to lessen the strong 
hold of large land owners would have been to impose a high tax on unused land. Such a tax 
was proposed several times during the 19th century, but was consistently blocked by large 
landowners’ interests (Skidmore, 1999:52). Despite these efforts of the landowning elite to 
keep immigrants from acquiring land, a substantial peasant class developed in the south of 
Brazil and along the frontiers in the north and the centre-west of the country (Wolford, Baletti 
& Johnson, 2008:293).  
 The Brazilian economy grew significantly in the second half of the 19th century. However, 
economic growth was not evenly distributed in the regions, as economic development was 
concentrated in the southeast coffee region. The northeast continued to decline and its 
population lived close to the subsistence level. In 1889, Emperor Pedro II was dethroned by 
the army following the desire of the Brazilian elite for more local autonomy. The 
subsequently formed republic embraced federalism and awarded the states among other things 
the right to write their own land laws, which ensued into further enrichment of the local 
landowning elite and haphazard application of land rights. Sharecroppers and rent tenants 
were often forced to move frequently so that they would not establish claims to the land they 
worked on. Without long-term prospects for farming, peasants had little incentives to invest 
into the land and the fertility of the soil. Environmental degradation was therefore widespread 
in the south of Brazil, aggravating the insecure life of peasants.  
  During the late 19th and early 20th century, localised peasant uprising started to emerge in 
the Brazilian country side. Small-scale farmers experienced ongoing pressure from the 
landowning elite and the state administration to make land and labour available for large-scale 
commercial farming oriented towards the export sector as well as for foreign investors 
(interested in infrastructure programmes such as railways, dams and electricity). In 1912, a 
noteworthy wave of rural protests took place in the state Rio Grande do Sul. Joao Maria, a 
herbalist and mystic, successfully led peasant farmers and the rural poor in a protest against 
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their exclusion from land that was meant be allocated to a US investor (Wolford & Wright, 
2003:xxviii).    
 The decades of the 1920s and 1930s were periods of interrelated political and economic 
changes. The worsening of the economic climate and the eventual financial crash of 1929 
strengthened the rationale for a central government in Brazil. In 1930, a revolt by the 
landowning elite abolished the Old Republic and established Getúlio Dorneles Vargas as 
provisional president from 1930 to 1934. Vargas dominated Brazilian politics in various posts 
until 1954 and promoted a national development policy in contrast to the previous federalist 
approach. Vargas was a member of the land-based oligarchy and had risen through this 
system of patronage and clientelism, but at the end of his political career the pre-eminence of 
the agricultural elites had ended and new urban industrial leaders had acquired influence 
nationally (Schmitter, 1971:62, 78). 
 With the start of the Great Depression in 1929, the Brazilian coffee economy suffered 
from a severe decline in world demand and plunged Brazil into an economic crisis, which, 
however, it managed to weather comparatively well due to an income support programme that 
bought excessive amounts of coffee and thereby transferred capital back into the economy 
(Skidmore. 1999:97–98). The result was an overall stimulation of demand, accompanied by a 
greater investment into the slowly emerging industrial sector. The advance of industrialisation 
and urbanisation triggered the appearance of regional trade unions as well as the foundation of 
the Brazilian Communist Party in 1922, which also found a substantial number of followers in 
the rural communities, as two-thirds of Brazilians were still living in the countryside. 
 Poverty and ongoing land inequality, aggravated by the Great Depression and World War 
II, generated frequent resistance, coalescing in the middle 1900s with the Communist Party, 
the Catholic Church and trade unions expanding their mobilisation efforts to the countryside. 
In 1955, the first liga camponesa (peasant league) was established in Pernambuco, a poor 
state in the northeast of Brazil. The peasant league fought against large-scale land eviction 
and obtained legal help from Francisco Juliao, a member of the socialist party and appointed 
parliament member. Julia was able to pass a bill allowing for the expropriation of three 
plantations and the subsequent division of them among the threatened tenants and 
sharecroppers. In response, peasant leagues grew rapidly, if in a disorderly fashion, in the 
states of Pernambuco, Paraiba, Ceara, Piaui and Alagoas (Schmitter, 1971:210). Furthermore, 
Brazil’s Communist Party started to infiltrate the peasant leagues and founded the Union of 
Agricultural Labourers and Workers of Brazil in 1954, claiming 122 syndicates with a total of 
35 000 members in 1961. The Catholic Church also began in the middle 1900s to mobilise 
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rural associations through financial help and the realisation of literacy and leadership courses 
(Schmitter, 1971:210–211).  
 This accelerated mobilisation of the rural as well as urban population, intertwined with the 
rhetoric of socialism and communism, increasingly alarmed the government and urged the 
then President Goulart to make some concessions. In 1962, rural labour unions were legalised 
and in 1964 comprehensive land reform was proposed in order to appease opponents and to 
integrate union leaders into the clientelistic and therefore manipulable rural base. But in the 
Cold War climate and during the rise of Fidel Castro in Cuba, these changes did not agree 
with conservative sections of the Brazilian elite, and in 1964 armed forces stepped in to 
establish an authoritarian dictatorship, which radically altered the perspectives of the rural 
movements. 
2.2.3 Military rule  
Repression, opposition and the increase of inequality 
When the military took over the government in 1964, power rested entirely within the army 
officer corps. However, these officers were less united than it appeared. The moderates 
believed that Brazil had been misled by left-wing populists and that the public would come to 
its senses once the populists and Communists were removed, after which democracy could be 
reintroduced. In contrast, the conservative wing distrusted all politicians and believed that 
only authoritarian measures could protect Brazil from the left-wingers. In the first years of 
military rule, the moderate officers formed the new administration. Therefore, despite open 
repression of left-wing politicians and intellectuals, the press remained relatively free in the 
early period, informing the public of the ongoing purge in civil society and government 
(Skidmore, 1999:159–160). Immediately after the coup, the military began to attack and 
dismantle peasant groups. The peasant leagues, the Union of Agricultural Labourers and 
Workers of Brazil, and other ‘subversive’ organisations and movements were disbanded or 
forced underground. Many other rural unions were compelled to appointed new ‘safe’ leaders. 
In some areas, peasant leaders were harassed and even assassinated. Despite this ongoing 
repression, the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (Confederação Nacional dos 
Trabalhadores na Agricultura [CONTAG]) and the Church in particular continued to actively 
organise farmers and the landless (Schmitter, 1971:212).  
 Along with political changes came a major economic stabilisation programme in 1964. 
The effects of this programme were felt throughout 1964 and 1967 by decreasing wage levels 
and large cuts in public spending. In response, union members started to organise and strikes 
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erupted countrywide. These strikes were joined by widespread protests of university students 
and heated up the political atmosphere. The ‘hard-liners’ in the government eventually gained 
the upper hand and quickly introduced tougher measures of control. The congress was purged 
and all criticism and opposition to the government were banned by introducing strict and 
thorough censorship. Wire tapping, mail opening and denunciation of dissidents became 
commonplace in Brazil.   
 The growing repression of the government gradually provoked armed response in 1969. 
Guerrilla warfare, inspired by the Cuban revolution, became one strategy of openly opposing 
the regime. Urban guerrilla groups engaged in robbing banks and the kidnapping of important 
diplomats such as the US, Swiss, German and Japanese ambassadors. The hostages used to 
bargain for the release of imprisoned guerrilla members and in each case the guerrillas were 
successful in their negotiations. Some of those who were released would once again become 
active in Brazilian politics and therefore continue their fight against the regime. Although 
these high-profile attacks against the state garnered public attention and publicity, they neither 
provoked a widespread support for the guerrilla movement nor did they ever pose a serious 
threat to the military regime. Other guerrilla groups tried to mount a rural front against the 
government. In the Araguaia region of the Amazon Basin, guerrillas infiltrated the peasant 
area and gained the trust of local farmers. Yet, the activities of urban and rural guerrilla 
groups were met with draconian repression by the military. In 1974, all armed opposition was 
essentially liquidated (Skidmore, 1999:166–167; Wolford & Wright, 2003:5–6). 
 From 1968, Brazil began to experience rapid economic growth as the six following years 
showed growth rates of about 11% per annum. The establishment of the central bank, which 
assisted in bringing inflation under control, continuous financial help from the USA as well as 
the easing of credit boosted primarily the industrial sector. The industrial wage level 
improved and consequently the situation of urban workers. However, this also had the effect 
of widening the earning gap between industrial and non-industrial workers; in particular, it 
increased the income disparity between the industrialised centre-south and the poorer regions. 
In view of these high differences in income and living standards, migration from rural to 
urban areas accelerated substantially and ushered a transformation of Brazil’s socio-economic 
landscape. In the 1950s, 36.3% of Brazilians had resided in urban centres, but by 1991 this 
figure had grown to 74.7% (Globalis, 2009). Brazil had transformed from an agrarian society 
to one that was dominated by an urban lifestyle and industrial wage labour. Nevertheless, 
many urban Brazilians maintained close ties to the countryside either through family relations 
or business enterprises. The countryside also remained the last resort for many poor urban 
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migrants. Similar to South Africa, cities and towns in Brazil were not able to absorb the 
massive influx of people being left over from an increasingly mechanised agricultural sector. 
This overflow resulted in giant slums around the cities and a general insecure existence for 
many migrants.  
 
The ‘sorrowful’ modernisation of Brazilian agriculture 
Brazilian agriculture continued to be dominated by large latifúndios and a confusing and 
corrupt system of land titles. Many land owners possessed large sections of land they had 
never seen in their life and had not put to productive use. The option to redistribute land in 
order to overcome inefficiencies and underutilisation had been discussed by many Brazilian 
governments. Before the military coup, some idle land had in fact been expropriated for 
redistribution under the planned land reform programme of then President Goulart. But the 
new military government halted the programme immediately and engaged in an agricultural 
modernisation programme that was in line with their economic stabilisation plan (Wright & 
Wolford, 2003:27, 31). The modernisation programme entailed the state-supported 
mechanisation of large farms and the diversification of crops. Important export crops such as 
soybeans and citrus fruits were added to the cultivation of coffee and sugarcane.   
 Small-scale farmers continued and increased the production of food crops. Their products, 
in contrast to the export crops cultivated by large commercial farms, served the domestic 
market and thereby helped to prevent the escalation of food prices during the boom years. 
Despite these positive contributions of small-scale farmers, federal agricultural policy 
favoured the export sector, as it generated foreign capital. The generous rural credit policy, for 
instance, was only accessible to large commercial farms and therefore heavily discriminated 
against small-scale peasants (Skidmore, 1999:178–179). Furthermore, the Brazilian 
government strongly encouraged foreign companies, for example through subsidies and tax 
breaks, to invest in the countryside as a means of modernising rural areas. Dam projects, 
railway networks and large-scale commercial agriculture funded by syndicates from Japan, 
Europe and the USA increasingly displaced small producers; in particular in the southern 
regions of Rio Grande do Sul, Parana and Sao Paulo. Due to generally insecure legal 
arrangements and land titles of peasant farmers, the federal state and large land owners could 
easily evict farmers from their land and transfer it to investors. This practice was aggravated 
by the discriminating land law, which favoured large properties and the maintenance of 
privileges of the land-holding elite. In Brazil it also became practice to hire gunmen if legal or 
bureaucratic means failed to clear the way for powerful land owners. Bribery and ingratiation 
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was commonplace in the administration as well as in the courts (Wolford & Wright, 2003:27–
33). In such an environment, dominated by those who had money and large properties, small 
farmers repeatedly failed to stand their ground. Therefore, the displacement and 
marginalisation of peasants continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s and provoked a 
leading Brazilian scholar to call this period modernizacao dolorosa, meaning ‘sorrowful’ 
modernisation (Da Silva, 1982). 
 
2.3 Contextualising South Africa and Brazil 
After having reviewed the history of the land question and the associated struggle for land in 
South Africa and Brazil, two important but somewhat patent conclusions can be drawn. There 
are interesting parallels in the history of both countries. But at the same time and on closer 
examination there are contrasts in their economic and social developments, which had 
profound repercussions for their contemporary situation regarding the mobilisation and power 
of rural movements.  
 In this context, this chapter gives a short summary of the historical facts that make South 
Africa and Brazil two very interesting cases to compare. By doing so it becomes clear that 
despite the similarities, there are differing historical facts that until this day influence the level 
of activism of the landless in the respective countries. These historical differences have 
shaped the economic, social and political systems prevailing in South Africa and Brazil and 
thereby the existing opportunity structures for rural activism. In this regard, the chapter serves 
to relate key historical similarities and differences to current circumstances in South Africa 
and Brazil. Thereby, the dynamics of the NLC in South Africa and the MST in Brazil, 
analysed in chapters 3 and 4 respectively, are contextualised and hence better understood.  
 
Key historical similarities and differences 
South Africa and Brazil are both countries with an influential colonial history, where the 
question of land stood at the centre of colonial control and power. Both countries have been 
invaded by Europeans, who regarded the acquisition of land as a condition for wealth and 
influence over the pre-existing population. In South Africa as well as in Brazil the abundance 
of land was overwhelming for the arriving few settlers and initiated a system of large 
landholdings. A small, but extremely rich land-holding class developed in both countries, 
which maintained influence in politics throughout the entire history. South Africa and Brazil 
were equally characterised by a colonial economy relying on the export of raw materials and 
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the import of manufactured goods as the Dutch/English and Portuguese administrators wished 
to chiefly exploit the colonies for resources. This early on generated economies that possessed 
self-sufficient farms and plantations producing mainly for the export sector and private 
consumption. In addition, as has been argued before, the abundance of land caused both 
colonies to resort to coercive measures to acquire the labour force they needed for their large 
farms and plantations. The closure of the escape route to land has been solved in different 
ways and with different intensity by South Africa and Brazil. However, the contemporary 
highly uneven distribution of land in both countries as well as the marginalisation of a large 
part of their populations finds its origin in the colonial economy employing coercive measures 
in order to become profitable. 
  In this context one encounters the first important difference between South Africa and 
Brazil. South Africa had a large and complex African population, which maintained their 
independence and strength for about 150 years after the arrival of the first European settlers. 
South African settlers were therefore able to exploit an existing large pool of labour. To this 
day, South Africa is dominated, despite miscegenation, by its native population, which 
comprises 80% of its population (Statistic South Africa, 2001). In contrast, Brazil lost most of 
its Indian population early on. The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) 
reported in its 2000 census that 0.4% of its population were Indian (IBGE, 2000). Due the 
rapid decline of the Indian population, settlers in Brazil adopted slavery to compensate for the 
lack of labour. The import of African slaves changed the racial composition of Brazil 
tremendously and created a large population of mullatoes and mestizos, which today amounts 
to approximately 46% of the total population (IBGE, 2000). South Africa’s coloured and 
Indian/Asian community, in contrast, accounts for 11% (Statistic South Africa, 2001). The 
comparatively high racial mix between Europeans and Africans in Brazil has been attributed 
to the lower level of racial prejudices in Brazil compared to South Africa (Freyre, 1978; 
Skidmore, 1999). Brazil’s population has always experienced large numbers of intermarriage, 
assimilation of cultures and racial miscegenation. To explain the origin of these differing 
levels of racial prejudices and assimilation is beyond the scope of this study. Yet, the differing 
number of native populations in conjunction with the varying level of racism had profound 
long-term consequences for the political and social opportunity structure for rural activism in 
the respective countries. 
 Racism against non-white populations groups has been a feature of both countries’ 
histories, yet it was in South Africa where racial discrimination took a more pronounced turn 
in the form of apartheid. In South Africa, racial policies of dispossession and 
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disfranchisement were institutionalised and carried over into the independent modern state. 
This process with its social and economic consequences has been presented in detail in the 
previous section. What stands out in this analysis, in comparison to Brazil, is the 
demobilisation of a small-scale land-owning peasantry. The destruction of an independent 
coherent African agriculture and the proletarisation of the South African peasantry stands in 
contrast to Brazil, which, during the 19th century, attracted large numbers of European 
immigrants who, despite various repressive measures, developed into a significant number of 
small-scale land-owning farmers in certain regions. The almost complete absence of a 
coherent land-owning African peasantry in South Africa had substantial consequences for the 
organisational capacities of rural movements in this country. This is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3. 
 The historical overview furthermore demonstrates that apartheid did not only dispossess 
African people, but also disfranchised them to the extent that they lost their legal status as 
South African citizens. Therefore, the fight for land in South Africa was essentially tied to the 
general struggle for citizenship. Brazil also experienced dictatorship and hence a restriction of 
freedom of speech and organisation, yet this affected all population groups and did not 
exclude an entire group of people from equal participation in the economy. These differences 
in intensity and targets of oppression had long-term consequences, which to this day shape the 
strategic focus of rural movements in South Africa and Brazil. This aspect is further discussed 
in chapters 3 and 4. 
 The emergence of organised social resistance in South Africa and Brazil took place 
roughly at the same time. Beginning in the early 20th century, it culminated in the 1970s and 
1980s with the slow opening of the authoritarian regimes and the transition to democracy. In 
South Africa, the existence of a large African population completely excluded from political 
and economic participation triggered the surfacing of a strong African liberation movement 
(the ANC), which ultimately became the leading party of the new democratic South Africa 
and thereby continued the racial/ethnical definition of politics in South Africa. In contrast, 
Brazil’s history did not bring forward a strong political party that essentially represents all 
marginalised non-white people of Brazil.12 Brazilian politics is rather characterised by a 
multitude of different parties organised along class lines and patrimonial structures. The high 
racial mix of the Brazilian society, mentioned above, could be one reason for this political 
development. Consequently, the ensuing new democracies in South Africa and Brazil were 
                                               
12 Brazil had sporadic cases of black movement activity, such as the Frente Negra Brasileira in 1930 or the 
Associação Cultural do Negro in the 1950s. However, they never attained political significance.  
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emerging from a different interpretation and constellation of political and economic power, 
which would substantially shape the political opportunities and mobilising and framing 
processes of the emerging rural movements.  
 This chapter placed South Africa’s and Brazil’s struggle for land in the historical context 
before the emergence of the NLC and the MST. Thereby, similarities and differences in their 
socio-economic and political development were uncovered. These findings point to interesting 
aspects that in the long run created different opportunity structures for rural mobilisation in 
South Africa and Brazil. Based on these findings, the following chapters conduct a systematic 
comparative analysis of the South African NLC and the Brazilian MST and thereby illustrate 
how different opportunity structures have led to different dynamics of rural mobilisation and 
power.  
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Chapter 3 
Movement dynamics in South Africa 
 
3.1 The emergence of the NLC amid the liberation movement (1979–1990) 
As the historical overview has demonstrated, South African politics have been based on racial 
grounds since its early history. The long-term discrimination and segregation of the majority 
of the population has created a deep chasm in South African society, which, despite 
successful liberation and democratisation, has moulded contemporary activism in South 
Africa. Political opportunity structures, mobilisation structures as well as framing processes 
have maintained inherent racial characteristics. Rural activism has been subject to this aspect 
of South Africa’s history from the beginning. The struggle for land has been intertwined with 
the struggle against the apartheid system, as land grievances were directly linked to the 
disfranchisement of the non-white population. As a result, the fight for land was incorporated 
and initially subordinated to the fight for universal civil rights. (This subordination of the land 
question is discussed in more detail in the following argumentation.) In order to trace the 
emergence of the NLC in South Africa, one therefore needs to start with the South African 
liberation movement, which experienced an upsurge during the 1970s and 1980s in South 
Africa. This increase in movement activity can be traced to changed political opportunities, an 
improvement in mobilising structures and strategies as well as successful framing processes. 
In this chapter, I analyse each aspect in turn and establish important links that underscore the 
interrelatedness of the three concepts. By unpacking the dynamics of the civil-rights 
movement, aspects of the origin of the NLC emerged that substantially shaped the 
organisation’s later character and development. 
 
3.1.1 Political opportunities: Fragmentation and repression  
In the 1980s, the political system of South Africa underwent changes that were intended to 
pacify the growing domestic and international anti-apartheid lobby as well as to provide some 
economic relief. The slow opening of the political structure proved to unleash a massive 
opposition, whose eventual success can only be sufficiently explained by additional reference 
to their organisational capacities and framing potential. What shifts occurred in the apartheid 
system and where did they emanate from? The early apartheid state can generally be 
described as a closed up and repressive system to any anti-apartheid, black activism. The 
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National Party found sufficient supporters for their discriminating policy, aimed at 
maintaining a cheap labour force and low competition for skilled and semi-skilled jobs in 
urban and rural areas. In the 1980s, this alignment started to break down. South Africa was in 
the middle of a recession and the domestic market felt the shortage of a skilled labour force 
and the increased demand of middle-income earners. Furthermore, the Afrikaner population, 
the backbone of the National Party, increasingly moved away from the countryside and settled 
in urban centres. By 1980, more than 88% of Afrikaners lived in urban centres and 70% were 
engaged in white-collar jobs. Professionals, business people and absentee landowners had 
replaced the old rural elites in control of the National Party (Thompson, 2000:216). Being 
affected by a crippled and segregated economy as well as being amid a worldwide upswing of 
civil-rights movements, reformative tendencies among the political elite took root and upset 
the ideological conformity that had dominated the National Party for the last decades. This 
increasing division of the elite alignment has been convincingly illustrated by Emery (2005). 
He argues that the fractionalisation of the regime became pronounced in 1987 with the 
internal publication of a document that addressed the crisis by proposing to scrap all 
discriminatory laws and the commencement of multiparty negotiations. The document was 
compiled by top-level bureaucrats and was testimony to partial political will to engage in 
discussion on alternative solutions. Emery (2005) furthermore illustrates how, in particular, 
influential members of the Afrikaner community became dissidents to the regime. The 
Afrikaner leader of the liberal Progressive Federal Party, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, for 
instance, resigned in order to subsequently launch the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in 
South Africa (IDASA). This institute later on played a major role in facilitating talks of 
Afrikaners with the ANC in exile and thereby provided access points for the liberation 
struggle. A wave of defections from the National Party also signified fractionalisation. For 
instance, a group of Stellenbosch academics, at that time the educational centre for Afrikaner 
nationalism, broke with the party and engaged in talks with the ANC directly.  
 This division in the elite alignment has been identified as an important catalyst for 
movement activity by numerous scholars (McAdam et al., 1996, Tarrow, 1998; Tilly & 
Tarrow, 2007). All of them have stressed the political space that such break-ups provide for 
dissident thinking not only in society, but in the government itself. Fragmentations in the 
political elite make a government vulnerable as policy alternatives emerge and compete with 
each other. In the South African case, the slow break-up of conformity in the government 
provided the space for liberal reforms, which translated into a slow opening of the regime to 
non-white political participation and legal organisation. In 1979, all previously illegal African 
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labour unions were legalised and allowed to strike. The year 1984 saw a change of the 
Constitution. Indian and coloured people were awarded with a minority representation in the 
government, but no African participation was allowed. In 1986, the ban on multiracial 
political parties and interracial marriages was repealed (Thompson, 2000:218–220). The 
attempt of the government was to co-opt some sections of the disenfranchised community by 
allowing some small, decentralised civic activity. Yet the response from society was far from 
cooperative. The legalised African labour unions soon turned political and radicalised their 
activities. The established Indian and coloured representations in government were boycotted 
by the communities through their refusal to vote (Thompson, 2000:222).  
 The marginal opening of the political system was a signal that the government had become 
vulnerable, but the reform process had fallen short of providing African people with any 
political participation and other civil rights and therefore remained elusive for many 
oppositional groups. While the political opportunities were hence partially expanded, they 
were not recognised by the civil movements as such and rather regarded as additional 
grievances. This interpretation of the political opportunity structure by the opposition was 
further underlined by the increasing repression emanating from the apartheid state. The 
geographical and occupational division between white and non-white South Africans 
remained stable. The homelands continued to be officially the only place where Africans were 
allowed to settle. This regulation was underlined by the Natives Land Act, the Group Areas 
Act and the Illegal Squatting Act. The most visible and controversial state repression was the 
ongoing eviction and removal of African communities from their homes and the destruction 
of squatter camps. Collective resistance against the removals by multiracial activists was met 
with fierce armed response and imprisonments. During the states of emergency, repeatedly 
proclaimed in 1985 and 1986, the media was harshly censored, thousands of activists were 
detained without trial, the police forces raided offices of oppositional groups and spies were 
employed to track down activists and their supporters. Assassinations took place and 
repeatedly forced activists out of the country, draining the mobilising capacities of 
movements (Nauta, 2004:20–21; Thompson, 2000:228–231). This ongoing repression was 
based on a conservative bureaucracy, policy and army, which remained loyal to the regime. In 
1980, South Africa already possessed by far the most powerful military machine on the 
continent. It maintained a trained operational force of 180 000 men and it could mobilise 
nearly half a million troops within a few hours (Leonard, 1981:13). The apartheid regime 
possessed the organisational capacity for continued repression of revolutionary forces.  
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 Therefore, when summarising the political opportunity structure for movement 
mobilisation during the last years of apartheid, one can detect a contradictory thread. On the 
one hand the state opened the system for participation for some minority groups, but remained 
racially discriminatory against the majority of the population. On the other hand, the state 
resorted to extreme oppression against dissidents who did not co-opt with the newly created, 
supposedly more liberal, system. In the literature review it was mentioned that increased 
oppression by states and the way it affects movement activity are still controversial issues in 
social movement theory, as scholars do not agree on the effects. South Africa’s civil-rights 
movement is an interesting case in point, as it successfully organised resistance and eventual 
transition to democracy despite harsh oppression by the state.  
 Rational choice theory offers an analytical starting point. Tilly (1978) argues that 
dissidents can sustain protest actions amid repression as long as the expected benefits of 
protest outweigh the costs. This relation may shed light on the question why movements 
engage in protest action amid repression, yet it falls short of elaborating on the way in which 
dissidents collectively define or perceive a current or future situation as costs and benefits. 
These variables of the ‘activism equation’ are socially determined, since they originate from 
people, their milieus and daily experiences. Therefore, one needs to scrutinise the condition 
that led people to judge a situation as worthwhile and gave them the power to act. In this 
respect, Opp and Roehl’s recommendation, “which effect is to be expected under what 
conditions” is indicative (1990:523). The clear effect in South Africa was the strengthening of 
the civil-rights movement despite segregation, discrimination and repression. The conditions 
that cognitively and structurally activated people over a long period of time amid state 
repression cannot, however, be reduced to in the marginal opening of the political system. 
Opp and Roehl (1990) in this regard expand the explanatory base. They argue that state 
repression does not necessarily reduce movement activity if the repression is perceived as 
illegitimate and sets off micro-mobilisation processes that target individuals and groups with 
the goal of recruiting them for further protest activities. Hence, state repression can in fact 
stimulate mobilisation, if perceived as illegitimate and if the oppressed are integrated into 
“protest-encouraging groups” (Opp & Roehl, 1990:526). If such conditions prevail, the ‘cost-
benefit analysis’ for sustained protest is defined and perceived in more positive, activating 
terms.  
 These insights point to the parallel importance of framing processes that, via the 
construction of injustice frames, collectively define a situation as an illegitimate grievance 
that can be addressed. Furthermore, the protest-encouraging groups are indicative of the 
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concept of mobilising structures, which are instrumental in actually carrying out the struggle 
and sustaining it beyond several occasions of protest action. As Emery (2005) states, overt 
protest by apartheid opponents was initially harshly suppressed by the state and therefore not 
immediately an option for dissidents. Yet, the limited opening of the apartheid system in the 
1980s, although it was the source of much criticism and therefore a vantage point for injustice 
framing, did provided the little political space that was needed to trigger micro-mobilisation 
processes. This micro-mobilisation created the infrastructure that was needed to form protest-
encouraging groups that engaged in targeted actions and framing processes to sustain the 
struggle. In this way, micro-mobilisation laid the foundation for the national liberation 
struggle that continued to unfold until 1989. What contributed to micro-mobilisation, apart 
from the marginal opening of the political system? What enabled the movement to maintain 
the momentum over several years? The answer to these questions can be found in the 
interplay of resource mobilisation, tactical repertoires and framing processes. In the next 
section, I first address resource mobilisation and tactical repertoires of the movements, and 
subsequently weave framing processes into these dynamics. 
 
3.1.2 Resource mobilisation: Micro-mobilisation and tactical protest actions 
As was already mentioned, the split that had developed within the white minority government 
resulted in ongoing defections of party members, politicians and bureaucrats to the anti-
apartheid movement. These defections of elite members did not necessarily translate into 
them joining the ANC, rather it meant their acceptance of movement goals of non-racialism 
and universal civil rights (Emery, 2005:220). The emerging civil-rights movement was 
gradually provided with a pool of skilled and well-connected activists who helped to 
coordinate and finance the movements’ activities. At the same time, they facilitated the 
recruitment process of new supporters by setting an example of dissidence and thereby 
underscored the process of delegitimising the government. This pool of human resources was 
supplemented by university students and graduates politicised by the activities of the 1970s 
(the Soweto Youth Uprising in 1976, the killing of Steve Biko in 1977) and political 
prisoners, many of whom were released in the early 1980s. As the movement gained 
momentum, local actors and particularly businesses and churches also began to underwrite the 
anti-apartheid struggle (Habib, 2005:676). Private foundations were established to finance 
activities and foreign governments such as the USA, the United Kingdom and the then Soviet 
Union sponsored movements.  
 66 
 
 Micro-mobilisation initially started at the local levels, for instance student groups, youth 
groups, churches, women’s organisations, religious groups and sports clubs. They primarily 
provided support for affected communities and individuals by providing legal, organisational 
and financial help, but they also engaged to a larger and lesser extent in debates on political 
alternatives and thereby were the intellectual nucleus for an anti-apartheid struggle. As 
mentioned, one of the most controversial issues during the 1970s and 1980s was the forced 
removal of millions of African people into the homelands, the evictions of coloured 
communities and the destruction of squatter camps. This publicly visible repression by the 
state amid an increasingly widespread motivation and capacity to stand up for universal civil 
rights triggered the emergence of anti-eviction projects dotted in the country. Initiated by 
concerned, mostly urban, South Africans, these associations had multiracial memberships and 
were often associated with local churches. There were numerous small grassroots 
organisations; a specific number cannot be provided, but four of them are highlighted, as they 
formed the nucleus of the later NLC: the Association for Rural Advancement in KwaZulu-
Natal, the Surplus People Project in the Western Cape, the Grahamstown Rural Committee 
and the Rural Action Committee, which grew out of the social movement the Black Sash in 
the then Transvaal (Eveleth & Mngxitama, 2003:160). All of these organisations emerged as 
distinct movements in the early 1980s and provided support to the local struggle against 
forced removals. 
 These micro-mobilisations in South Africa predominately took place in urban centres, as 
the grassroots organisations mentioned above were located in towns where an informed and 
interested audience was gathering regularly. Furthermore, movement leaders themselves often 
had urban backgrounds. For instance, they were members of local churches, worked in the 
local municipality, were union members or white-collar workers. The urban centres of South 
Africa were, compared to the rural areas, more fluid and heterogeneous, allowing the 
contradictions of apartheid to become evident on a daily basis in private and public life. In 
contrast, the millions of black rural workers in the countryside were for the most part 
geographically and legally excluded from protest-encouraging groups. The grip of the 
conservative apartheid system was still deeply entrenched in the countryside. The utter 
dependence of black farm workers on their white landlords, the resulting master and servant 
attitude prevalent among country people and the restricting pass and organisation laws made 
the countryside a very difficult place to mount resistance (Greenberg, 2004:8-9). The 
homelands, although de jure independent, were de facto highly reliant on the apartheid state. 
Increasingly overcrowded in the 1970s and 1980s, virtually no-one was able to make an 
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independent living from agricultural production. The vast majority of rural African people in 
the homelands were migrant workers and relied heavily on wage remittances or government 
grants for survival. These limited resources, which ultimately depended on the state and its 
economy, restricted micro-mobilisation in the homelands. Yet one may argue that these 
constraints might have been overcome by skilful leadership and coordination. The apartheid 
administration, however, purposefully employed the strategy of ‘divide and rule’ in the 
homelands in order to prevent a strengthening of oppositional forces. The homelands were 
ruled by appointed tribal leaders who had strong ties to the apartheid government and were 
able to accumulate wealth and influence to their own benefit and therefore were to a large 
extent interested in suppressing anti-apartheid micro-mobilisation (Greenberg, 2003:102).  
 In sum, the micro-mobilisation necessary to slowly erode and delegitimise the government 
under a repressive system mainly took place in urban centres and focused on addressing 
injustice and violence occurring in the movements’ immediate proximity. Forced removals in 
the countryside, on the other hand, received less attention, although some anti-eviction 
projects maintained ties with affected communities and carried out protest actions, as will be 
discussed later. Overall, protest-encouraging groups centred in towns and focused on the 
practical and rhetorical fight against discriminatory practices. The ANC in this regard also 
turned its attention to the urban audience and their issues, as they were politicised and 
organised and therefore more receptive to its campaigning.  
 The civil-rights movement gained momentum in the middle 1980s due to its decentralised 
but effective micro-mobilisation and successful injustice framing, which will be discussed 
below. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 was a significant step in 
the anti-apartheid struggle, as it was a loose coalition of nearly 700 civil organisations 
including sports clubs, student groups, youth groups, trade unions, churches, women’s 
organisations and religious groups (Zunes, 1999:153). Furthermore, the four aforementioned 
anti-eviction groups joined forces in 1985 and founded the National Committee against 
Removal (in 1990 it was renamed the National Land Committee [NLC]), which was loosely 
connected to the UDF (Mngxitama, 2006:45). The NLC operated mainly decentralised 
through its affiliates in the different provinces. By forming the NLC, the first step towards a 
national presence of civil movements focusing on rural issues was taken. The formation of the 
UDF and the NLC marked a significant trend in the liberation movement away from local 
small-scale struggles to national, anti-systemic mobilisation structures. The extensive micro-
mobilisation in South African cities also gradually led to the growth of alternative institutions. 
Cooperatives, community clinics, legal resource centres and similar offices offered help to 
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people when existing institutions were discriminatory and inadequate. These institutions 
effectively created a situation of dual power in South Africa, as they came increasingly to be 
managed by black South Africans themselves – a situation that again points to the parallel 
importance of political opportunities in triggering activism, as apartheid administrators 
increasingly turned a blind eye to these alternative institutions and even cooperated with 
them.  
 Mobilising structures reached a peak level with the formation of the mass democratic 
movement under the leadership of the ANC. It comprised the informal alliance of the ANC, 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), the UDF, UDF affiliates and other 
civil associations. By that time, the ANC had become the primary organisational vehicle 
through which black South Africans pursued their rights. It had built up a huge network of 
international representatives, which outnumbered the embassies of the apartheid state by far 
and also possessed a powerful domestic network of solitary groups and sympathisers (Marais, 
2001:75; Zunes, 2005:139). The ANC also spearheaded the disobedience campaigns, which 
characterised the civil-rights movements’ tactical actions during the last years of the apartheid 
regime. The aim of these campaigns was essentially to make the country ungovernable by 
initiating boycotts, strikes, occupations and the general challenging of petty apartheid laws. 
Scholars writing on the South African liberation struggle agree that the civil-rights 
movements predominately relied on non-violent protest actions to bring the apartheid system 
down (Emery, 2005; Marais, 2001; Zunes, 1999). Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that 
the mass democratic movement did not exclusively use non-violent tactics. Rioting, 
sabotaging, murdering of opponents and other violent acts were part of the anti-apartheid 
resistance movement. The military arm of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, carried out several 
bombings of military, industrial, civilian and infrastructural sites since the later 1970s. 
However, it never constituted a military threat to the apartheid state. The ANC leadership saw 
Umkhonto we Sizwe rather as a means to force the government to the negotiation table. 
Strikes, boycotts and the establishment of alternative institutions were regarded as the main 
element in the organisation’s strategy for liberation. Anti-eviction organisations such as the 
Association for Rural Advancement or the Surplus People Project engaged exclusively in 
non-violent protest actions, for instance by sit-ins and silent vigils in the cases of removals, by 
disseminating information on evictions through press statements and by providing general 
legal advice on social pensions, maintenance grants and work dismissal (Association for 
Rural Advancement, 1999:99). The Surplus People Project gathered quantitative and 
qualitative data on the forced removal of millions of African people and published it in a 
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comprehensive report. In this way, the scale of rural and urban evictions became better known 
and assisted in delegitimising the apartheid government (Nauta, 2004:18). 
 Therefore, one can argue that the paramount tactical repertoire of the civil-rights 
movements was non-violent, but occasional violent attacks were carried out to disrupt the 
existing order. The extensive mobilisation of human, material and financial resources via 
domestic and international networks, which collectively organised targeted disruptive actions, 
allowed the civil-rights movement to attack the state where it was weakest, namely its 
absolute economic dependence on black workers. By resorting primarily to non-violent 
boycotts and strikes, the movement made the apartheid system ungovernable and publicly 
demonstrated that the state needs the consensus of the majority of the people to be functional. 
This gradual process of weakening the current apartheid government and empowering a 
strong multi-racial opposition, culminating in the ANC amid ongoing state repression, can be 
attributed to micro-mobilisation structures, as they enabled actors to carry out tactical protest 
actions and therefore to sustain activism. In other words, these mobilisation structures reduce 
the costs for actors to engage in activism and slowly increased their benefits as they observed 
concessions by the government and increased national organisation.  
 
3.1.3 Framing processes: Common vision, common generalisation 
As pointed out earlier, organisation and protest actions alone cannot account for sustained 
activism and eventual success of the movement. Opp and Roehl (1990) emphasise that a 
delegitimisation process is equally important to justify and mobilise sustained activism. 
Framing processes can explore this aspect of the South African civil-rights movement as well 
as the subordinated role of rural movements in the liberation struggle. Framing constructs the 
connection between agents, structures and grievances. It links these factual experiences up to 
a new interpretation that mentally envisages how something can be, if one collectively 
engages in that action to repeal this particular grievance. A realistic but culturally rooted 
interpretation is important to cognitively mobilise people within their existing social 
networks. It thereby strengthens collective identity, forges organisational unity and broadens 
the circle of participants. In this respect, the mass democratic movement under the leadership 
of the ANC successfully engaged in constructing a persuasive interpretation that framed their 
struggle nationally and internationally. The ANC in particular was able to gain the structural 
and ideational position as the legitimate government-in-waiting of South Africa. Furthermore, 
the ANC framed its liberation struggle in such broad terms that it became the most inclusive 
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liberation movement of South Africa, able to absorb and activate most strands of resistance to 
apartheid nationally and internationally. In the following discussion these framing processes 
are traced and weaved into the previously described political opportunities and mobilising 
structures.  
 The mass democratic movement under the leadership of the ANC manoeuvred within a 
very broad cultural-ideational matrix in South Africa. This matrix was dominated by the race 
question and the legitimate governmental form for South Africa. Within this scope, various 
strands of thinking existed and entered the discussion for an alternative system in South 
Africa. Debates were led in normative, religious and ideological terms (Klotz, 2002). The 
emerging global debate on human rights, politically expressed in the United Nations and 
practically fought for in the USA by the African-American civil-rights movements, provided 
the ideational backdrop for equal humanitarian sentiments in South Africa. These sentiments 
were supplemented by fundamental Christian values of charity and non-violence. Yet, the 
Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa had used religious values for decades to support 
racial segregation. Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu became a symbolic religious figure in 
the fight against apartheid by advocating racial conciliation. Deeply rooted in Christianity was 
also the Black Consciousness Movement that emerged in the 1960s under Steve Biko. By 
employing normative Christian values they appealed to African people to recognise their own 
potential for cognitive liberation and thereby facilitated greater cohesiveness and solidarity 
among black groups. Ideological interpretations of the apartheid system were strongly 
influenced by the then actually existing socialism in the Soviet Union and Cuba and the 
liberal-democratic capitalism of the USA and Western Europe. Marxist ideas of class struggle 
and economic exploitation were mirrored in the apartheid system. Guerrilla warfare and the 
intent of proletarian revolution, including expropriation, were therefore part and parcel of 
certain sections of the liberation movement, including African labour unions, the Communist 
Party of South Africa and the ANC itself. At the same time, a strong liberal tradition 
originating mainly from the white South African middle class, but by no means reducible to 
them, permeated the ANC as well as other movements. They advocated a more ‘welfarist’ 
policy aimed at ameliorating the suffering of the oppressed through constructive engagement 
with the apartheid government, but without a radical emancipatory project (Marais, 2001; 
Mngxitama, 2006).   
 The ideational platform upon which a strong oppositional force was to be built was 
therefore extremely diverse. How was it feasible to enclose such a diverse interpretation of the 
South African situation under one injustice frame, mobilising national and international actors 
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to back the ANC and the mass democratic movement in South Africa? Marais (2001) outlines 
an argument that draws on the Gramscian concept of ‘common sense’. By framing the 
struggle around central and common values and aspirations that make sense to most actors and 
their positions, the injustice frame attains a broad resonance, which is highly inclusive. But 
broad inclusiveness means that the frame is equipped with a certain elasticity and ambiguity 
that allow multiple oppositional strands to join the coalition without breaking ranks. By 
focusing on central values and remaining vague on explicit policy proposals, the ANC was 
able to assemble a broad coalition that grew into a national liberation movement echoing 
global norms and aspirations. In this respect, it can be argued that the ANC built a master 
frame that united different classes, traditions and cultures in South Africa around the common 
purpose of challenging and gradually delegitimising the apartheid system.  
 This master framing can be unpacked in detail in order to identify the stages and 
consequences more clearly. According to Snow and Bendford (1988), the framing process can 
be divided into diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and motivational framing. The 
diagnostic stage, the construction of an injustice frame, was the most important stage for the 
ANC in unifying the mass democratic movement. By identifying the apartheid system as the 
root of all grievances, the movement reduced the origin to one common denominator and 
linked the fight against poverty and economic decline to the fight against apartheid. The 
liberation movement agreed in broad terms that the current economic and social situation in 
South Africa was due to racial discrimination and the marginalisation of the majority of the 
population. This all-encompassing enemy image of the apartheid system circumvented a 
positioning towards deeper structural questions such as the economic system, urban-rural 
disparities and gender issues. Land distribution therefore became a ‘victim’ of this 
overarching injustice frame, as it was implicitly identified as a grievance associated with 
apartheid, but not explicitly recognised as a fundamental requirement for structural liberation. 
The research project of the Surplus People Project, which gathered data on forced removals of 
African communities, certainly helped in bringing this rural issue to the attention of a broader 
public, but at the same time it focused in its analysis of the inhuman practices of the apartheid 
regime and not explicitly on the underlining need to redress this huge shift in land 
distribution. The inequality in land distribution remained one of many grievances under 
apartheid. In this respect, the NLC also agreed on the injustice frame, recognising the need for 
firstly abolishing apartheid and its discriminatory laws and then addressing land distribution 
under a new non-racial dispensation (Mngxitama, 2006; Sihlongonyane, 2003).    
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 As a result of this generalised diagnostic framing, the proposed alternatives also remained 
inclusive and addressed basic human values. As Marais (2001:76) argues, the ANC’s 
conception of a post-apartheid society, the prognostic framing, “remained rudimentary and 
impressionistic” and modelled around the “sweeping injunctions of the ANC Freedom 
Charter”, which states that “[t]here shall be houses, security and comfort! ... The people shall 
share in the country’s wealth! ... The land shall be shared among those who work it!” (African 
National Congress, 1955:n.p.). These future perspectives remained barely elaborated on over 
the 30 years of liberation struggle and therefore left ample room for interpretations from 
various stances. While uniting South Africans in their fight against apartheid, they would later 
on lead to much conflict and confusion on the direction of policy.  
 The motivational framing stage, which addressed the actual actions needed for change, 
ranged from violent actions through Umkhonto we Sizwe to the non-violent disobedience 
campaigns outlined above. While emphasis was given to non-violent protest action, space was 
provided for an armed struggle throughout the ANC liberation history. It can be argued that 
this two-track approach assisted in building an inclusive resistance front. The armed struggle 
helped in allying and pacifying the more radical wing of the movement, while the prevalent 
non-violent campaigns, accompanied by repetitive rhetorical assurances of an inclusive 
democracy based on conciliation, opened the door for many white South Africans and 
international sympathisers to join the movement.   
 In sum, diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing by the ANC and the mass 
democratic movement remained focused on central values and aspirations, which provided the 
interpretational elasticity needed to unite most oppositional forces of South Africa. By 
agreeing on a common enemy and focusing on a non-racial society based on universal civil 
rights, the ANC could mobilise nationally and internationally, across races, classes and 
cultures. This process culminated around the imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela, whose 
liberation campaign symbolically framed the national liberation struggle and the legalisation 
of the ANC. Admittedly, this framework shortens and sums up a long and much more 
complex process of the South African liberation movement. It is important to note that there 
were numerous internal fights, break-ups and debates around the idea of liberating South 
Africa. It was certainly not a smooth process with a clear idea of how to become a national 
liberation movement. Through many trials and errors, the ANC experimented with different 
forms of protests and alignments, yet eventually arrived at a strategy that promised mass 
mobilisation in South Africa as well as international assistance. By assembling numerous 
oppositional forces under one master frame, the ANC became the authentic voice for a new 
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South Africa and thereby defied the apartheid system. This process was supplemented by the 
international community, which recognised the ANC as the government-in-waiting and 
initiated through the United Nations political, cultural and economic sanctions, which 
contributed to the symbolic isolation and economic erosion of the apartheid regime.  
 
3.1.4 Summary 
In order to gauge contemporary rural activism in South Africa, a thorough analysis of the 
South African civil-rights movement had to be presented, as the organisational and ideational 
roots of the NLC and the LPM can be found there. The NLC is essentially a child of the 
liberation era of South Africa and has retained many characteristics of this time. Without 
understanding the dynamics of the anti-apartheid struggle, one cannot attempt to describe the 
evolvement of the NLC and subsequently compare it to the MST of Brazil. As it was shown, 
the political opportunity structure, mobilising resources and framing processes were 
dominated by the dichotomy of the apartheid state and the civil-rights movements in South 
Africa. The NLC and its affiliates were participants of the mass democratic movement and 
shared their values and aspirations. Its work was directly interlinked with the work of other 
civil movements in South Africa and it sustained the same repressive state. Hence its 
trajectory is fatefully connected to the South African liberation movement and the ANC.  
 The civil-rights movement of South Africa was successful in mobilising and sustaining a 
national mass movement during the 1970s and 1980s. Ultimately it was able under the 
leadership of the ANC to enter into negotiation with the apartheid state in 1989 and to 
gradually phase out apartheid laws, leading up to the first non-racial democratic elections in 
1994. Employing the synthesised framework, one is able to discern two fundamental and 
interrelated reasons for the civil-rights movement’s success. Firstly, micro-mobilisation, 
which progressively evolved into a national mass movement, established an institutional 
situation of dual power in South Africa and organised defiance campaigns that structurally 
undermined the apartheid system. Furthermore, it facilitated framing processes resulting in the 
collective perception of the apartheid state as illegitimate. These micro-mobilisation 
processes, however, were not solely due to a sudden recognition by South Africans that 
activism is possible and needed. Political opportunities opened up domestically and 
internationally, which enabled and justified an intensified struggle. The second reason is to be 
found in the very successful framing of the liberation struggle. The ANC in this regard 
engaged in counter-framing by progressively uniting the liberation movement under one 
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master frame of an alternative ‘South African vision’. In essence, the ANC structurally and 
symbolically undermined the apartheid system and nationally and internationally attained the 
status of the legitimate South African government-in-waiting.  
 Having emerged and subsequently becoming a part of these developments in South Africa 
moulded the NLC in a way that made it substantially different to the MST from its inception. 
Following the impetus of the civil-rights movement, the nucleus of the NLC can be found in 
the urban centres. The NLC was founded by four separate already-established anti-eviction 
projects, which originated from urban micro-mobilisations against forced removal. Most staff 
members were dedicated anti-apartheid activists with urban backgrounds and non-rural day 
jobs. As Mngxitama (2006:45), a former NLC member, argues, the NLC was founded on 
welfarist principles by people wishing to ameliorate the suffering of the oppressed. The 
actually affected rural people were not the primary initiators of the NLC, they were at the very 
beginning the receivers and only later absorbed in greater numbers into the organisation as 
fieldworkers and administrators. The NLC, while later attaining the status of a national rural 
movement, was in fact largely founded by people not directly linked to a rural livelihood. The 
situation in the rural sector, as it was shown, was very much dominated by apartheid 
segregation and marginalisation and thereby missed the potential to actually voice direct 
resistance from the grassroots. This was reinforced by the focus of the ANC and other civil 
associations on the urban centres. While theoretically acknowledging the grievances of the 
rural non-white communities, their ‘manpower’ was not sufficiently integrated into the 
nationwide liberation struggle.  
 Apart from the urban orientation of the NLC, it attained another crucial characteristic 
resulting from its emergence within the liberation movement. As it was shown, the ANC 
successfully constructed an almost all-encompassing injustice frame, uniting the people 
around common values and aspirations. The fight against poverty and oppression meant 
challenging the apartheid regime and all its discriminating practices. The land question 
remained one part of this struggle and therefore relatively unspecified. It was interpreted 
through the mutual fight against racial discrimination and marginalisation in all areas of life. 
It can be argued that the NLC activists largely adapted this view and carried it over to the 
post-apartheid era. This encompassing vision of a new and better South Africa would also 
unite the NLC and delay a more in-depth engagement with the land question.  
 These characteristics of the NLC and its historical embeddedness into the South African 
liberation movement are significant features of the NLC’s emergence phase. One needs to 
take cognisance of these findings, as they contrast with the findings of the organisational and 
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ideational origins of the MST and therefore already point to systemic differences that explain 
variations in contemporary rural activism. 
 
3.2 Stabilisation and adaptation (1990–1999) 
The release of Nelson Mandela and the legalisation of the ANC in 1990 marked the beginning 
of a completely different political opportunity structure for the NLC and rural activism in 
South Africa. In 1990, the ANC and a host of other parties entered into negotiations with the 
National Party in order to bring about a gradual change towards a new inclusive South 
African administration. The negotiations yielded important results. In 1993, an interim 
constitution was approved, reintegrating the former de jure independent African homelands 
and eradicating all racial laws, among them the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures 
Act No. 108, which repealed the 1913 and 1936 Land acts. Secondly, it comprised the 
intention to form a Government of National Unity (GNU) after the first democratic elections 
in 1994, which echoed the ANC’s zeal under Nelson Mandela to reconcile the races and to 
allay fears of an ANC-dominated government (Thompson, 1998:234–250). 
  The new political power constellation emerging from the transitional period and the 
eventual ANC election victory in 1994 opened a new era for rural activism. The ensuing years 
were characterised by the shared desire of civil society and government to fashion a 
development path that could redress the legacies of apartheid. Development planning became 
an official state affair. The new political opportunity structure had profound implications on 
the organisational structure of the NLC and its further development. In essence, the period 
1990 to 1999 can be described as a continuous blurring of state and civil society, of which the 
NLC was very much part. By examining the development of the NLC during this particular 
period, the interrelatedness of political opportunities, mobilising structures and the framing of 
land issues become apparent. The NLC, in this regard, is a very interesting example of the 
decline of a movement due to the inclusion in governmental structures and attitudes and 
thereby progressively losing its critical distance necessary to maintain the momentum of 
collective action.    
 
3.2.1 Political opportunities: Inclusion and neutralisation 
The political opportunity structure ensuing after 1990 can in retrospective be described as 
excessively inclusive and neutralising. This tendency was formalised by the post-apartheid 
alignment of most of South Africa’s progressive forces which, aspiring to form a new 
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administration, gradually rose to a new political elite and thereby drained civil society of its 
vibrant and critical segments and framed the new government as the one legitimate entity for 
development policy. This assimilation was a practical expression of ideas conceptualised in 
the master frame, emphasising the inclusive ethos of the ANC and aiming at reconciliation 
and nation building. The tripartite alliance became characteristic of the new political structure. 
The ANC allied with Cosatu and the South African Communist Party (Nauta, 2006:29). 
Critics (Greenberg & Ndlovu, 2004; McKinley, 2008; Nauta, 2006) have pointed out that the 
incorporation of Cosatu and the Communist Party certainly facilitated the process of transition 
as the ANC became nationally connected to a well-organised network of supporters and could 
justify its claim of being the ‘united voice’ for South Africa. Yet, in the long term it meant the 
taming and alignment of dissident voices and thereby the gradual loss of an influential 
opposition in South Africa.  
 The joint efforts of fighting the apartheid regime, which had united the civil-rights 
movement during its struggle years, ensued into a euphoric and optimistic will to work 
together with the new administration for a better South Africa. This led to the co-optation of 
the vast majority of the former anti-apartheid movements into the South African National 
Civic Organisation (Sanco) in 1992. Sanco attained a central role during the early 1990s, in 
particular through its coordination of local governance structures. However, with the local 
government elections in 1995/1996, many of the representative roles performed by civics at 
the local level ceded to political parties and elected councillors and therefore diminished the 
role of Sanco (Seekings, 1997). In 1995, a new umbrella organisation was founded, namely 
the South African National Nongovernmental Organisation Coalition (SANGOCO). 
SANGOCO combined nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), among them the NLC, 
universities, civic movements and unions. It was mandated to spread the notion of the state’s 
development policy among the public (Naidoo, 2001). 
 The all-encompassing tendencies of the new South African administration also included 
the alignment of interest groups from industry and international financial institutions. As 
mentioned, the ANC “had only slogans and broad statements of principles at its disposal” and 
“[n]othing resembling an economic policy outline existed” (Marais, 2001:124). The ANC was 
therefore obliged to cooperate with domestic and foreign economic advisors, but was at the 
same time willing to listen since the reconciliation policy advocated by Mandela called for the 
consideration and incorporation of domestic and international business interests. Amid a 
globally changing development paradigm that shifted from state-led welfarist principles to 
market-oriented solutions, and guided by the World Bank and local business groups, the ANC 
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in 1996 disbanded its initial economic strategy, the 1994 Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) and introduced the GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) 
strategy. GEAR has been regarded by numerous scholars as a setback in terms of pro-poor 
development and as a defeat of the assimilated left-wing voices (e.g. Greenberg, 2003; Hall, 
2004; Marais, 2001; McKinley, 2008). GEAR gave impetus to the 1997 White Paper on Land 
Reform, which stipulates South Africa’s present three-pillar land-reform policy: land 
redistribution based on the willing seller–willing buyer principle,13 land restitution and tenure 
reform. It furthermore repealed the 1970 Act on the Subdivision of Agricultural Land and 
thereby legally paved the way for reducing farm sizes and diversifying ownership structures. 
 The institutional inclusion of various interest groups into the process of shaping a new 
South Africa translated into legal structures characterised by the effort to allay different 
strands of the new ‘rainbow nation’. The above-mentioned land-reform policy is one example 
of an attempt to reconcile social development issues with the perceived need to preserve the 
basic economic structure, as South Africa’s land policy is inherently market-oriented, but 
maintains through grants and start-up assistance a state-directed welfare component. The 1996 
South African Constitution also reflects this dualism. One of the most contentious issues 
during negotiations was the property clause, which addressed the core question of how to 
rectify apartheid in terms of asset ownership. The ANC was initially interested in not 
including a clause protecting private-property rights in order to keep the subject of possible 
state expropriations open. Yet, in the course of negotiations it became clear that the National 
Party and foreign advisors would not accept anything less than a property clause. In the end 
the property clause included the protection of private property rights, but reflected the ANC’s 
point of view in that expropriation would be legally feasible under certain conditions – “for a 
public purpose or in the public interest”, which includes “the nation’s commitment to land 
reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources” 
(South Africa, 1996:n.p.). Beyond this, it states that “[t]he state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which 
enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis” (South Africa, 1996:n.p.).  
 Consequently, the South African Constitution provides the legal space to address land 
distribution, including the option for land expropriation. Therefore, it can be argued that 
South African rural movements are provided with a favourable legal framework that is 
supportive of land reform and can therefore serve as a vantage point for rural activism, as it 
has been the case for the Brazilian MST. In Brazil, the constitutional condition of land serving 
                                               
13 Including at this time the Farm Equity Scheme and the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG). 
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a ‘social function’ became one of the cornerstones of the MST’s success, as will be discussed 
in Chapter 4. In contrast, the legal space of the South African Constitution has not translated 
into the same mobilising potential for the NLC. The rationale for this divergence can be found 
in the complex interrelatedness of movement dynamics. While political opportunities were 
exceptionally favourable for the NLC in terms of political and legal access points, the political 
openness ultimately translated into an almost complete absorption of the NLC into ANC 
branches, making it difficult to distinguish between the organisation itself and governmental 
structures. Accordingly, as discussed below, resource mobilisation of the NLC became 
dominated by governmental inputs and structures. The land question was framed in 
compliance with the government’s concept of land reform. This general alignment of 
dynamics towards the government resulted in a gradual neutralisation of the NLC as an 
independent rural movement.  
 In line with their reconciliation policy, the ANC government advocated an orderly, 
administrative approach to land distribution and called on the NLC to be part of its 
implementation. The 1997 White Paper on Land Reform (South Africa, 1997:n.p.) spells out 
this intention clearly:  
The land reform programme emphasises the key role of the non-governmental sector in 
supporting rural and urban development and land reform policies…. Those who stress good 
governance and transparency and argue for participation, see a role for NGOs greater than as 
mere deliverers of services. They seek to involve NGOs and CBOs [community-based 
organisations] in the policy dialogue and in decision making. In this connection, the 
strengthening of NGOs and CBOs as separate, specialist institutions is important. 
The literature review has shown that such processes can lead to a splitting or radicalisation of 
organisations, as certain members oppose the increasing alignment with government 
(McAdam, 1995). This was ultimately the fate of the NLC, as the next section will illustrate. 
Yet, as outlined in detail in Section 3.1, the common struggle against apartheid had forged a 
strong alliance between the anti-apartheid movement and the ANC and thereby also delayed a 
critical engagement of the NLC with its political environment. Nauta (2006:222) boldly 
describes this alignment as follows: “[T]he NLC and its affiliates were regarded as comrades 
by the ANC. Comrades who supported the struggle of the people and underground ANC”. For 
this reason, hopes and expectations were high during the first 10 years that the land question 
could be addressed jointly. As the next section will illustrate, the NLC became an 
organisational and ideological partner for the national land-reform programme.  
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3.2.2 Resource mobilisation: Institutionalisation and cooperation 
Between 1985 and 1998, the NLC grew from four affiliated organisations to ten14 (National 
Land Committee, 1998:1). Thereby, the NLC network became the only segment of civil 
society addressing land issues in South Africa with a national presence (Mngxitama, 
2006:45). With the gradual abandonment of apartheid after 1990, the NLC directed its core 
focus to joining the discussion and implementation of a national land-reform programme.  
 This renewed attention to explicit questions of land distribution came at a time when many 
rural areas in South Africa experienced upheavals due to the political changes promising 
redress and political participation (Association for Rural Advancement, 1999:122; 
Mngxitama, 2006:47). With the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC in 
1990, land invasions in rural and urban areas started to gain momentum, but as transitional 
negotiations were pending, people continued to be arrested and removed. Landless people in 
South Africa were either urban squatters or loose communities working and living on white-
owned farms. As outlined in the historical overview, an independent African peasantry 
farming on its own or rented land or as sharecroppers had been largely eradicated by the end 
of World War II. Labour tenancy had become the predominant system and their growing 
families resulted in an increasing number of idle farm dwellers and rural workers travelling 
from farm to farm in search of work (Greenberg, 2004:9). In the former homeland alone, 
remainders of African subsidence farming were present (Vaughan & McIntosh, 1993:1–2). 
Land needs in South Africa were therefore many-sided, including the wish for ancestral 
restitution, secure tenure for workers and their families in urban and rural areas, support for 
subsistence agriculture in the former homelands and land redistribution. Land-reform 
discussions were consequently multi-dimensional, with a strong focus on rights and support.  
 During this crucial transitional period, the NLC took a strong stance for the landless and 
the need for land reform. It continued condemning forced removals publicly and initiated 
numerous community-based meetings to discuss post-apartheid land-reform options. In 1993, 
it organised the “Back to the Land” campaign at the World Trade Centre Johannesburg 
(where the political negotiations took place) to lobby against the inclusion of property rights 
in the property clause (Sihlongonyane, 2003:30). This campaign was followed by a National 
Land Conference in 1994 with representatives from more than 700 rural and landless 
communities gathering to discuss their needs. The delegates drew up a Land Charter, which 
                                               
14 Association for Rural Advancement in KwaZulu-Natal (AFRA), Grahamstown Rural Committee, Eastern 
Cape Land Committee, Farmworkers Research & Resource Project, Free State Rural Committee, Southern Cape 
Land Committee, Surplus People Project, Transkei Land Service Organisation, Transvaal Rural Action 
Committee, Association for Northern Cape Rural Advancement. 
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addressed numerous issues, indicating that the right for land was still identified more with a 
right for equal rights in the new South Africa, e.g. “[l]and must be shared among Black and 
White. We say, ‘One farm, one farmer’! There must be democratic, non-racial, non-sexist 
local government. There must be affordable, good resources and services” (Association for 
Rural Advancement, 1994:11, 13, 14). 
  Shortly after the 1994 elections, both national and local government came to be seen as 
more sympathetic to home and landless people, triggering numerous land invasions of 
communities. The monthly NLC newsletters of 1994 report on several invasions of 
communities in rural KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape, Transvaal and the Free State 
occupying their ancestral land (National Land Committee, 1994), but explicitly called them 
autonomously organised. The demand for land and the will and capacity to mobilise for land 
invasions on a grassroots level if given the political opportunity structure became evident to 
the NLC as well as the new government during this short period of time. In response to these 
unregulated micro-mobilising activities, the ANC government swiftly enacted the Restitution 
to Land Rights Bill in December 1994 in order to initiate a process “which aims to deal 
rationally and in a organized way” with this problem (National Land Committee, December 
1994:1). This bill was followed by the Land Rights Court in 1995, mandated to administer the 
process of land restitution.  
 Following the widening political opportunities from 1994 onwards and the perceived will 
of the new government to cooperate, the NLC became increasingly engaged in governmental 
meetings to debate policy proposals and implementations. The NLC welcomed the land 
initiatives taken by the government and commented regularly on them in its newsletters. 
Apart from seeing each other as ‘comrades’ and sharing a common vision for a prosperous 
land sector, the NLC also had practical reasons for its increased cooperation. After the 
elections, the civil society sector in South Africa had started suffering from a funding crisis. 
With the advent of a non-racial democracy many donors perceived the South African crisis to 
be over and instead channelled funds to other countries or to the new ANC government, 
specifically supporting state-directed developmental programmes such as the RDP and state-
sponsored social welfare partnerships with ‘approved’ civil society organisations (Association 
for Rural Advancement, 1999:157; McKinley, 2008). Therefore, to integrate the NLC into the 
evolving development agenda of the ANC appeared only logical on factual and ideological 
grounds.   
 After 1994, the NLC therefore increasingly changed its work focus from crisis and 
resistance work to long-term advocacy and development support. After 1994, its primary task 
 81 
 
was to assist people in the different provinces to lodge land claims and to gather data on land 
needs for future land-redistribution projects (National Land Committee, 1994; 1995b). 
Furthermore, it got involved in so-called strategic task teams, which were set up nationwide to 
facilitate NGO-government cooperation outlined in the RDP strategy. The positive and to 
some extent self-sacrificing attitude towards this mutual cooperation is reflected in the 
following letter extract of an NLC coordinator to a Member of the Executive Council for 
Land Reform in the Eastern Cape (as cited in Nauta, 2004:204):  
… we believe that in various fields related to land reform, NGOs may have a valuable 
contribution to make … We would be eager to assist Strategic Task Teams in their work on the 
understanding that this may involve limited secondment of NGO staff … 
The secondment of NGO staff became a widespread practice in the period 1994 to ca. 1998. 
Many skilful and well-connected staff members joined the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) 
at national or provincial level. AFRA, as one of the NLC affiliates, commented on this 
process in 1999: “While this added considerably to the capacity of the Department, it meant 
that AFRA lost some of its most strategic thinkers” (Association for Rural Advancement, 
1999:170). In 1994, NLC chair Richard Clacey was seconded to the DLA, in 1995 Joanne 
Yawitch and Bahle Sibisi were appointed special advisors to the Land Affairs minister, to 
name only a few cases of secondment (National Land Committee, 1995a). Consequently, one 
can observe a progressive bureaucratisation of the NLC and absorption of its staff and 
projects into the national development agenda. Activism and voluntarism were replaced by a 
culture where notions of professionalism, management, career and hierarchy came to the fore. 
While the NLC continuously stressed its critical and independent partnership with the 
administration throughout its newsletters, the NLC became more or less a formal rural 
institution carrying out research and administrative tasks.  
 By 1996, the delivery of land via restitution and distribution had started to stagnate due to 
considerable budget cuts and an increasing focus on market-oriented solutions outlined in 
GEAR. This non-delivery accompanied by ongoing farm evictions caused discontent among 
the landless to flare up and resulted in sporadic land invasions in rural areas, as reported in the 
1996 and 1997 NLC newsletters (National Land Committee, 1996; 1997). The slow and 
ineffective land-reform process became clear to the NLC and the landless, yet it neither 
resulted in an abandonment of the formal cooperative course the NLC had taken nor in an 
emergence of a renewed organised grassroots movement, even though discontent and micro-
mobilising capacities were present. The master frame the ANC had constructed during the 
struggle years in conjunction with its political openness towards the NLC caused the NLC to 
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see the government as the legitimate entity to regulate land reform – an entity that can be 
wrong sometimes, but whose “sincerity and commitment can not be doubted” (National Land 
Committee, March 1996:1). In this sense, the NLC throughout 1994 to 1999 engaged in 
‘containment framing’ of autonomous rural actions and thereby continued to include in and 
somewhat subordinate its struggle for land to the broad national master frame of the ANC. 
  
3.2.3 Framing processes: Containment framing within the national master frame 
As stated in Section 3.1, the NLC was since its inception dominated by liberal welfarist views 
originating from urban activists. During the 1990s, this dominance was gradually challenged 
by rural fieldworkers, the ANC Youth League, Communist Party members and young 
graduates who ascended into leadership positions and advocated more radical direct measures 
for land reform. Yet, as it was argued before, the master frame that had united South Africans 
during the struggle years was carried over to the post-apartheid years and ensued into an 
atmosphere of cooperation and optimism to work jointly with the ANC government. This, as 
Mngxitama (2006) argues, also resulted in an overall harmonious co-existence of different 
strands within the NLC during the first years of the post-apartheid era, agreeing that the ANC 
government in consultation with the NLC will design and implement an appropriate land 
policy. That this internal consensus resulted in an increased institutionalisation of the NLC 
has been demonstrated above, yet it also led to an alignment of framing processes in a sense 
that the struggle for land became publicly defined as one technocratic process amid many 
rural issues.  
 The ANC called upon civil society to set out to reconstruct the South African society and 
to participate in an ideological turn from resistance to reconstruction (Marais, 2001). The 
master frame experienced a redefinition, building on the common values and experiences 
generated in the anti-apartheid struggle; it bridged the feeling of camaraderie with patriotism 
and thereby a sense of duty to follow and serve the ANC government in their quest for a 
better South Africa, whatever this entailed. Land reform was therefore publicly defined 
through state policies and accordingly framed around technocratic and conformative 
principles. The framing of the land question by the NLC became through institutional and 
ideological inclusion subordinated to these ‘master frame principles’. As outlined previously, 
throughout 1990 to 1999 state policy experienced a change as the ANC adapted a more 
market-oriented approach in the form of GEAR, which had repercussions for diagnostic, 
prognostic and motivational framing processes of the land question. When going through the 
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various NLC newsletters, one can discern this alignment process. For instance, the NLC 
diagnostic framing task diverged substantially. In June 1994, shortly after the first democratic 
elections, the NLC maintained the following with reference to how to overcome poverty and 
inequality:  
… land reform lies at the heart of this process. It is the starting point in any real debate 
about redistributing wealth and providing opportunities…. [The government] can embark on 
as many housing schemes, electrification programmes or health campaigns as it likes. But 
until it deals with the real problems in the distribution of land in South Africa it is going to 
miss the point. (National Land Committee, June 1994:1) 
In April 1998, this determinism had shrunk to an admission that “land is not viewed in 
isolation from broader rural development and poverty eradication issues” (National Land 
Committee, April 1998:1). In fact, in 1998, the NLC newsletter saw a merger with the 
Environmental Development Trust newsletter and an almost complete abandoning of explicit 
rural issues such as land invasions, evictions and land-policy discussions, which had featured 
prominently in its newsletters throughout 1994 to 1997. The merger meant a divergence to 
stories covering HIV, gender and environmental issues in the rural sector and thereby 
followed the overall trend of seeing land distribution as one part of rural misery (Rural & 
Land Digest, 1998–2001). 
 Also prognostic and motivational framing aligned with state policy. From its “one farmer, 
one farm policy” outlined in the 1994 Land Charter, which aimed to “redistribute land to the 
vast majority of landless people”, it moved to a position formulated in GEAR that land 
reform should follow cost-benefit principles and hence target economically viable 
beneficiaries who are able to engage in competitive commercial agriculture (Mngxitama, 
2006; National Land Committee, December 1994:1). Consequently, motivational framing, 
the rhetoric and tactics chosen to activate landless people, was oriented towards addressing 
these diagnostic and prognostic interpretations of the land question.  
 Motivational framing in compliance with the ANC’s idea of cooperation therefore took a 
form of channelling land demand in an organised and rational way, which enabled the NGO-
government coalition to direct the process. While the NLC repeatedly maintained that “farm 
dwellers themselves will have to organize and try to change their situation” (National Land 
Committee, December 1996:1), it was engaged in containing grassroots mobilisation, 
following the opinion of Minister Joe Slovo that “land invasions were orchestrated by 
outsiders who do not have the best interest at heart, but who are instigating such actions for 
their own personal and political gain” (National Land Committee, September 1994:2). AFRA 
maintained that “[land invasions] is a sign of failure, not success. It is a sign of desperation, 
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of giving up hope in the programmes of the government and civil society to deliver land to 
all people” (Association for Rural Advancement, 1999:134) Land invasions have remained a 
sensitive topic in South Africa and the state maintains a zero-tolerance policy for reasons that 
are discussed in Section 3.3. The NLC in this regard was in a motivational framing dilemma. 
On the one hand, it recognised the need for a strong grassroots movement to remind the state 
of its land-reform promises, on the other hand it considered itself to be in the state’s debt in 
terms of its ideological and institutional partnership. Up until about 2004, this framing 
contradiction would simmer within the NLC, controlled by the national master frame that 
was persistently evoked by the government. The NLC therefore embarked on a critical, but 
organised, land-reform campaign that included workshops, land summits and publications 
aimed at the landless communities to become aware of their rights, but at the same time to 
provide a controlled environment to vent their anger. Since the motivational frame of the 
NLC was embedded in the inclusive national master frame of reconstruction and partnership, 
it was resonant with most landless communities who to a large extent identified with the 
ANC. It ultimately led to a cognitive demobilisation of the landless and contributed to the 
neutralisation of the NLC. The 1990s therefore saw the establishment of state-directed land 
activism in South Africa.             
 
3.2.4 Summary 
The period between 1990 and 1999 changed the political opportunity structure of the NLC 
entirely. The NLC went from complete political exclusion to excessive inclusion. Theories on 
political opportunity have generally maintained that political openness stimulates activism, as 
legal and institutional access points are provided that increase activists’ mobilising and 
advocating capacity. Yet, South Africa and the NLC present an empirical example that 
underpins the importance of examining the interrelatedness of movement dynamics. When 
examining the changes that took place in the organisational structure, tactical repertoires and 
framing processes, one can reason why eventually the NLC lost its activism potential in terms 
of mobilising the landless and making an impact on land reform. In this regard, McAdam’s 
(1996:29) insight of movement form being a variable of the differences in the nature of 
political opportunities applies to South Africa’s NLC. He maintains that changes in the legal 
or institutional structure that grant more formal political access to groups are apt to set in 
motion the most institutionalised movement forms.  
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 Between 1990 and 1999, the NLC developed from a grassroots civil movement to a 
formalised NGO. The sudden political openness triggered a substantial absorption of project 
activity and staff members into governmental branches. The NLC in this way became an 
integral part of the new administration and while de jure independent, became de facto very 
dependent on public funding and state-initiated development projects. Resource mobilisation 
occurred around the national development agenda, which included the actual landless 
communities whose attempted micro-mobilising activities via land invasions were channelled 
into bureaucratic processes. This change could, however, only happen in conjunction with an 
overall strong belief in the new government and its good intentions. The master frame of a 
new and better South Africa generated during the struggle years by the ANC provided the 
ideological perspective that made people perceive the benefits to be higher when cooperating 
with the state as opposed to consistently acting against it. By linking camaraderie with 
patriotism, the master frame became a tool of neutralising and conforming land activism to 
the new national development agenda. Land activism by the NLC was reduced to a state 
partnership that did not challenge the major course of the government and contained 
grassroots activism. Hence, the NLC is an empirical example that illustrates that the nature of 
political openness ultimately determines the form that activism takes. The political 
opportunities after 1994 were essentially too inclusive to maintain the independent critical 
stance of the NLC.  
   
 
3.3 Radicalisation and decline (1999–2009) 
The period 1999 to 2009 saw the collapse of the NLC and the emergence but quick decline of 
a new national rural movement, the Landless People’s Movement (LPM). Today there is little 
political pressure emerging from landless organisations. It is a regionalised process of 
contestation and engagement with government. Following the previous Sections, the overall 
constellation of movement dynamics did not alter substantially; rather an amplification of 
existing characteristics of political opportunities, resource mobilisation and framing processes 
took place, which, taken together, account for the collapse of a national representation of 
landless interests. The short lifespan of the LPM was ultimately the consequence of the 
persistence of these established dynamics. Being a product of perceived grievances, the LPM 
was generated by the NLC in response to the failure of land reform in South Africa, yet, as the 
following chapter will show, sustained movement dynamic was not feasible in South Africa 
given the constellation of political opportunities, resource mobilisation and framing. 
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3.3.1 Political opportunities: Consolidation of top-down approach 
Political opportunities for rural activism did not open up in the period of 1999 to 2009. 
During this time, the ANC government consolidated its dominant position as South Africa’s 
ruling party and as the legitimate institution to bring about change to the countryside. While 
the early post-apartheid era was still characterised by an atmosphere of cooperation and 
counselling, this had changed to a gradual closure and professionalisation of the state. The 
ANC government, supported by its tripartite alliance, was confirmed as the South African 
ruling party in the 1999 and 2004 general elections. Thabo Mbeki succeeded Nelson Mandela 
as president of the Republic in 1999 and was subsequently re-elected for a second term in 
2004. The ANC had transcended from being a liberation party to a consolidated governing 
party, defining itself as “a disciplined force of the left” (African National Congress, 
2002:n.p.).   
 By 1999, the economic landscape had changed significantly. Black Economic 
Empowerment had become the new policy focus – a programme aiming at speeding up the 
integration of previously disadvantaged groups into the South African economy. Attention 
was hereby given to ‘economic viable’ beneficiaries, a policy focus that was in line with the 
conservative stance of the macroeconomic strategy GEAR. Considerable cuts in social 
spending, which also affected the budget for land reform, and the establishment of an 
influential elite of approximately 90 000 black commercial farmers were the results (Driver, 
2007: 67). With less than 2% of farmland being reallocated in 1999, it became clear that the 
goal of redistributing 30% had failed (Lahiff, 2008:23). The majority of the rural population 
remained poor and in precarious working conditions. The commercial agriculture sector 
increasingly faced international competition, thus reverting to job cuts and temporary labour 
in order to decrease costs. Overall, the South African countryside experienced a widening 
income gap reflecting the general tendency of an unequally growing economy (Aliber, 
2003:479) 
 In response to the slow delivery of land, the entire land-reform programme was put on 
hold after the Mbeki administration took office and a lengthy review followed, which has 
been described as a behind-the-door process, since it excluded any input from the non-
governmental rural sector (Eveleth & Mngxitama, 2003:163). In 2000, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs issued a policy statement extending the delivery period to 15 
years (from 2000 to 2015) and announced the introduction of the Land Redistribution for 
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Agricultural Development programme (LRAD), which largely replaced SLAG (Hall, 2004:8). 
LRAD’s focus was the creation of a black commercial farmer class, since poverty was not a 
requirement to qualify for a loan and wealthy farmers could raise much bigger loans (Hall, 
2004; Weideman, 2004). 
 LRAD is an example of the post-apartheid absorption and neutralisation of rural 
organisations and their gradual embracement of market-oriented strategies, because any 
opposition to LRAD from rural organisations was early on silenced and channelled into 
orderly conduct. As outlined before, the late transitional period was already characterised by a 
‘pacting’ between the state, World Bank and white agricultural capital. The Mbeki 
administration fostered this tendency further, which also affected the course of South African 
land policy. In 1999, the politically significant class of black commercial farmers joined this 
elite alignment of business, capital and state. Agri South Africa (Agri SA)15 and the National 
African Farmers’ Union (NAFU)16 are the associations that represent established white and 
black farmers, respectively. In 2000, Agri SA started to embrace a coordinated land reform 
process and therefore initiated talks with the government. It subsequently joined NAFU in a 
presidential working group. Both unions enjoy preferential access to the highest level of 
executive authority in South Africa and meet regularly with the President. These 
representatives of white and black farmers, together with the state, represent the elite alliance 
that has shaped South Africa’s land policy ever since. Their focus throughout 1999 to 2009 
has been the stability and profitability of the commercial agricultural sector and the 
empowerment of ‘qualified farmers’ (National Department of Agriculture, 2001:9). Farmers’ 
unions made some advancement in supporting black farmers, but on a limited scale, mostly 
via small development projects (Hall, 2004:8). However, they have not engaged in any 
serious discussions on how to make land available to a wider circle of beneficiaries. While 
rhetorically still defending the role of land reform and rural movements in fighting rural 
poverty and apartheid injustice, actual policy initiatives have shown different results, 
indicating an abandoning of pro-poor inclusive land initiatives. As the president of Agri SA 
has put it bluntly: “Rural poverty is not a problem the agriculture sector can solve. It’s 
government’s problem” (Sherry & Paton, 2009).  
 Space for the inclusion of NGOs and rural movements therefore became increasingly 
marginalised and conditioned on the submission to the general state development strategy. 
                                               
15 Agri SA was founded in 1904 and represents small- and large-scale commercial farmers. Since the late 1990s 
it has actively recruited black farmers. 
16 NAFU was established in 1991 and represents a small but important class of black commercial farmers. Most 
are individual black farmers, and some are urban business people investing profits in agriculture.   
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District assessment committees were for instance established across the country. The 
committees were mandated to determine, in cooperation with the local government, which 
land-reform projects should be approved (Hall, 2004:9). In some instances, staff were 
recruited from rural organisations, endowing them with some political leverage and finances, 
yet strongly discouraging any grassroots mobilisation attempts, as will be seen below. The 
government’s zero-tolerance against land occupations and grassroots mobilisation became 
even more pronounced during this period. This attitude arose not only from the legacy of 
Mandela’s reconciliation policy, but also from the disastrous economic and social results of 
land occupations in bordering Zimbabwe.17 Since 2000, the land-reform policies of President 
Robert Mugabe have had a significant impact on the South African debates on land reform. 
Considering South Africa’s own stagnating land reform and Mbeki’s rather timid attempts to 
condemn the land invasions, international investors feared a Zimbabwean-style land reform in 
South Africa too. The South African government became worried about investor confidence 
and subsequently came down hard on land-occupation attempts. In a 2004 released press 
statement, the opinion of the ANC government was declared as follows: “South Africans will 
not tolerate hooliganism that is only aimed at misleading people and creating chaos and 
discord. Those with designs to deliberately flout the law and occupy land illegally will be met 
with the full might of the law” (African National Congress, 2004:n.p.).  
 In recent times, attempts to occupy land have focused on urban and peri-urban land in 
South Africa. Large-scale land invasions have not been reported to this day. Groups of 
restitution claimants have however repeatedly tried to speed up the process by occupying land 
temporarily (Hall, 2004; Pithouse, 2009b). The invasion of land was met with strict eviction 
by the government. For instance, the land occupations at Bredell outside of Johannesburg or 
Khayelitsha near Cape Town in 2001 were harshly suppressed (Sihlongonyane, 2003:29). 
Recent legislations have accordingly focused on the control and regulation of urban land 
invasions. The City of Cape Town has set up an anti-land invasion unit to stop people from 
occupying land that has been identified for housing (City of Cape Town, 2009). The 
KwaZulu-Natal government enacted the Slums Act in 2007 in order to eliminate slums, 
prevent new slums from developing and control and upgrade existing slums. The Act is 
currently challenged in the Constitutional Court and has therefore not been implemented yet 
(Abahlali, 2009). The Act provides authorities with significant powers to force people to 
                                               
17 In February 2000, war veterans associations organised land invasions on farms owned by white farmers. White 
farmers’ appeals to the government were ignored. Due to a lack of substantial farming experience, the 
subsequent drop in farm output has been tremendous and produced widespread starvation.  
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move and to determine where and how they are going to live, resulting into an entirely top-
down approach to settlement. 
 The year 2007 also saw the surfacing of an attempt to speed up land reform via a change 
in the compensation requirements for land expropriation. Current land-reform legislation 
requires payment to the landowner according to market value, which has been argued inhibits 
the purchase of farmland due to the currently high land prices (Van der Merwe, 2009). The 
2007 Expropriation Bill would have allowed for expropriation at below-market value if the 
owner benefited from apartheid subsidies (Hofstatter, 2009). The Bill was shelved in 2008 
amid strong opposition from Agri SA, the Afrikanerbond18 and the Democratic Alliance.19 
They argued as follows: “The Bill is based on the false perception that white South Africans 
have no moral right to ownership of land in particular, but also property in general, as 
everything they possess is the result of wrongful deprivation” (Expropriation bill under fire, 
2008). This points to the ongoing debate in post-apartheid South Africa on who is the 
legitimate owner of the farming land. Having farmed relatively successfully for centuries, 
white South African farmers and in particular Afrikaners still identify strongly with their land. 
Even though land ownership does not translate into political power as it used to during the 
18th and 19th centuries, farm land is still very much part of the Afrikaner culture and used as a 
kind of defence mechanism for being a genuine white African (Fraser, 2007). As in the past, 
contemporary South Africa does not link legitimate land ownership to social productivity 
criteria as it is the case in Brazil, but rather to race. A legitimate landlord was white during 
apartheid, today a legitimate beneficiary of land reform has to be black. To be expropriated 
because you are a white farmer even though you are productive (as it happened in Zimbabwe) 
causes resentment. To have their land taken away essentially means for many contemporary 
Afrikaners the same that it meant for African people: the renouncement of their productive 
contribution to South Africa. This racial dynamic has shaped the political opportunity 
structure tremendously, as the land reform debate is to this day a question of race wrapped up 
in market-efficient principles.       
 The 2009 elected ANC administration under President Jacob Zuma faces the same 
constraints when attempting to tackle land reform with current land redistribution amounting 
to 6.7% in September 2009 (Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, Sept 2009). 
Yet, as with every new ANC president, initial proclamations of a new and better approach 
raise hopes among the constituency and mobilise votes. In this regard, discussions on 
                                               
18 The Afrikanerbond was established in 1994, an association open to anybody who identifies with the Afrikaner 
community. 
19 The Democratic Alliance is a political party and the governing party in the Western Cape province. 
 90 
 
productivity levels and poverty reduction in the land sector seem to have attained renewed 
attention as well. The government acknowledged the failure of about 50% of black land-
reform beneficiaries and promised better post-settlement assistance (Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group, 2008; Bernstein, 2008). President Zuma also stated that the government’s 
priority is to “ensure that land reform through redistribution” is linked “to the creation of 
livelihood for the poor” (Mahlangu, 2009:n.p.). This renewed emphasis on service delivery 
contributed to the ANC’s continued majority rule in 2009, despite the emergence of a 
potentially influential opposition party, the Congress of the People (COPE) in 2008. COPE 
was founded by dissident ANC voices and hence might be an indication of increasing 
fractionalisation within ANC ranks as well as slow detachment of voters from the ANC as the 
sole legitimate representation of black South Africans. However, COPE does not yet represent 
an oppositional force in the current parliament. The ANC continues to dominate South 
African politics based on its established national master frame. Most South Africans still 
perceive the ANC as their liberator and regard it as their duty to support its policy and to 
refrain from open antagonistic behaviour or rhetoric.  
 Consequently, the state with its elite allies essentially remains the only authority to discuss 
and implement land reform in South Africa. This has once again become evident in recent 
policy developments. The former Department of Land Affairs has become a separate ministry 
in 2009, possibly leading to a further bureaucratisation of the land-reform process. 
Furthermore, the entire land-reform programme is under review at the moment. A Green 
Paper committee has been set up, mandated to give new perspectives on South Africa’s land 
policy. The composition of the committee is symptomatic to South Africa’s situation in the 
land sector. The committee consists of academics, World Bank officials, land-reform director-
general Thozi Gwanya, and other government officials (Hofstatter, 2009). Hence, the overall 
political opportunity structure in South Africa does not provide for the inclusion of rural 
organisations’ interests and remains a top-down affair.  
 
3.3.2 Resource mobilisation: Collapse of national rural organisations 
The mobilising structures underwent changes during 1999 and 2009, yet ultimately, existing 
constraints prevailed and in conjunction with restricting political opportunities and framing 
processes led to the collapse of the NLC and the LPM.  
 As the failure of the land-reform programme and the neoliberal turn of the government 
became evident to the NLC, an internal discussion on present structures in the land sector was 
initiated. The introduction of GEAR in 1996 had already sparked the first internal disputes, 
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yet with the consolidation of President Mbeki’s elite alignment, the need for new alignments 
in the land sector was established. It was decided to facilitate the re-emergence of an 
independent rural movement or at least some form of grassroots mobilisation to push for land 
reform on a national scale (Sihlongonyane, 2003:30). It is interesting to note that the need for 
such a movement was realised by an established rural organisation and not by the landless 
themselves. This is indicative of the non-existence of a landless identity that progressively 
frames claims for land reform in modern South Africa and the implicit subordination of 
activism to state guidelines even at grassroots level.   
   The first effort to mobilise grassroots activism was the Rural Development Initiative 
(RDI). In 1999, the NLC held a conference for community-based organisations in an attempt 
to organise them into a broad coalition. Yet, this initiative collapsed as soon as funding dried 
out for follow-up meetings (Greenberg, 2004a:16). The NLC continued to support 
community-based projects with various backgrounds (water access, health issues and 
agriculture). It also remained committed to its working relationship with municipalities 
through the organisation of workshops and meetings with international donors and land 
experts. The period after 1999 was characterised by an increased cross-border activism of the 
NLC, as it often played an important role in formalising networks in Southern Africa. There 
was a mushrooming of Southern African networks20 dealing with all kinds of land issues, 
often sponsored by foreign-aid organisations or governments (Sihlongonyane, 2003:31–32).  
 As mentioned before, micro-mobilisation in the form of land occupations around urban 
centres increasingly became an issue for the NLC, in particular after the events in Zimbabwe. 
The NLC was forced to confront the issue and take up a stance on whether to support and 
even encourage such activities in its effort to generate a rural movement or to condemn such 
moves. Occupations of rural land had remained a symbolic form of protest in South Africa 
since the end of apartheid. They were aimed at speeding up bureaucratic restitution processes 
or extorting other kinds of services from landlords or the municipality (Mngxitama, 2006:47). 
Land occupations took an unorganised form; there was usually no intention to settle or to 
engage in crop cultivation. In this regard, it needs to be noted again that South Africa’s 
landless cannot be equated with full-time farmers. As mentioned before, the apartheid system 
had largely eradicated an independent African peasantry. In the former homelands, subsidence 
farmers developed a strong reliance on wage remittances from urban workers. Labour tenants 
and farm dwellers often lacked the managerial skill and resource capacity to commit to 
                                               
20 For instance the Southern African Network on Land, the Agrarian Reform Network and the Land Rights 
Network of Southern Africa. International links were established to UK Oxfam and Food First in the USA.  
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independent farming. While these characteristics point to the current high failure rate of land-
reform beneficiaries, it can also partially explain the reluctance of South Africa’s landless to 
carry through with land occupations. Yet, the inadequate farming background can only be a 
partial reason, because the mobilising dynamics of land occupations are also influenced by 
political opportunities, which were rather oppressive and therefore discouraging in South 
Africa, as seen in the previous section. Furthermore, grassroots micro-mobilisation needs to 
be supported by some kind of external guidance that can draw the landless’ attention to legal 
and political loopholes (McAdam, 1982). This combination happened extensively with the 
MST in Brazil. In South Africa, the NLC was also faced with the question of whether to 
support land occupations by providing resources and emphasising the constitutional right to 
land reform.  
 During the transitional years, the NLC had taken a strict anti-land invasion stance since 
occupations run counter to its efforts to bring about change to the countryside through 
bureaucratic channels. The increasing closure of political access points and the neoliberal turn 
of the ANC government had convinced the organisation that some form of organised 
grassroots pressure is necessary; yet the question of whether land occupation should be used 
as a tactical repertoire divided the organisation. Being interrelated with governmental 
structures through funding, project work and some sort of comradeship did commit many 
members to follow state policy and conventional forms of protest. On the other hand, there 
was a rising radical wing in the NLC, mainly comprised of field workers and young graduates 
eager to speed up the reform process through land invasions (Mngxitama, 2006:48–49). This 
wing continued mobilisation at the grassroots level and drew parallels between South Africa, 
Brazil and Zimbabwe, seeking to generate an alternative frame of landlessness in South 
Africa that would stand in firm opposition to the government (Wolford, Baletti & Johnson, 
2008:301–305).  
 This wing of the NLC took advantage of a big United Nations event in South Africa in 
order to raise funds and draw public attention to its cause. In 2001, the World Conference 
against Racism in Durban brought together more than 3 000 landless delegates from 
communities across South Africa and from around the world. At this conference, the LPM 
was founded with a radical oppositional outlook, encapsulated in its demand to transfer “land 
to those residing and working on it” (Greenberg, 2004a:2). The LPM emerged during 
discussions on a land charter that sought to carry forward their campaign motto, 
“Landlessness = Racism”, which is indicative of the previously discussed interpretation of 
landownership in South Africa as not directly linked to beneficial production, but race. By 
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accentuating this connection, the LPM could reach a wide audience during the conference and 
indirectly brought land reform back onto the agenda. The LPM’s attempt to construct a 
counter-frame that is resonant with the landless is discussed further in Section 3.3.3.  
 Following the events at the conference, the LPM quickly mobilised, primarily with the 
help of the NLC, a national structure. However, the LPM remained largely structured at the 
top with a national council assembling representatives from each province, but at the bottom 
members remained tied to their local organisations and NLC affiliates. The LPM was highly 
dependent on the supportive wing of the NLC in terms of financial and organisational 
resources and was therefore reliant on its consensus (Greenberg, 2004a:21). These constraints 
on resource mobilisation were a partial reason why the LPM remained an agitating 
organisation throughout its lifespan. As soon as finances were refused by the NLC, the LPM 
reversed its activism. It made a strong public appearance at the 2002 United Nations World 
Summit on Sustainable Development by organising a landless march with 25 000 participants. 
Furthermore, it issued press statements threatening land occupations if the government did not 
respond to its claims. Yet, its tactical repertoires never included concrete projects such as 
occupations or strikes (Greenberg, 2009a). The LPM in this regard remained a ‘spin-off’ 
movement from the NLC (McAdam, 1995). It drew most of its human and material capacities 
as well as its range of tactical repertoire from the NLC. Its foundation was based on the 
NLC’s wish to establish a national grassroots organisation that stands in opposition to the 
government. The LPM was therefore essentially a generated movement with a national 
structure, but with no sustained input from the bottom and no tactical repertoires that forged 
nationwide solidarity and community.  
 This immobility of the LPM was also a reflection of the internal dispute in the NLC on the 
feasibility and acceptability of land occupations in South Africa. Throughout 2000 to 2003, 
the NLC fought in numerous meetings, but did not agree on a common stance. The LPM was 
seen by some NLC affiliates as a radical, anti-systemic movement that did not conform to the 
NLC’s vision on how to implement land reform in South Africa. The supportive wing of the 
LPM pressured for a tactical and visionary readjustment of the NLC and accused the NLC of 
exorbitant salaries and financial mismanagement. In 2003 it came to a rupture: NLC affiliates 
in the Eastern Cape, North West and Northern Cape withdrew from the movement and the 
NLC director, who had publicly supported the LPM, was dismissed (Donors ditch land NGO, 
2005). Associations with the LPM were cut completely. The LPM did not survive this crisis. 
National structures were dismantled and projects cancelled. According to Stephen Greenberg, 
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a former NLC/LPM activist, the LPM exists only by name today, since some local 
communities and journalists continue to use the label in the media (Greenberg, 2009a). 
 The NLC did not survive the crisis either. As internal fractionalisation became evident and 
accusations of nepotism became louder, donors withdrew from the NLC, which aggravated 
problems even further. In addition, the ANC government increasingly distanced itself from 
the NLC and referred projects to smaller local organisations. Between 2003 and 2005, the 
NLC still attempted to streamline its head office and finances, yet disagreements and financial 
difficulties could not be solved, and in 2006 the NLC was disbanded (Mngxitama, 2006). 
Each affiliate continues to work separately in the provinces, but there is no national 
coordination of activities and therefore no national representation of landless people lobbying 
for land reform any more. Today, most of the remaining organisations21 represent shack 
dwellers in and around urban areas in South Africa, while some of them also engage in post-
settlement assistance to land-reform beneficiaries. But their work is more a regionalised 
engagement with government with very little political pressure emerging from them. 
 Over-dependency on the government in terms of project work, finances and land-reform 
policy therefore continued to guide the NLC during 1999 to 2006. Alternative resource 
mobilisation through the LPM did not succeed, as the NLC was not able to reconfigure its 
dependent and inclusive relationship to the state and as landless people were rather reluctant 
to express their discontent in organised state opposition. Resource mobilisation remained 
constrained. The emerging grievances: the stagnating land reform programme within a 
neoliberal economic policy did therefore not suffice to trigger a sustained grassroots 
mobilisation or a renewed activism by the NLC. As the following section shows, part of the 
reason was also the failure to construct an alternative resonant frame of landlessness in South 
Africa. 
  
3.3.3 Framing processes: Dominance of the national master frame 
The period 1999 to 2009 did not see an alteration in framing landlessness in South Africa. 
There were attempts to construct a new collective action frame that would counter the existing 
national master frame and thereby trigger a specific identity of landlessness, mobilising for a 
push to speed up land reform. Ultimately this attempt failed and the South African landless’ 
claims remain part of the national master frame, which calls for a state-led development 
strategy and sees landlessness as one of many issues amid the racially skewed South African 
                                               
21 For instance Abahlali baseMjondolo, the Anti-eviction Campaign and the Rural Legal Centre. 
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society. This section attempts to explain why the LPM’s counter-frame generated by the NLC 
was initially successful, but ultimately failed to produce sustained mobilisation.  
 From its inception, the NLC identified with the national master frame of the ANC. This 
has been shown in the previous Sections. The crux of the matter is that the NLC was never 
able to detach itself from this frame by gathering enough support for an alternative frame. 
This, in combination with resource dependency and closure of political opportunities, sealed 
its decline. The 1990s saw the ascent of a more radical wing within the NLC, increasingly 
competing with the more liberal welfarist-oriented leadership (Greenberg, 2004a:19, 
Mngxitama, 2006:47). As the previous section showed, this group pursued the build up of the 
LPM by disseminating and amplifying ideas of an alternative approach to carry out land 
reform. Constructing an alternative frame of landlessness was part and parcel of this goal. The 
frame was supposed to stand in opposition to the national master frame by radicalising 
diagnostic, prognostic and motivational components. In this regard, the former apartheid and 
current governments were seen as the primary stumbling blocks. The ANC government was 
accused of mismanagement and overly neoliberal tendencies and charged with selling out 
land reform. Prognostic framing was rather vague, reflecting the diversity of land claims in 
South Africa. There were claims to obtain small plots, large commercial farms, legal titles for 
shacks and many tribal restitution claims. Motivational framing comprised the most 
controversial component of the LPM’s counter-frame as it called for land occupations to 
pressurise authorities.  
 At its outset, this collective action frame seemed to draw the attention of the landless and 
was recognised by the South African media, as the LPM received considerable publicity. In 
retrospective, it needs to be argued that this collective action frame was resonant among the 
landless as long as it was used as a tool to draw public attention. The campaign motto of the 
LPM (Landlessness = Racism) at the 2001 United Nation conference was resonant, as it 
firstly  fitted into the theme of the conference and secondly evoked elements of the national 
master frame constructed during the apartheid struggle years. As previously argued, race is 
the dominating feature of the land question in South Africa during and after apartheid and to 
associate landlessness with racism in such plain terms would ensure the attention of the press, 
the government and the ordinary person. It is indicative that the LPM was most active during 
big conferences where it was secured national attention by using radical banners such as 
“Land now! Organise and unite!”, “Take back the land!”, “No Land! No Vote!” (Landless 
People’s Movement, 2003).  
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 The vague prognostic framing initially ensured the interest of a vast pool of land 
claimants. As Greenberg attests, LPM members came from all backgrounds, even successful 
black commercial farmers joined wishing to take advantage of the public attention the LPM 
drew. During 2001 and 2002, the LPM generated considerable press coverage with debates on 
expropriations and the land question in general. Amplified by the events in Zimbabwe, this 
was purely achieved through agitating rhetoric, as there was no real grassroots organisation or 
activism. The frame failed to translate its ideas into actions; in particular the diagnostic and 
motivational component did not transform or match sufficiently with existing interpretations 
of the situation. Several interviews conducted by Stephen Greenberg show that most LPM 
members did not share the same radical views on the ANC government. Greenberg states that 
“the view was widespread that the LPM’s first task was to speak to the government” 
(2004:29). In support this allegation, Greenberg (2004:29) cites two LPM members 
interviewed in 2003:  
“We want to meet with the government to discuss our grievances. If they don’t listen then 
we must protest. Government should rectify the situation.”; “We held a meeting with the 
public to ask the council to make land available. We haven’t yet spoken to the council. 
We will first speak to councillor Nkomo, and if there is no response we will occupy the 
land.” 
A strong conviction prevailed among the landless that the institutional space, won together 
with the ANC during the apartheid struggle years, must be used to achieve the goals of land 
redistribution as far as possible. There were dissident voices denouncing the ANC, such as 
Mr. Gini (cited in Greenberg, 2004:34), a shack owner and former LPM member: “… I am 
sick and tired of the ANC. The mouth is talking nice[ly], but when it comes to the hands the 
politicians do nothing”. However, the majority of LPM members interviewed by Greenberg 
remained loyal to the ANC. For instance, Mrs Makhanya, a farm worker (cited in Greenberg, 
2004:34) stated: “We need to vote ANC, because they are the only organisation here. The 
DA rules here, we need a change of power in this area. Even if the ANC won’t deliver, we 
will be able to go to them …”. Ultimately, most landless people do not want the government 
to fail and strongly identify with the ANC administration. The enemy images that some NLC 
and LPM activists tried to build up did not (yet) resonate with the majority of the local 
population.  
 The same applies to the tactic of land occupations. As previously argued, there are 
objective reasons why long-term occupations were not feasible, yet there is also a sense that 
land occupations are only a tactic to raise concerns about ‘proper’ access to land, which 
should ultimately be achieved in cooperation with the government. In this regard, some 
 97 
 
members even expressed the expectation that the government should assist with occupations: 
“We must take the land. But the police and farmers prevent people from occupying it. If we 
want to occupy the land, we must go to the government and tell them to stop the police” 
(LPM member cited in Greenberg, 2004:29). Furthermore, the indecisive stance of the NLC 
leadership on land occupations affected perceptions of the acceptability of land occupations 
on the ground: “Occupations are not a good idea because they lead to confrontation. 
Although we could try to occupy unused or unoccupied land. There is nothing wrong with 
that. People are ready to occupy. They have been calling on leadership, but the leaders have 
been delaying …” (LPM member cited in Greenberg, 2004:34). Overall, land occupations 
remained a symbolic protest form with no long-term idea of how to stay on the land or how 
to use it productively. Hence motivational framing could not bring about the long-term 
stimulus of activism and sense of community as it did in Brazil through land occupations and 
post-settlement solidarity.  
 The collective action frame of the LPM remained an engineered frame, which was not 
sufficiently resonant with the people on the ground as it did not match or gradually transform 
deep-rooted perceptions formed during the apartheid years. After political democratisation, 
the national master frame of the ANC continues to provide the ideological background for 
most South Africans. The ANC is regarded as the liberator and therefore the inherently 
benevolent state, which, despite current delivery bottlenecks, is to be trusted and supported in 
its ongoing efforts to build a new South Africa. The broader purpose of this national master 
frame calls for nation building and the joint fight against poverty. Any attempts to design 
alternative channels of activism are rejected as detrimental interferences and are referred to 
political access points that the ANC has ostensibly established for all South Africans. The 
following press statement (African National Congress, 2004) voices this claim of exclusivity 
clearly:  
If the LPM has legitimate concerns regarding the land restitution process, these can and 
should be dealt with through the appropriate government departments.… If any organisation 
believes they have better policies than the ANC – on land reform or anything else – they 
should test the support of the electorate for these policies through the democratic process.   
The dominance and implicit acceptance of this national master frame ultimately led to the 
demise of the NLC and the LPM as representatives of landless people. The emergence of an 
active oppositional force with national scope is politically suppressed and more importantly 
not sustained by genuine grassroots level support.  
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3.3.4 Summary 
The period 1999 to 2009 witnessed the collapse of national representation of the landless in 
South Africa. Today, rural movements still exist on the local and provincial level, yet no 
nationally coordinated lobbying for land reform takes place any more. Activism focuses on 
rural-urban issues and is predominately carried out in accord with government projects. This 
chapter has shown how the constellation of movement dynamics that were planted during the 
apartheid years, evolved in the following years, were solidified from ca. 1999 onwards and 
eventually led to the breakdown of the NLC and the LPM.  
 While the government rhetorically continued to evoke the spirit of camaraderie of the 
apartheid struggle years and linked it to the present day duty to consider the state as the only 
legitimate entity for development policy, it actually increasingly closed political opportunities 
for rural movements. There were no vital alternative channels for activism, as land 
occupations were strictly suppressed and the NLC was gradually marginalised from the 
national debate on land reform and replaced by a state alignment with white and black 
commercial farmers. Although the NLC did not critically contribute to land policy any more, 
its resource mobilisation continued to be dependent on state structures in terms of funding and 
project work. The NLC became a formal agency providing services to land-reform 
beneficiaries and coordinating Southern African land networks. Essentially, the NLC turned 
into a disguised governmental department. 
  As the failure of the market-led land reform became more and more evident, internal 
voices started to question the institutionalisation of the NLC and its partnership with the state. 
In response to the perceived grievances, the LPM was engineered by NLC activists, in the 
hope to establish a powerful grassroots movement that can articulate its demands and thereby 
direct land reform back to its pro-poor roots. The LPM emerged not from a change in political 
opportunities, resource mobilisation structures or framing processes, but purely in response to 
perceived grievances. It was a planned initiative by NLC activists, temporarily backed up by 
other rural organisations and landless people as a tool to draw attention. Yet, the initiative 
ultimately lacked the dynamics that sustain movement activism, namely vital political access 
points, committed and somewhat organised grassroots activists, a powerful tactical repertoire 
and a collective action frame that counters existing interpretations. The specific constellation 
of movement dynamics that was established shortly before and during the transitional period 
and had widely demobilised independent rural activism persisted. Essentially, there was no 
ideological and structural space for an oppositional rural force on a national scale. The 
national master frame of the ANC continued to dominate political thinking within the NLC 
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itself and the ANC’s mainly black electorate, which also comprises the majority of the 
landless. Therefore, the land question has remained largely a matter of racial redress and is 
continuously treated as one of many apartheid legacies that need to be addressed exclusively 
by the state. The temporarily emerging discontent within the NLC is minor proof of dissident 
thinking, yet the collapse of this opposition illustrates that South Africa at the bottom and the 
top is not ready for the kind of political pluralism characterising the Brazilian case. 
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Chapter 4 
Movement dynamics in Brazil 
4.1 The emergence of the MST (1978–1985) 
The MST emerged amid the democratic opening of the Brazilian state. The year 1978 saw the 
rise of major strike movements in the Sao Paulo district, which ensued in a national wave of 
protests accelerating liberal reforms. Opening political opportunities enabled the landless to 
raise their voice and to organise predominately in the southern states of Brazil. At the same 
time, the local political structure remained overall hostile, encouraging activism through this 
ambivalent opportunity structure. Existing strong religious networks in conjunction with 
shared meanings of landlessness facilitated the emergence and positioning of the MST.    
 
4.1.1 Political opportunities: National opening and legal access points   
As in South Africa, Brazil experienced a gradual and negotiated opening of its political 
system in the 1970s and 1980s. The strong conservative alignment of the Brazilian military, 
which had characterised the military government during the 1960s, started to change, 
providing access points for oppositional forces to enter into negotiations with the narrow 
governmental circle. General Geisel, who had assumed the presidency in 1974, and his 
political adviser Golbery initiated behind-the-door talks with the Catholic Church and union 
leaders. The moderate voices in the military government identified with General Geisel and 
Golbery’s strategy. While rooted in the military tradition, many of them had legal 
backgrounds and therefore tended to believe that ultimately only a popular election would 
legitimise the Brazilian government. The moderate wing was furthermore strengthened by the 
still partially functioning Congress, which remained directly elected and had thereby 
maintained a link to the civilian constituency (Skidmore, 1999:184-185).  
 As in the South African case, the gradual shift towards the moderate wing in the Brazilian 
military government was also guided by the international context. The global debate on 
human rights and universal suffrage had its affect on Brazil’s political elite. The country 
identified strongly with the North American democracies, in particular the USA, and 
maintained close economic ties with them. Reports of torture and abuse of human rights had 
brought Brazil massive international criticism and thereby facilitated an international and 
domestic process of delegitimising military rule (Skidmore, 1999:184–187).    
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 Consequently, the 1970s and 1980s saw a general strengthening of the moderate, pro-
democracy forces within the military circle, and conservative officials started to align to the 
moderate wing, which in turn established ties to civil society. Several liberal reforms were 
introduced, for instance, censorship and policy surveillance were partially removed (Ondetti, 
2008:55). With the electoral reform of 1979, new parties were allowed to form. Intended to 
divide the opposition, it however prompted the founding of influential oppositional parties, 
e.g. the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático 
Brasileiro [PMDB]) and the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores [PT]) under Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, popularly known as Lula (Dabene, 2003:7). The opening of protest 
structures enabled oppositional forces to become more articulated in the different states as 
dissidents returned to Brazil and media campaigns became feasible.  
 In 1981, Congress enacted a law restoring direct state elections of state governors and 
thereby reintroduced a strong federal component, which paved the way to the first multi-party 
elections in 1984. The loosening of state repression and the opening of political participation 
generated increased cooperation between state agents and oppositional groups in rural areas in 
an effort to exploit regional issues to their political advantage. The 1982 federal state elections 
eventually opened doors for oppositional parties to gain political ground. This represented 
great political opportunities for rural groups to tie votes to the promise of addressing land 
questions. In several southern states, governors inclined to carry out land expropriations for 
the sake of redistribution were elected and thereby provided an effective political access point 
for rural grassroots activism (Wolford, 2003:73). The revival of direct state elections and 
thereby federalism in Brazil enabled groups to bring regional conflicts to national attention by 
making governors, who assembled in Congress, accountable to their state policies (Cheibub, 
Figueiredo & Limongi, 2002).   
 These emerging political access points were underpinned by the relatively long legal 
tradition for land reform in Brazil, attempting to regulate often illegitimate land titles and 
thereby gradually neutralising the power of the landowning elite. Surprisingly, the military 
regime had brought about an important change in the legal framework concerning this policy. 
A land statute was signed in November 1964, shortly after the military coup, which 
acknowledged de jure the need for land redistribution, declaring that land not serving a social 
function is subject to expropriation. If effective use could be demonstrated, which meant 
cultivation for a year and a day, then that person could legally claim the holding (Hecht & 
Cockburn, 1989:168). The statute’s main focus was to develop ways of dealing with 
unproductive latifúndios amid the national plan for agricultural modernisation. It furthermore 
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eased potential exportations by stipulating that landowners would be compensated with public 
bonds only redeemable 20 years after being issued. Thereby, cash payment according to 
market value could be avoided. It also established that only the federal government would be 
entitled to decree expropriations for the purpose of land reform (Navarro, 2009:3). 
 Although the political participation and the influence of Brazil’s rural population 
increased progressively amid the political opening of 1978 to 1985, direct opposition of local 
governors and landowners towards changes in land distribution remained strong in the 
Brazilian states. Landowners frequently resorted to violence towards rural activists and 
imbedded legal processes. Instead of allocating plots of land from exiting unused 
landholdings, local administrators pressured landless people to settle at the frontier regions of 
the Amazon forest, which most landless people rigorously rejected (Wright & Wolford, 
2003:42–43) The local struggle for land therefore remained highly controversial and 
hazardous even though a favourable political and legal environment was evolving at the 
national level.  
 This ambivalence of national and regional political opportunities, which would become 
more pronounced in the following decades, spawned the ‘creative political tension’ that 
mobilised the work of the MST in Brazil. While the favourable legal and participatory 
framework was used to inspire landless people, the hard-fought implementation at the 
regional and local levels facilitated the emergence of a ‘foe image’ towards local landlords, 
regional administrators and judges. Thereby, the creative political tension underpinned 
mobilisation and framing processes, as people could not trust an exclusive bureaucratic 
solution and therefore deemed it necessary as well as legally and morally justified to resort to 
collective actions. Consequently, the political opportunities emerging during this time of 
democratic opening laid the context for rural activism in Brazil. The translation of this 
political tension into creative efforts required micro-mobilising and framing processes, which 
activated the landless and sustained their actions.  
  
4.1.2 Resource mobilisation: Grassroots initiatives and land occupations 
The regime’s institutional liberalisation and loss of political legitimacy encouraged social 
movement activity as the threat for repression reduced and the potential for political 
concessions increased. The upsurge in protest actions began in the late 1970s with the Sao 
Paulo automobile strikes under Lula, who was the president of the Steel Workers’ Union. The 
government’s failure to suppress these activities and its willingness to make compromises 
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signalled its relative weakness to dissident groups and thereby facilitated the spread of protest 
nationwide. In this sense, the automobiles strikes have been called an ‘initiator movement’, as 
it triggered a mass protest cycle in Brazil during the late 1970s and early 1980s by 
demonstrating that a favourable political structure exists (McAdam, 1995; Ondetti, 2008:95). 
 Amid this national struggle, protest activity also emerged in the rural areas. Previous 
mobilisations through the peasant leagues in the northeast and the rural trade unions in the 
south during the 1950s and 1960s (as outlined in the historical overview) had established 
rudiments of micro-mobilisation in these regions. The rural protest activities erupted over a 
variety of issues, such as interest rates, crop prices, labour conditions and land evictions 
(Carter, 2009:13; Ondetti, 2008:57). Taking advantage of the arising political opportunities, 
rural workers responded to the effects of the ‘sorrowful’ modernisation in Brazilian 
agriculture. In the most dynamic agricultural regions, the south and southeast, the number of 
farmers, tenant farmers and sharecroppers declined sharply in the 1960s and 1970s. Due to the 
ensuing economic crisis in the early 1980s, urban centres were not able to absorb this surplus 
labour, leaving large numbers landless and jobless (Skidmore, 1999:181–183).  
 The genesis of the MST can be found at this concurrence of increasing political 
opportunities, mobilisation capacities and grievances, which were framed successfully to 
sustain its actions. The existence of a large contingent of landless people, in particular in the 
southeast, whom had lost their own land or tenancy relatively recently, represented a pool of 
aggrieved but skilled farming people. Ondetti maintains that the MST “emerged mainly in 
‘colonial’ regions, where small, owner-operated farms predominate and much of the 
population is of Italian, German or Polish extraction” (Ondetti, 2008:71). Many of the people 
who joined the movement therefore had a peasant-immigrant background and in some cases 
their families still owned farms, but did not have enough land to divide them among their 
children.  
 However, the existence of this pool of landless people did not sufficient to activate 
sustained movement activity. In order to stimulate organised actions, micro-mobilisation 
processes needed to take place. As aforementioned, the Brazilian countryside was already 
comparatively politicised through a network of union activity and localised peasant leagues. 
However, suppressed and eroded through the military regime, another social actor had gained 
substantial micro-mobilising potential in rural areas. In the 1960s, the Brazilian Catholic 
Church began to organise thousands of grassroots Bible study groups, known as Christian 
Ecclesiastical Base Communities (CEBs) in the Brazilian countryside. These communities 
preached according to the ideas of liberation theology, which by that time was widespread in 
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Latin America and placed social justice and equality at the centre of their attention. In the 
countryside the most important manifestation of the Catholic Church was the Pastoral 
Commission on Land (Comissao Pastoral da Terra [CPT]). Reflecting the liberation 
philosophy, the CPT perceived its role within rural communities as principally advising and 
supporting attempts by the landless to help themselves (Karriem, 2008:4). During regular 
services and social meetings, rural people discussed their problems with the priests and 
thereby gradually isolated the land question as the principal reason for their problems. In this 
way, the CPT provided a social network where the base for organisational structures as well 
as for framing processes was laid. As aforementioned in the theoretical overview, McAdams’s 
(1982) concept of ‘cognitive liberation’ is indicative in this regard. The CPT was actively 
involved in diagnostic framing by making people aware of their common situation and by 
pointing to land distribution and overall corruptive practices as the root of the problem. This 
framing aspect of the land question is discussed in greater detail below. 
 A very interesting aspect during the emerging years of the MST was the active 
involvement of state agents and professionals, interested in supporting dissident voices amid 
the national struggle for democracy. In Rio Grande de Sul, the nucleus state of the MST, a 
Kaingang tribe, in an effort of indigenous self-actualisation, expelled 970 farmer families 
from their land  in 1979 (Wright & Wolford, 2003:15). The families set up squatter camps 
along roads and talked of launching a counterattack on the Kaingang tribe. In this tense 
situation, local priests from the CPT, political activists and an agronomist of the state 
government arrived in the camps and encouraged people to reflect more deeply on their 
situation. Through their discursive influence, the anger of the farmers was redirected to the 
skewed land distribution in Rio Grande de Sul. Mobilisation and framing processes were 
initiated, based on the aggrieved landless families forming the nucleus mass and political and 
religious activists who interpreted their situation in terms of political opportunities and 
spiritual concepts.  
 Joao Pedro Stedile, the state agronomist, was crucial in pointing the landless to the 
existence of unused land with dubious legal histories (Wright & Wolford, 2003:27). Political 
activists and lawyers added their legal expertise by explaining the social function of land as 
stipulated in the Land Statute. CPT priests legitimised self-help with reference to the given 
‘sinful structures’ in Brazil (Ondetti, 2008:53, 66–67). Therefore, a tactical repertoire was 
developed that relied symbolically and practically on the occupation of unused land to 
pressurise officials for land redistribution. The first successful land occupation was carried out 
in Rio Grande de Sul by the expelled farmer families in 1982. The local political opportunities 
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were favourable, as a sympathetic state governor had been elected amid the revival of direct 
federal elections. This occupation can be called the initiator movement of the MST, as it was 
followed by several other land invasions, more or less successful, during the early 1980s in 
the south and northeast of Brazil, following similar micro-mobilisation patterns (Wright & 
Wolford, 2003:73). As subsequent Sections illustrate, land occupations became the MST’s 
principal tactical repertoire and developed into an almost routine course of action, adhering to 
certain rules and standards.   
 CPT leaders nationwide recognised the need for an entity representing the landless across 
Brazil. In 1982, the CPT began organising regional meetings of landless people, which paved 
the way for a national meeting. However, at the national meeting efforts to unite the struggle 
stalled, as some CPT activists believed that local struggles for land redistribution needed more 
time to mature. At this point, landless activists from the state Rio Grande de Sul organised 
another meeting in 1984, which was dominated by voices of landless people who had 
experienced successful occupation campaigns. This meeting ultimately led to the formal 
founding of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem-Terra (MST), the Landless Rural 
Workers’ Movement. In 1985, a national conference was organised, assembling 12 300 
people from countrywide encampments. At this conference, the MST was formally defined as 
a “workers-led national organization, independent of church, political parties, and unions” 
(Ondetti, 2008:90). 
 While the national organisational structure was still more an idea than reality, the basic 
resource-mobilising characteristics of the MST were already present. A strong grassroots 
element can be discerned: landless people with a farming background as well as deep 
connections to the Catholic Church. In this way, occupations were facilitated through their 
existing knowledge and partially existing resources necessary to construct and maintain 
occupation settlements. Furthermore, they were receptive to the CPT and could take courage 
from their strong religious beliefs. Apart from this grassroots element, a small contingent of 
professionals became part of the struggle, and in some regions members of rural unions and 
political parties such as the PT and PMDB were also present (Ondetti, 2008:73). Partially 
driven by a benevolent disposition and partially interested in organising a strong rural front in 
the emerging new democracy, they constituted an invaluable source of legal and political 
knowledge as well as financial support in carrying land occupation through the legal 
processes.                 
      This interrelationship of state-critical professionals, CPT activists and landless people 
constitutes the crucial mobilising capacity of the MST to this day. As subsequent Sections 
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show, the equal involvement of professionals and grassroots activists from the start was part 
of the reason why the MST was able to sustain its activism over 25 years. Furthermore, the 
choice of tactical repertoires in combination with the political and social feasibility to carry 
out land occupations provided the MST with a strong mobilising advantage.  
 
4.1.3 Framing processes: The sem terra and land as a gift from God 
The previous Sections have already touched upon the significance of framing processes in the 
emergence of the MST. The accomplishments of the MST during its early years, 1978 to 
1985, were firstly the transformation from a local struggle to a national consciousness of 
landlessness. Secondly, it devised tactical repertoires that enabled the landless in cooperation 
with experts to take advantage of the political opportunity structure. While the organisational 
and political capacities were elaborated on above, it remains to be discussed how the MST 
was able to connect objective conditions of poverty and exploitation to a collective action 
frame that legitimised land occupations, and how this action frame transcended regional 
borders and became an effective nationwide mobilising device among the landless. 
 As aforementioned, the Brazilian Catholic Church played a profound role in giving 
meaning to the land struggle in Brazil. Liberation theologians endowed the struggle with its 
basic values, norms and shared narratives by combining factual grievances with well-known 
religious concepts that were mixed with local folklore. Activists sought to frame landlessness 
as a collective problem that found its roots in both the longstanding social structures and 
elitist state policy in Brazil. The diagnostic framing process therefore focused on the agrarian 
system of huge but often fallow latifúndios and the corrupt and inefficient administration, 
which inhibited access to land rights. Land scarcity and poverty were related to the recent 
modernisation policies that favoured large producers. Landless people were therefore not 
simply unfortunate or incompetent, but rather sem terra (without land), a class of 
discriminated and marginalised people (Ondetti, 2008:76).   
 The diagnostic process therefore paralleled the emergence of a nationwide landless 
identity, the class of sem terra whose oppositional class character was at that time also 
influenced by Marxist-Leninist theory. Its basic ideas of structural exploitation and 
proletarisation were incorporated into activists’ interpretational tool kits. It was argued that 
“as small farmers in rural Brazil, the settlers are exploited by a capitalist system whose chief 
engineers are large landowners, politicians and corporations” (Wolford, 2003:507). 
Participation in the MST thereby became an expression of a collective class struggle whereby 
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the denial of land rights was perceived as the principal exploitation mechanism by the land-
owning elite. The diagnostic interpretation of the situation was therefore rather 
straightforward for most landless people, as the ‘enemy’ was clearly discernable. Everyday 
experiences of evictions and discrimination matched with the proposed structural analysis. 
Furthermore, the realisation of commonalities among the landless strengthened their sense of 
solidarity as a class of sem terra. 
 The formation of a strong class identity was underpinned by prognostic framing processes, 
as Brazil’s landless people were essentially united in their belief that access to land will lead 
to a dignified life based on Christian values. As mentioned before, a large percentage of the 
landless mobilised by the MST had a farming background, having experienced small-scale 
family farming through their parents or grandparents who were often direct descendants of 
immigrants attracted in the 19th and 20th century to colonise Brazil. In this regard, it can be 
argued that a common idea of and appreciation for a prosperous independent farming 
community based on past personal experiences and inter-familial narratives still existed 
(Wolford, 2003:46). The loss of one’s land or the right to cultivate a plot was therefore 
regarded as a humiliation and disfranchisement and consequently the source of much 
frustration. This shared understanding of a family farm being the source of a dignified and 
prosperous life was substantiated by the CPT’s communitarian social vision, which saw the 
smallholder village as the ideal social context to propagate Christian values (Medeiros, 1989, 
cited in Ondetti, 2008). Prognostic framing therefore focused on the establishment of an 
egalitarian small-scale farming community, where agricultural production served the family 
and the regional market. The community was to attain village status by constructing churches, 
hospitals, markets, schools and artisan workshops. The redistribution of land was regarded as 
the prerequisite for the realisation of these goals. At its first national conference in 1985, the 
MST established its long-term target as a “fight for an agrarian reform that distributed land to 
those who would work it, and for the development of a just, fraternal society” (Wolford, 
2003: 500).  
 Motivational framing, which essentially constructed the reason for carrying out land 
occupations, was strongly influenced by religious concepts. Group discussions would start 
with a Bible reading and prayers, after which activists would ask: “Does God want it to be 
this way? If not, what can we do about it?” (MST activist, cited in Ondetti, 2008:76). The 
struggle for land was justified on the basis of the scripture by comparing it with Moses’ trek 
across the desert in search of the ‘promised land’. Therefore, the struggle for land was just 
and the landless had a right to land as it was a gift from God. In asserting land as a social 
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good, priests contested the sacrosanct notion of private property, which was crucial, as respect 
for private property was deeply entrenched in the rural social relations. Religious justification 
provided a new meaning to the ownership of land and thereby legitimised land occupations. 
As one MST member suggested: “Land is a gift from God and if we are the children of God, 
you have to have access to it” (MST activist, cited in Karriem, 2008:4). In attempting to 
legitimise land occupations, activists also persistently pointed to the political and legal 
opportunities present in Brazil. The state itself has declared through the 1964 Land Statute 
that fallow land should be distributed to the landless. Therefore, the sem terra had a legal 
right to land and by putting pressure on the government they were merely asserting their right. 
Furthermore, earlier concessions by state governors in the Rio Grande de Sul had 
demonstrated that the state is responsive in this regard.   
 The collective action frame of the MST was therefore constructed around the moral and 
legal right of the sem terra to access land. This was based on their mutually shared notion that 
small-scale family farming could secure a dignified and prosperous life in the Brazilian 
countryside. Land occupations were framed as a legitimate tool to assert this right nationwide, 
taking advantage of political and legal access points as well as their existing farming 
knowledge. It needs to be argued that this frame enjoyed a high resonance among Brazil’s 
landless as well as the broader public. It was compatible with existing cultural frames and 
successfully extended by including new concepts and norms of social justice. 
 Apart from tapping into and broadening the religious background of the landless, 
mobilising activities of the CEBs and the CPT fitted comfortably with local practices and 
traditions. As Wright and Wolford (2003:10) argue, the discursive element of the meetings 
that encouraged people to engage in critical debates with each other and the priest matched 
very well with the love of conversation and sociability in Brazil. Furthermore, the priest acted 
as an equal among the landless, often not wearing a clerical garb but jeans and a t-shirt. In the 
southern states of Brazil, the special facilitator of sociability is the chimarao, a large gourd in 
which erva mate22 is brewed. The chimarao is passed around and everybody takes a sip. This 
practice has also become an integral part of CEB and CPT meetings and therefore contributed 
to a sense of belonging and togetherness. The ability of early activists to tap into the folklore 
of the landless facilitated framing processes, as people entered an environment they knew and 
trusted and thereby displayed an increased openness to new radical ideas of mobilisation. 
   The collective action frame, which included land occupation as tactical repertoire, 
received a comparatively positive public response during the emerging phase of the MST. In 
                                               
22 Erva mate is a species of holly. Its dried leaves are used to prepare an infused drink. 
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this way, the fight for agrarian reform via land invasions was also publicly legitimised in 
Brazil and eased the way to making it the principal tactical repertoire of the MST. The call for 
land reform was not a new idea in Brazil. As the historical overview has shown, the skewed 
distribution of land is regarded as one of the primary reasons why Brazil’s economic 
development lagged behind. In Brazil, the legal tradition of linking land ownership to 
responsible and productive use for society had therefore started early. The ‘social function 
principle’ had appeared in the 1934 and the 1946 constitutions, yet only the 1964 Constitution 
eliminated the strict financial requirements for expropriation and thereby eased the process 
considerably (Navarro, 2009:3; Wittman, 2009:123).  
 The first successful land occupations in the early 1980s in Rio Grande de Sul were 
facilitated by the fact that the fallow latifúndios had been previously earmarked for state 
expropriation, but due to dubious legal records, corruption charges and administrative delays 
it never materialised. The ambivalence of legal and political opportunities, which theoretically 
acknowledged the need for land reform but practically denies access, once again became 
apparent. Therefore, the idea of transferring this land to the landless enjoyed enormous public 
and media support (Wright & Wolford, 2003:28). In this regard, Wright and Wolford (2003) 
point to a tendency in Brazilians that may have facilitated the public acceptance of land 
invasion throughout Brazil. They maintain that due to historical records and personal 
experiences,  
Brazilians have little respect for the specifics of the laws that protected private property, even 
when those same people supported the inviolability of private property in principle. As with 
the civil rights movement in the United States, there would prove to be considerable public 
sympathy, even among judges and legislators, for those who broke the law that was known to 
be a sham for perpetuating injustice. (Wright & Wolford, 2003:24) 
Hence, one can argue that public support of land invasions underpinned the construction of a 
nationwide injustice frame that mobilised the landless as well as the general public to regard 
land invasions as a legitimate tool to fight for land reform. The MST’s collective action frame 
provided an effective interpretation of the land question that stood in relative opposition to the 
government and united the sem terra. 
 
4.1.4 Summary 
By the end of 1985, the MST had become a significant rural movement of national scope. 
Admittedly, the movement was most organised and successful in southern Brazil. However, 
landless rural workers started to organise in many areas in Brazil and there were strong efforts 
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to unite the struggle at the national level. The MST, like the South African NLC, had emerged 
amid a democratic opening, whereby both movements were driven by national and 
international civil protest movements during the 1970s and 1980s. Activists of the MST and 
the NLC therefore took advantage of changed political opportunities and translated them into 
mobilising and framing processes to sustain their activism. Yet, both organisations developed 
fundamental differences in their movement dynamics that would in the long run faithfully 
define their struggle.  
 The political opportunities were of varying degrees in South Africa and Brazil. The NLC 
emerged amid an extreme repressive and discriminating system, denying civil rights to the 
majority of the population. Therefore, its early struggle years were characterised by a 
marginal and slow opening of political structures, making activism a matter of cautious, small 
steps of opposition, mainly focusing on the immediate support of eviction victims. The 
decade-long system of apartheid had stratified the countryside; amid the white commercial 
farms there existed only a very small number of independently farming African people. Most 
non-white rural workers had been tied up in feudal-like relationship for decades. Rural surplus 
labour was flowing into urban centres, forming squatter camps and maintaining only weak 
ties to their rural relatives due to pass laws. Therefore, the political system of apartheid 
substantially undermined the mobilising potential of the rural non-white population, which 
also changed only slowly with the opening of the system.  
 In Brazil, on the other hand, political opportunities were of an ambiguous character. While 
certain land legislations and former immigration policies favoured small-scale farmers, actual 
policy implementation was persistently detrimental. Although the liberalisation process 
increased political and legal access for rural activism, the inherent ambivalence of the 
political system was never entirely eliminated. In Brazil it triggered the growth and 
establishment of a small-scale peasantry that became the nucleus mass of the MST, basing 
their struggle on favourable legal access points already introduced in 1964. The military 
government also allowed the flourishing of rural CEBs, which once again demonstrates the 
fluidity of the Brazilian political system as opposed to the strict ban of any non-white 
organisation in the South African countryside under apartheid. Thereby, the MST could be 
built on an already established grassroots network in the countryside, which proactively 
encouraged rural communities and the landless to assert their rights and legitimised land 
invasions in religious terms. The still close relationship to farming, the recent disappointment 
of agricultural modernisation and the ongoing religious socialisation triggered framing 
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processes that made the Brazilian landless to identify themselves as sem terra, a class for 
itself with a strong rural background and with an early focus on agrarian reform.  
 This constitutes a major difference to the NLC, as South African activists were initially 
urban-based workers who established ties to rural evicted communities. These communities 
were not the prime movers of the organisation as the sem terras were. Furthermore, the NLC 
could not construct an equally unifying identity of landlessness as the MST had achieved in 
its first years of existence. Due to apartheid politics, the South African landless remained too 
dispersed, unorganised and comparatively detached from a mutually shared idea of land 
ownership as a way out of poverty. The principal alignment of communities along tribal lines, 
in particular in the homelands, may also have inhibited the growth of a unifying landless 
identity. Landlessness therefore did not acquire the same urgency in South Africa as it did in 
Brazil. The South African landless’ problem was inherently intertwined with apartheid’s 
denial of universal civil rights and therefore early on subordinated to the more urgent issue of 
fighting apartheid under the leadership of the ANC.  
 The legacy of apartheid therefore presented the NLC with a different configuration of 
movement dynamics at its early formation. The many-sided issue of landlessness in South 
Africa, which affected rural as well as urban non-white South Africans, the stratified and 
unorganised countryside in combination with a national urban struggle for universal civil 
rights, did not allow the formation of a rural-based movement, entirely focused on land issues. 
Although the MST emerged amid a repressive government as well, citizenship and prosperity 
were not linked to the institutional suppression of certain races, as was the case in South 
Africa. In Brazil, citizenship and prosperity were directly tied to land-ownership patterns and 
elitist policies. Hence, the land question obtained from the outset a different political and 
social interpretation as well as mobilising capacity in Brazil and South Africa.    
  
4.2 Growth and stabilisation (1985–1999)  
The year 1985 saw the first democratically elected president of Brazil after years of military 
dictatorship. Despite the ongoing consolidation of democratic rule in Brazil, the political 
opportunity structure remained ambivalent in nature, providing the MST with sufficient 
loopholes to sustain its activism, but at the same time with enough resistance to necessitate 
and legitimise activism in the eyes of the landless. In terms of mobilisation, the MST 
experienced tremendous growth and territorialisation. Its protest methods matured and 
through its successful conversion of occupation camps to settlements the MST established a 
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‘self-preserving’ tactical repertoire that concurrently provided resources for further activism 
as well as framing opportunities that strengthened the sense of community and ideological 
identification.  
 
4.2.1 Political opportunities: The ambivalent democracy 
The period from 1985 to 1999 saw the establishment of democratic rule in Brazil, the 
enactment of a new constitution in 1988 and the implementation of a significant land-reform 
programme in 1995. The specifics of political access points, political alignment and scale of 
repression were therefore altered, yet it can be argued that the overall political and legal 
ambiguity towards the land question continued. The creative political tension underpinning 
mobilising and framing processes of the MST was maintained and facilitated the growth and 
stabilisation of the landless movement. 
 The first decade of civilian rule proved to be a period of political and economic 
disappointment. Debt and inflation caused the economy to stagnate during 1985 and 1994. In 
contrast, agriculture continued to grow. Yet due to ongoing mechanisation and 
commercialisation the sector continued to shed jobs, resulting in continued migration to urban 
centres and stagnating rural poverty rates. The first president chosen to lead the new regime, 
President Neves, died unexpectedly. Sarney’s presidency (1985–1990) was plagued by 
clientelism and was not able to lift Brazil from its deteriorating economic situation. His 
successor, Collor (1990–1992) initiated market-orientated reforms, yet his presidency proved 
to be even more corrupt than Sarney’s and did not succeed in containing inflation. Economic 
recovery resumed under President Franco (1992–1995) and his finance minister Cardoso, who 
attained popularity through its economic recovery plan, the plano real. Benefiting from his 
reputation, Cardoso assumed the presidency in 1995 until 2002 (Skidmore, 1998:189–232). 
 Despite the inclusion of a variety of parties, the governing coalitions were generally 
conservative in outlook, consisting predominantly of landholding elites and former military 
officers. With the appointment of President Franco (who identified with the centrist PMDP), 
and later President Cardoso, a slight shift occurred in the coalition alignment, reflecting a 
more urban-based centrist electorate. President Cardoso, affiliated with the Social Democratic 
Party (PSDB), assembled a heterogeneous coalition dominated by the centrist PMDP. This 
centre-left coalition promised at least theoretically to give more attention to social issues, 
including the land question. While not in the governing coalition, the PT, under Lula, had 
turned into a formidable party and allied openly with the MST by promising fundamental 
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social reforms, including land reform (Ondetti, 2008:102). The rise of the PT in Brazil was 
accompanied by the increased cooperation of the government with the World Bank and the 
IMF. As South Africa, Brazil during the 1990s experienced a wave of neoliberal reforms 
targeting industry and agriculture in an effort to align development policy with free-market 
principles. 
 The return to democracy therefore ushered in a period of new governmental alignment 
strategies and the growth of extra-parliamentary opposition parties. The political opportunity 
structure hence became more fluid and receptive to protest actions. Yet, at the same time, it is 
argued that the political capabilities to represent popular interests were weak due to a highly 
fragmented party system and clientelistic practices, such as vote-buying (Carter, 2009:8; 
Meszaros, 2000:526; Wright & Wolford, 2003:65). Since the advent of democracy in 1985, 
Brazil’s government had been characterised by a multi-party system, with numerous political 
parties sharing the vote. Since there is a 0.04 election threshold, the Brazilian congress 
consists of numerous minority parties. Unlike in South Africa, no single party had the chance 
of gaining power alone, leading to the formation of heterogeneous coalition governments. The 
agendas of the different parties show an ‘ideological fluidity’ in order to form loose coalitions 
if required. Party discipline is low, resulting in difficulties and delays in passing legislation. It 
also led to the formation of the bancada ruralista, a caucus that acted mainly in the interests 
of large landowners, but for strategic purposes sometimes aligned with small-holder interests 
(Linz & Stepan, 1996:184).  Consequently, the democratic structure did not fundamentally 
change the political opportunities for the MST, despite evolving loopholes through the PT and 
temporary alliances with minority parties. The general over-representation of conservative 
rural interests in Congress insured a containment of popular interests. Yet, the new democracy 
maintained its inherent tendency of acknowledging the land question, which resulted in 
occasional concessions or even comprehensive reform plans to address it. The 1988 
Constitution, in particular the Land Law, represented such a compromise, as it did not fulfil 
the MST’s requirements for agrarian change but enabled it to continue its tactical repertoire of 
occupations into the new democracy.   
 The post-transitional constitutional debate included questions on the legal conditions for 
land expropriation. In 1985, President Neves initiated the drafting of a national agrarian 
reform plan, the Plano Nacional de Reforma Agraria (PNRA), which envisaged large-scale 
expropriations and settlement projects (Wolford, 2003:102). However, with his death, this 
plan lost its most influential supporter and became the target of harsh criticism by the 
landholding elite, which strategically founded the Uniao Democratica Rural (UDR), a rural 
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democratic union, to oppose any changes in connection with the right to private property. 
Ultimately, the Constitution maintained the right to expropriation based on the 1964 Land 
Statute. It reaffirmed the ‘social function’, but excluded productive23 properties from 
expropriation. This was a partial defeat for the MST, which aimed for the expropriation of any 
farm over 600 rural modules24 to break the stronghold of large latifúndios (Wright & 
Wolford, 2003:105). Yet, it was also a partial defeat of the rural conservative class, as 
expropriation was still legally feasible. The provision provided a loophole just large enough to 
make the occupation of large unproductive rural estates a relatively effective tactic to 
pressurise state governors. Given this legal framework and the mobilising capacities of the 
MST, the post-dictatorship governments were not able to block occupations altogether. 
 The ambivalence of political opportunities comes to the fore again when looking at the 
actual implementation on the ground and the repression that the MST camps had to face. The 
legal process of expropriating land and distributing it to the occupiers takes between two and 
ten years after having invaded the land. INCRA, the institute charged with carrying out 
expropriations, had the legal powers, but its administrative capabilities were insufficient and 
corrupt, necessitating year-long court fights and bribes (Foweraker, 2002:136). Frequently, 
violent conflicts broke out between the occupiers and the military police force, which was 
controlled by the state government. Assassinations of MST activists, political activists and 
even occupying families were common in all regions.  
 The scale of political tension between the occupying landless and landowners, who via 
their political influence could in many cases employ the state police, became publicly visible 
in two deadly massacres. The first one occurred in the state of Rondonia in 1995. Nine 
occupiers and two policemen were killed and there were reports of torture and execution. The 
second incident was even more deadly; the killing of 19 and injuring of more than 60 people 
in the state of Para in 1997. The killings provoked considerable media coverage. The second 
massacre was partially filmed and broadcasted on Brazilian television. Following these 
events, the agrarian question was discussed extensively in the national media and also caused 
the international press to comment. Even the Vatican issued a letter condemning the killings 
and urging renewed attention to the land issue (Ondetti, 2008:153; Meszaros, 2000:521). 
 The new Cardoso government responded by making some concessions. President Cardoso 
created a new agrarian reform ministry for INCRA and appointed a new minister with an 
                                               
23 Productive meant the effective utilisation of 80% of the farm’s surface as well as adherence to ecological and 
labour standards. In addition, a productive farm exists where its use is of common benefit to land owners and 
workers. This definition is applied in Brazilian courts to this day (Wright & Wolford, 2003:105). 
24 One rural module is the regional-specific quantity of land considered sufficient to sustain a family of four. 
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activist background in order to speed up the land-distribution process. Several expropriation 
cases were quickly pushed through the legal process. Furthermore, he pledged to introduce 
some favourable legislative initiatives,25 but all except the summary rite were watered down 
considerably by the congress. Cardoso’s renewed commitment to land reform was also 
publicly expressed in his cooperation with the World Bank and the set-up of a land-reform 
programme based on market principles in 1996. It followed the willing buyer–willing seller 
principle. A land bank, partially funded by the World Bank, issued credit to landless people to 
buy property. Initially, this project functioned well because land prices were relatively low, 
yet it never replaced or outnumbered the traditional method of state expropriations (Navarro, 
2009:8). After 1995, the settlement of landless families progressed faster than ever before in 
Brazilian history. According to official figures, Cardoso’s land-reform efforts amounted to the 
settlement of 288 000 families during his presidency. Yet, most of the INCRA settlement 
activity took place in the backward Amazon frontiers, which was criticised by the MST as not 
changing the overall distribution of land in Brazil. Nevertheless, the increased speed of land 
reform amid the national debate on land caught on with the MST, as political opportunities 
improved to settle camping families quickly all over Brazil. This was further facilitated by the 
temporary diminishing of violent conflicts in the aftermath of the massacres (Nucleo de 
Estudos, Pesquisas e Projetos de Reforma Agraria, 2007).  
 The political opportunity structure during 1985 and 1999 maintained the creative political 
tension that activated and sustained the MST’s struggle. The continued ambivalence of partial 
support and partial opposition towards MST activism underpinned its organisational growth 
and tactical maturity, as seen below. By providing a legal and administrative framework that 
allows expropriation, its core strategy could be applied and more members could be recruited, 
in particular during the Cardoso years. A strong mobilising incentive was furthermore 
established by the federal government through its practice of only settling landless campers 
who had participated in the occupation process (Ondetti, 2008:133). This political opportunity 
translated into avoiding free-rider problems when organising occupations and subsequent land 
distributions.  
 It also needs to be mentioned that the public support of the landless during and after the 
two massacres points to the interrelatedness of framing and political opportunities in Brazil. 
The public support for the landless urged the government to respond and in this way opened 
political and legal opportunities for activism. Analogous to the public acceptance of land 
                                               
25 Reform of the rural land tax, a measure to limit the capacity of judges to order for expulsions and the summary 
rite, which gave INCRA possession of a property 48 hours after the President’s signing.   
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occupations, the injustice frame of the MST was resonant with the public and thereby 
widened the MST’s operating range by impacting on the political opportunity structure. 
However, these favourable aspects of the political environment contrast strongly with severe 
restrictions. Bureaucratic barriers, local violence and overall undisciplined and fragmented 
governing coalitions in regional states corroborated the MST’s antagonistic stance on the 
government and its commitment to land reform. Thereby, the injustice frame maintained its 
diagnostic element of the state being essentially an adversary. Furthermore, the objective need 
for efficient resource mobilisation to organise occupations and legal challenges remained and 
therefore sustained and even encouraged activism.        
 
4.2.2 Resource mobilisation: From occupations to settlements 
When the MST held its first national conference in 1985, it was essentially only a loose 
alliance of local activist groups, concentrated mainly in the south and very dependent on the 
Catholic Church. Over the next years, this coalition developed into a relatively autonomous 
and cohesive organisation with a presence in 24 of Brazil’s 26 states (Nucleo de Estudos, 
Pesquisas e Projetos de Reforma Agraria, 2007:32). Between 1985 and 1999, the MST 
experienced growth in terms of membership and land occupations. This shift occurred 
geographically, as occupation density in the south was maintained but grew in other regions.26 
Data from the CPT shows that from 1989 to 1995, 63% of total occupations were organised 
by the MST (CPT, cited in Ondetti, 2008:112, 159). Land occupations experienced a 
substantial spark after President Cardoso pledged to address the land question. From a total of 
186 occupations in 1995, it increased to 459 in 1996, 514 in 1997, 828 in 1998 and reached a 
peak in 1999 with 903. The relative weight27 of MST camps decreased between 1996 and 
1999 due to the rise of autonomously organised land occupations by families, rural unions and 
the CPT, anticipating that political opportunities to quickly obtain land would open up. 
 The expansion of the MST was made possible by extensive travelling of activists through 
poor rural and urban areas, informing people about their right to land and the MST strategy of 
land invasion (Karriem, 2008:6). By 1990, the MST had hundreds of well-trained activists, 
who predominantly originated from relatively prosperous and more literate southern 
smallholder families. Most of them used to be MST occupiers before and had obtained land 
(Wolford, 2003:506). As the MST spread over the various regions, the composition of the 
                                               
26 Percentage growth of occupations by region (1988–1999): centre – west 34; north 25; northeast 70.9; south 
39.3; southeast 30.0 (Ondetti, 2008:110, 159). 
27 MST occupations as percentage of total: 1996 – 44.2; 1997 – 37.4; 1998 – 22.0; 1999 – n/a (Comissao Pastoral 
da Terra, 2008) 
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rural population changed. The smallholder tradition from the south faded and people 
accustomed to wage labour and other forms of non-independent farming took on a larger role. 
Local social networks were not as established in other regions as in the South, where CEBs 
had created a strong presence. Thus the spot recruitment of hundreds of people as it was 
possible in the South, was not an option in other more socially stratified regions. Yet, the 
majority continued to have a rural agricultural background and was directly or indirectly 
affected by the ongoing liberalisation process of the 1990s in the agricultural sector which due 
to international price pressure and tight credit conditions reduced agricultural jobs. Amid an 
urban sector which did not provide a robust enough growth to counteract this rising rural 
unemployment, a ‘favourable’ rural context was created for the landless movement (Ondetti, 
2008:172). Adapting to the changed social settings by going from door to door to recruit 
people and capitalising from the rural grievances, the MST successfully expanded its 
membership base (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem-Terra, 2005b).  
 Throughout the late 1980s, a decline in the activist role of the Catholic Church was 
visible. The MST was actively driving to become independent from Church leaders, but the 
Brazilian Church also argued that with the advent of democracy, the need to represent the 
landless had lost relevance (Ondetti, 2008:108). In lieu of religious activists, political 
activities took a more influential role in the MST. In particular, the PT of Lula was popular 
among MST members. Activists often assumed leadership positions in both organisations. 
While at the national level the MST maintained relations with the national labour union 
(Central Única dos Trabalhadores [CUT]),28 at the state and regional level activists took a 
more hostile stance. The MST’s relationship with CONTAG generally remained distant 
(Ondetti, 2008:126, 127). 
 The national structure of the MST became increasingly centralised in the 1990s. Policy 
decisions were made by the National Coordination Office and National Directorate. 
Administration and collective activities were managed by the National Secretariat in Sao 
Paulo. The recruitment and training of young leaders was a key strategy of the movement and 
a primary task for many leaders (Wolford et al., 2008:296). A national congress was held 
every five years, which set out policies and activities for the next five years. In terms of 
funding, the MST was very successful in diversifying its financial resources. It draws its 
income from national and foreign NGOs (in particular European religious organisations), the 
Brazilian Catholic Church, sympathetic business groups and public officials. As occupiers 
were not in a position to contribute much to the organisation, the duty fell to the MST 
                                               
28 CUT was formed in 1983 and is to this day the chief union federation in Brazil.  
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settlements already generating produce. By the 1990s, most of the settlers’ financial 
contributions originated from subsidised government credit programmes (Ondetti, 2008:121). 
By providing special subsidies to small-scale farmers, the government therefore indirectly 
helped to fund the MST, which points once more to the ambivalent relationship of the MST 
with the federal state.  
 One of the key factors that enabled the MST to grow and consolidate nationally was its 
organisational praxis. During the late 1980s and 1990s, the MST diversified its tactical 
repertoires by devising effective mobilising strategies to extend and sustain its activism. The 
problem the MST has been constantly faced with is how to maintain a high level of 
participation of members who had already obtained land. The essence of its strategy lays in its 
active conversion of occupations to assentamentos (settlements), which serve as material and 
ideological facilitators for further land occupations. During the occupation time, which often 
meant hardship and risk, the foundation is laid for a feeling of community and duty to the 
MST. Already at this stage, the MST organises the campers into family groups, called nuclei. 
These nuclei, comprising 20 to 30 families, elect coordinators who represent the families at 
the settlement council and its committees.29 These committees assign each individual person a 
task or action that benefits the camp or settlement as a whole and seeks to foster a process of 
self-education and responsibility in each person. This level of decision making also seeks to 
break with the history of patronage and dependency that had characterised the political 
relationship of landless workers with the rural elites (Wittman, 2009:124). 
 After acquiring land, most settlers have established strong ties with the MST’s 
organisational structure as well as its principle beliefs. The identity frame of being a sem terra 
was bridged with being a dedicated MST member. The MST developed a concrete method to 
stimulate this process within its camps and settlements. This framing process will be 
discussed further below. Being an MST member meant discipline and cooperation. Once land 
was obtained, MST members were expected to contribute to further site developments, such 
as erecting buildings for schools, nurseries and latrines and cultivating the land. The post-
occupation time involved the active settlement of families on the land, which further 
integrated people into the organisational structures of the MST. But above all, productive 
settlements enabled the MST to extract resources needed for further activism. Settlers were 
asked to participate in occasional protest actions such as road blockades, marches and the 
occupation of public buildings. They also had to make food and material available for the 
ongoing land occupations. From its settlements, the MST also frequently recruited new young 
                                               
29 Committees include production and environment, health, security, political formation and education.  
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leaders into its national leadership structure, which thereby experienced a regular reshuffle 
from the grassroots. Often the new activists were also sent to campaigns in other regions, 
diffusing knowledge of occupation and settlement strategies (Wright & Wolford, 2003).  
 Overall, the MST employed land occupations as a permanent mobilisation mechanism. By 
actively engaging in post-settlement processes it maintained a high commitment among its 
members and utilised resources for future mobilisation. Therefore, the tactical repertoire of 
occupations leading to settlements must be seen as pivotal to the MST’s success. The 
motivation to remain in the MST can, however, not be reduced to these activities alone. 
Settlers are required by the Brazilian government to have a membership in some kind of 
formal organisation to benefit from agricultural credit, housing material, seeds or equipment 
made available by INCRA (Carter, 2009:22; Wittman, 2009:123). This political condition 
certainly facilitated the MST’s organisation. Yet, it does not account for the MST’s dominant 
position in the land sector. The MST stood in competition with other movements because 
members who disassociated with the movement sought membership in other rural 
associations. The MST’s region-wide presence and high land occupation rate were therefore a 
direct result of the fruitful interrelationship between political opportunities, mobilising 
processes and framing.  
 
4.2.3 Framing processes: Community and controversy 
The configuration of the collective action frame in terms of diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational components remained relatively stable given the continuance of an ambivalent 
political opportunity structure, the ongoing economic and social marginalisation of rural 
people and the focus on land occupations as tactical repertoire. What became more 
pronounced during the late 1980s and 1990s was the increasing connection between being 
sem terra and being a loyal MST member. The MST succeeded in using its camps as 
privileged spaces for political indoctrination and to foment a strong collective identity as 
MST members. Apart from establishing organisational structures to ensure human and 
material resources, the MST engaged proactively in framing processes that made the landless 
perceive the MST as the legitimate organisation to fight for land reform. In this section, some 
of the most important framing tactics are addressed as well as the reasons why they were 
resonant among the sem terra.  
 Many authors (Hammond, 1999; Karriem, 2008; Veltmeyer & Petras, 2001; Wittman, 
2009; Wright & Wolford, 2003) argue that the MST was exceptionally successful in 
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constructing a community feeling that reached beyond the camp or settlement site. MST 
members saw themselves as “part of a family” (MST member, cited in Carter, 2009:24) and 
therefore mutual assistance and respect were generated, which facilitated the dissemination of 
ideas and principles encapsulated in the collective action frame. The community feeling was 
more or less an imagined concept, because most members never actually met each other 
(Wolford, 2003:506). This ‘imagined community’ was built upon common past, present and 
future events and beliefs and was created through a discursive process that involved the 
selection and reassembling of certain aspects that have special salience to the movement.  
 The central discursive elements of this community building were the meetings and in 
particular the tradition of mistica (mystic). Being a legacy of liberation theology, mistica 
builds on a “combination of worldliness and idealism by creatively using songs, theatre and 
chants to help form new ideas and mould behaviour” (Wolford, 2003:510). Symbols of the 
struggle for land such as the machete and past resistance leaders were combined with the 
joyful presentation of their harvest in plays. Every camp had a committee responsible for the 
planning and execution of the mistica, endowing the play with local characteristics. All 
members were encouraged to participate in the play through singing, poems or jokes. 
According to an MST publication, mistica “reduces the distance between the present and the 
future, helping us to anticipate the good things that are coming” (Wolford, 2003:510). In this 
way, mistica is a crucial framing facilitator by encompassing all three framing tasks: it points 
to reasons for struggle; it presents the results of the struggle and thereby motivates future 
actions. Above all, this was done in a participatory fashion, stressing community and 
solidarity within local settlements, and established connections to distant MST struggles. 
 Education is another significant framing component that is inherently interwoven with the 
MST’s aim to raise rural people to critical, self-assured citizens. The MST established more 
than 1 200 primary and secondary schools in and around its settlements, which were 
recognised by the government. It provides adult literacy classes and established partnerships 
with 60 Brazilian universities to offer degrees for its members (Carter, 2009:23–24; 
Meszaros, 2000:529). Teaching material was designed by the MST’s own educational team 
and was inspired by Paulo Freire.30 In this way, the MST allowed thousands of children to 
regularly attend school, which was regarded by many MST members as important as 
obtaining land, since it enabled families to break out of the circle of patronage and 
dependency on the rural elite (Wittman, 2009:124). Apart from direct schooling, information 
                                               
30 Brazilian educator and influential theorist of pedagogy, who introduced teaching methods that emphasised 
critical thinking and student participation in class.   
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on agricultural techniques, health issues and political affairs were disseminated through 
workshops, newsletters and booklets.  
 The tactical repertoire of occupation and settlement programmes therefore became the 
groundwork for framing processes, because they offered the ideal social venue to practice the 
above-mentioned framing tactics. On the one hand, a sense of organisation-wide community 
and personal empowerment was fostered; on the other hand, activism was channelled into a 
certain directions favoured by the organisation.  
 The amplification of the MST’s collective action frame was facilitated by substantial 
public resonance. During its first decade, the MST maintained a certain isolation from the 
media, yet the 1990s saw increasing media attention contributing to a public framing of the 
MST and the land question. Hammond (2004:75) argues “that the MST can reasonably claim 
that it has won the battle to frame its main issue, the land question, in the Brazilian media”. 
The media generally portrayed agrarian reform as a necessity, latifúndios owners as 
reactionary and unproductive and the struggle for land as just (Hammond, 2004:75). In 
particular, the two massacres of 1995 and 1997 brought the organisation positive feedback, 
culminating in the screening of the telenovela31 O rei do gado (the King of Cattle) in 
1996/1997. Even though it showed a romanticised picture of land occupations, the issue 
became known to and was discussed by millions of Brazilians. Even President Cardoso 
visited the set and was shown on the evening news with the actors (Hammond, 2004:82). The 
impact of this media attention was reflected in a poll taken in 1997, according to which 52% 
of Brazilians were favourable of the MST and 85% approved of land occupations as long as 
they were not violent (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, cited in Brazil Justice 
Net, 1997).  
 While the land question generally received favourable coverage, the MST itself was 
framed in various terms, cultivating an image of controversy and sympathy. The two most 
reoccurring themes depicted the MST as a militant socialist movement and alternately as a 
possible solution to national problems (Hammond, 2004:75). In essence, these two themes 
corresponded with the image the MST presented of itself and thereby amplified its collective 
action frame. As discussed above, the MST portrayed its tactical repertoire as beneficial for 
the sem terra as well as a viable solution to change land patterns in Brazil. Its ideological 
background had from its earliest moments been inspired by socialist ideas, manifested in its 
                                               
31 Telenovelas are the most viewed shows in Brazil and significantly influence public opinion. A topic featured 
as the theme of a telenovela represents the peak of recognition in Brazilian culture.   
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class consciousness as sem terra and its diagnostic, prognostic and motivational analysis of 
the situation in the land sector.  
 When describing the MST as a solution to Brazil’s land and poverty problems, some 
authors (Carter, 2009; Karriem, 2008) have tried to devalue this framing component of the 
MST, possibly in an attempt to make the MST more broadly acceptable to a global society 
characterised by market liberalism. While the emphasis given to socialist concepts certainly 
varied in MST settlements (e.g. the implementation of collective vs. individual farming, usage 
of socialist symbols during meetings) and the MST openly allows for a diversity of 
worldviews, its antagonistic stance on capitalism cannot be denied and hence must be seen as 
an integral part of its counter-frame against the government and its land-reform programme. 
Particularly during the 1990s, as neoliberal reforms such as the market-assisted land-reform 
programme were introduced in Brazil, the MST remained in opposition and argued for the 
continuation of active state interference in the land sector. During the early Cardoso years, 
while exploiting the renewed political opportunities, the MST became the most articulated 
dissident voice publicly defending state expropriations and state assistance as the only viable 
solution (Hammond, 1999). Through its practical social assistance at the grassroots and its 
persistent animadversion on the Brazilian state and the capitalistic system, the MST 
maintained its socialist image, which has been demonised by as many people as it has been 
praised. Ultimately, it contributed to the plurality of Brazilian society by keeping channels 
open where alternative collective actions could flourish.    
 
4.2.4 Summary 
The MST experienced tremendous growth and territorialisation between 1985 and 1999. As 
the above Sections have illustrated, political opportunities in the new Brazilian democracy 
became more favourable, yet overall remained ambivalent in nature, which enabled the MST 
to take advantage of the institutional loopholes and at the same time presented the MST with 
constraints that justified the framing of the state as hostile and necessitated long-term 
mobilisation.  
 In this regard, political opportunities during the MST’s growth phase were very different 
to South Africa’s political structures in the post-apartheid era. Even though Brazil established 
a working democracy in 1985, the relationship of the MST with the government remained 
distant and was rather characterised by a creative political tension than partnership. The PT 
started to emerge as a potential political ally but, being a leftist party, remained in opposition 
for the next 17 years. The government was led by centre-right coalitions and more or less 
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dominated by the bancada ruralista. Although President Cardoso assembled a centre-left 
coalition in 1995, his land policy overall remained hostile. Only between 1996 and 1999 did 
President Cardoso show ambitious efforts to address the land question nationally. It is 
interesting to note again that during this time the percentage of MST activities to total land 
occupations declined sharply, illustrating that if an administration appears to be sympathetic 
the ability to pool activism declines. Hostility and organisational constraints also existed at 
the state level in Brazil. Throughout history, landowners of latifúndios had resorted to their 
political and economic leverage to defend their property. Amid a climate of lawlessness and 
corruption, this led to extremely serious and frequent violent conflicts, which made land 
occupation a dangerous protest action. Consequently, national land policy maintained its 
overall conservative outlook and implementation on the ground was constrained by red tape 
and violence. On the other hand, activism was made possible by very effective political access 
points. The 1988 Constitution continued to allow expropriations and INCRA continued to 
respond to land occupations and even increased its settlement rate in the 1990s. Furthermore, 
subsidies were transferred to small-scale farmers that were vital for the maintenance of the 
MST. Lastly, INCRA’s practice of only assigning land to those who actually occupied land 
continued to set a strong precedent.       
 South Africa’s first democratic years offered a completely different political opportunity 
structure. The transitional period was characterised by the alignment of the most significant 
progressive forces into the tripartite alliance and the establishment of structures that 
incorporated former anti-apartheid movements in the new government alliance. The ANC 
emerged as the majority party in the 1994 and 1999 elections and thereby established 
themselves as the new ruling party of South Africa without any significant oppositional forces 
or the need to assemble a coalition. South African politics, contrary to Brazil, was therefore 
characterised by a power block that founded its claim of supremacy on its large black 
constituency established during the apartheid struggle years. In Brazil, frail coalition 
governments had prevailed since democracy, making it necessary for the president to 
incorporate various policies by making concessions and compromises. Hence, the dominance 
of one party and one agenda was not feasible in Brazil. The ANC, on the other hand, which 
had emerged from a repressive regime, became the symbol of change and betterment, 
endowed with the kind of unprecedented powers enjoyed by de facto one party dominated 
systems elsewhere. From the outset, the ANC made it clear that it plans to work for the people 
and with the people. In addition, the land question was relatively swiftly addressed by passing 
a new constitution to allow for expropriations and the detailed outline of a land reform 
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programme, which incorporated land restitution and distribution, two of the most important 
elements for the South African landless. Consequently, the government became the only 
legitimate entity for land reform and development policy in general – a status that not one 
democratic Brazilian government has ever attained in Brazil, not even under the two 
‘friendly’ Cardoso years or the present Lula administration.   
 These highly differential political opportunity structures provided a very different context 
for mobilising and framing processes. The dominance of the ANC in South Africa triggered 
the institutional inclusion of the NLC into the state-directed land-reform projects. The NLC 
became essentially a government agency, as its staff was seconded, its finances were overly 
dependent on state projects and its tactical repertoire dominated by administrative tasks. The 
NLC became a servant to the state and did not design or encourage an alternative tactical 
repertoire, as the MST did to speed up the land-reform process. The bureaucratic channels 
that the ANC had established appeared to offer a viable solution to the land problem in 
conjunction with the ANC’s willingness to cooperate during its early years. In this process, 
the NLC lost touch with the grassroots, which in the early transitional period had shown 
willingness to mobilise for land occupations. Yet, the landless never attained the same 
strength and capacity to carry through with land invasions as did their Brazilian counterparts. 
Apart from the lack of skill, resources and a mutually shared vision for prosperity through 
land, as mentioned in Section 3.3.2, the South African landless did not receive the same 
encouragement from established organisations as the sem terra in Brazil. The NLC was from 
the outset against land occupations and therewith in line with ANC policy. During the 
transitional period, land occupations were regarded as a threat to the conciliation process and 
the South African economy and therefore repressed. The ANC had successfully extended its 
national master frame, which called upon all South Africans to follow the government to 
reconstruct a new South Africa. Efforts to open up alternative channels were perceived as 
detrimental and deviationist. Therefore, the NLC was firstly not willing and secondly not able 
to construct a counter-frame that could mobilise the landless specifically around the land 
question, although a favourable legal framework existed.   
 The MST in Brazil, on the other hand, was able and willing to exploit its legal framework 
and enforce expropriations through extensive grassroots mobilisation and framing processes 
that portrayed the MST as the legitimate institution to bring about change. In stark contrast to 
the NLC, the MST remained largely independent of the Brazilian state. The creative political 
tension facilitated mobilisation and counter-framing. The MST made extensive use of the 
political opportunity to occupy land and to remain there until granted ownership. These 
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occupation campaigns became the nucleus for its growth, since they were used by the MST to 
first of all provide a living to the landless and secondly to instil a sense of belonging to the 
organisation. Land occupations were thereby used to frame MST membership as a viable 
alternative. Furthermore, once a settlement was established, the MST continued to work with 
the people and extracted human and material resources from it, thereby sustaining its struggle. 
The tactical repertoire of land occupations therefore needs to be regarded as pivotal in the 
MST’s mobilisation and framing processes during this period. The capability and willingness 
to carry them thorough provided the MST with a very strong advantage compared to the 
South African NLC. Additionally, the MST maintained an ideological distance from the 
Brazilian state by adhering more or less to a socialist outlook in its framing activities and 
portraying the state as their common enemy, who will not provide land without force. 
Throughout its growth period, the MST proclaimed that equal distribution of land is the 
condition for pro-poor development in Brazil and succeeded in bringing the land question and 
its activism to national attention during the 1990s. In contrast, the NLC, due to its extensive 
inclusion in governmental structures, its consequent restrain in tactical repertoires and the 
historically multilayered interpretation of land versus poverty remained one movement among 
many in South Africa and was never able to prioritise the land question nationally.  
 
4.3 Decline and resurgence (1999–2009)  
The movement dynamics of the MST saw an interesting change in the period 1999 to 2009. 
Between late 1999 and 2002 the MST experienced a decline in activism, which was due to a 
concurrent change in political opportunities, tactical repertoires and framing processes. 
Having enjoyed public sympathy and a responsive government in the previous period, the 
MST became more radical and broad in its tactical repertoire as well as in its framing of 
collective action. President Cardoso answered with strategic repression, which seriously 
dampened activism. Yet, due to the MST’s mobilising and framing strengths and the election 
of President Lula da Silva in 2002, the MST experienced a great resurgence, leading to a 
broadening and diversification of tactics and frames that made the MST a globally acclaimed 
as well as a condemned rural movement.  
4.3.1 Political opportunities: Repression and revival 
When looking at the period 1999 to 2009 coherently, political opportunities continued to be of 
an ambivalent nature, which enabled the MST to maintain its activism by remaining in 
opposition to government policy and concurrently nurturing from its legal and financial 
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access points. The period, however, reveals an interesting political dynamic that temporarily 
caused the MST to decline in terms of its tactical occupations, but subsequently enabled it to 
regain its former strengths. Overall, political opportunities never changed in such a 
fundamental way that they would undermine MST activities completely, yet readjustments in 
political alignments, repression tactics and elite support occurred and had an impact on 
movement activity. This period illustrates once again how influential political changes are in 
levelling the ground for activism and thereby contribute to movements’ trajectories. 
 President Cardoso had been re-elected for a second term in 1998 amid an economy that 
showed small but positive growth rates. Unemployment had, however, increased from 6% in 
1994 to 15% in 2000 and real income decreased, triggering rising social tension (Sanders, 
2004:5). The neoliberal reformism of the Cardoso administration had led to substantial cuts in 
the land reform budget and INCRA’s budget for settlement projects decreased considerably 
from 1999 onwards. Accordingly, public spending on compensation payments for private land 
expropriations declined, reducing the chances for the MST to obtain private farm land through 
land occupations. Yet, apart from these budget cuts, which constrained the MST in its 
mobilising activities, another more significant political shift occurred that hampered MST 
activism temporarily. In 2000, the Cardoso administration shifted from grudgingly supporting 
the MST via selective concessions to openly opposing the MST in all its activities. But at the 
same time it publicly assured the landless of its commitment to land reform by opening up 
seemingly alternative channels of land reform32 (Pereira, 2007:36).  
 The Cardoso administration undertook specific measures to undermine the mobilising 
capacity of the MST, such as enacting repressive measures that made land occupations rather 
useless. The ‘provisional measures’ rendered occupied land ineligible for expropriation for 
two years. If occupied a second time, this ban would be extended to four years. The people 
and organisations participating in the occupation would not receive any kind of public 
assistance (Karriem, 2008:6; Ondetti, 2008:184). Technical assistance and educational funds 
for MST settlements were cut off completely after 2000 (Petras, 2000). In this way, the 
government had purposefully closed off important political access points for the MST, 
namely state funding and the potential for land expropriation via occupation.  
 This abrupt change of political attitude towards the MST by the same administration 
occurred in response to an increased radicalisation of the MST. As outlined in detail in the 
next Sections, the MST’s tactical repertoire was extended to occasional loathing and the 
                                               
32 For instance, INCRA established a system of ‘land reform by post’, where people could register for land by 
filling out a registration form in their post office and mailing it to INCRA. Furthermore, INCRA continued, 
albeit at a slower pace, to lobby for settlement projects on state land and land at the Amazon frontiers. 
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occupation of public buildings, triggering negative framing processes by the media and the 
government. The increasing radicalism caused friction within President Cardoso’s coalition 
and generated a sense of social chaos in Brazil. President Cardoso immediately responded 
with a suppression campaign and warned the MST that he would not tolerate more 
‘troublemaking’ (Ondetti, 2008:185). As seen below, this crackdown constituted a major blow 
to the MST’s mobilising and framing processes; yet due to its temporary nature and the 
MST’s subsequent tactical adjustments, the MST survived the closure of key political access 
points.     
 In the wake of these incidents, the PT of Lula, which had progressively won political 
ground in Brazil amid a sluggish economy and rising social tensions, distanced itself from the 
MST. Lula did not as usual participate in the MST national congress in 2000. In a ministerial 
interview in 2000, it was also noted that the government had expected more open resistance 
from the left to its crackdown on the MST (Gomes, 2000). Notwithstanding the public 
disregard, the PT remained an ally of the MST and by temporarily curbing land occupation 
activity the MST sought to facilitate a PT victory in the 2002 general elections. Lula’s 
election as president in November 2002 marked a turning point for the MST’s political 
opportunity structure. The arrival of a party with a historic commitment to land reform and 
strong ties to pro-land reform groups created expectations of speedier settlement activity 
(Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem-Terra, 2005a).  
 It has been argued, however, that President Lula’s election victory was based on the PT’s 
shift toward the political centre, thereby capturing votes from disappointed Cardoso 
supporters. Lula’s early lead in the polls had provoked uneasiness among investors fearing 
that a PT administration would default on its debts to introduce radical social measures 
(Abreu & Werneck, 2005:17). As the financial markets showed signs of distress, the 
government’s economic team approached the leadership of the PT to negotiate initiatives that 
could control the turmoil. By that time, efforts to soften the radical wing of the party were 
already underway, as moderate PT members perceived the destabilisation process as 
threatening to Lula’s election victory and his future government. In an open letter, Lula tried 
to reassure the national and international stakeholders that he was committed to stringent 
macroeconomic policy (Abreu & Werneck, 2005:17). In a further attempt, he appointed Jose 
Alencar, a wealthy industrialist and leader of the conservative liberal party (PL), as his 
running mate. The PT transformation from a radical labour party to a centre-left party was 
consolidated during the 2002 campaign. This alignment of the PT with more conservative 
forces even before the election did not go unnoticed by the MST, but it did not dampen their 
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hopes for progressive change in Brazil given Lula’s poor past as shoeshine boy and factory 
worker and his party’s long-standing leftist credentials (Tilly, Kennedy & Ramos, 2009).  
 Lula’s presidency,33 however, proved to be of an ambivalent nature. As was common for 
Brazilian governments, the institutional power base of President Lula was rather weak and 
therefore the chances for deep structural changes were slim. The PT remained a minority 
party in the Upper and the Lower House of the National Congress. Its alliance with other left 
parties and the PMDB provided it with a working majority, yet a very fragile one (De Souza, 
2006). It needs to be argued that Lula’s leftist background in fact put more pressure on him to 
follow a neoliberal economic policy in order to assure capital and gain a workable coalition; 
similar to the ANC administration in the post apartheid era. President Lula’s economic 
programme followed Cardoso’s focus on fiscal and monetary discipline. He passed reforms 
associated with neoliberalism, including cuts in the national pension system and the approval 
of genetically modified seeds in Brazil, which was strongly opposed by many leftist groups, 
including the MST.  
 During President Lula’s first term in office, the Brazilian economy experienced a modest 
recovery. This enabled President Lula to pass some of his promised social programmes, the 
most visible one being the Family Grant, which provides families with monetary assistance if 
they send their children to school. As a result of economic revival and the social transfers, 
poverty fell by 12.9% between 2002 and 2005 and bolstered President Lula’s re-election in 
2006 (Ondetti, 2008:207).   
 Likewise, there was a mixed performance in relation to land reform. President Lula 
essentially continued with Cardoso’s early land-reform policy by reducing the expropriation 
of private farmland, but accelerating the settlement of the landless via the placement of 
families on existing settlements and vacant public land (Tilly et al., 2009). While this kind of 
land reform does allocate land to people, the inherent land inequality of Brazil is not 
addressed, since the system of large landholdings is maintained and the land distributed to the 
landless is often of inferior quality or lacks market access (Caldeira, 2008:140). Therefore, 
Lula’s land-reform policy remained a point of criticism for the MST and, notwithstanding the 
historical bond between the MST and President Lula, gave rise to a new wave of protest and 
land occupations, as made clear below. This renewed activism would however not have been 
possible without the lifting of Cardoso’s repressive measures. President Lula did not officially 
revoke the provisional measures, but they were in general not enforced. In addition, President 
                                               
33 Lula’s first term was from 2002 to 2006, He was re-elected in 2006 for a second term until 2010. 
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Lula reintroduced funding for the MST (Ondetti, 2008:214). The organisation benefited 
greatly from this re-opening of political opportunities and quickly started to remobilise.  
 While the national political system regained its partial supportive elements with the Lula 
administration, federal policies remained antagonistic. As a result of the MST’s renewed 
activism and in response to President Lula’s centre-left administration, landowners began to 
organise again in many states and a large increase of land-related violence in Brazil was 
observed (Comissao Pastoral da Terra, 2009). In 2009, authorities in Rio Grande do Sul made 
attempts to classify the MST as a terrorist organisation, whereby they took advantage of the 
internationally proclaimed fight against terrorism. State administrators laid charges against 
MST leaders, which were based on crimes of ‘political nonconformity’. The National Security 
Law that served as the basis for these complaints was promulgated under the military 
dictatorship and had recently been revoked to file the case (International Federation for 
Human Rights, 2009). 
 Today, land reform seems to have entered a time of crisis. The latest available figures of 
2008 show a stagnation of land reform in Brazil. It is estimated that in 2008, the number of 
families that were assigned land titles decreased by 80% compared to the results of 2007 
(International Federation for Human Rights, 2009). Above all, in August 2009, the Upper 
House where President Lula falls short of a majority passed a bill that eliminated the official 
index used by INCRA to measure the productivity of land. This happened amid discussions 
on updating the index, which currently still uses productivity criteria from 1970.34 If updated, 
the government will technically force large-scale farmers to boost production to avoid 
expropriation (Reuters, 2009). The MST would benefit from such a revision as more 
properties become eligible for expropriation. The elimination bill has sparked heated debates 
within the government and the MST, as it is seen as an attempt by the bancada ruralista to 
block any future expropriations. Currently, the bill is pending and is being discussed by the 
Lower House.   
 The year 2009 saw another important legislation by the Lula administration. Provisional 
Measure 458 will privatise 67.4 million hectares of public land, which is currently occupied 
illegally in the Brazilian Amazon. Those occupying land could receive legal titles if they meet 
certain conditions, including having peacefully obtained the land and keeping it in productive 
                                               
34 With the modernisation of agriculture, the productivity potential of Brazilian agriculture has risen 
substantially. According to these new productivity standards, many large farming areas are underutilised. 
However, landowners are able to defy expropriation by adhering to the minimum standards of 1970, which for 
instance classify the herding of cattle once a year on the property as productive use. In times of food shortages, 
the opposition to this practice has grown and there is widespread support for an official updating of productivity 
criteria.  
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use (Hirsch, 2009). While it is too early to judge this bill properly, it does represent an 
opportunity for occupying people to obtain legal status and thereby assistance from the state. 
On the other hand, such an across-the-board land transfer is in fact counterproductive for the 
MST, as it eliminates the incentive to join the movement in this region. In addition, the MST 
does not officially support the settlement on rainforest land, as long-term sustainable farming 
is not feasible due to the soil and climate conditions (Meszaros, 2000:523). While it is 
claimed to be a once-off measure, it has set a precedent and will encourage people to occupy 
land in the Amazon Basin. It remains to be seen how the MST is going to deal with this new 
legislation. It raises new questions in terms of tactical repertoires and framing landlessness. 
On the one hand the government has taken a proactive step towards land allocation, which has 
always been part of MST campaigning and is therefore welcomed. On the other hand, the 
MST’s goal is the redistribution of existing farmland and not the encroachment on 
environmentally sensitive areas that do not offer a viable livelihood.  
 Overall, the period 2000 to 2009 demonstrated once again the interrelatedness of the MST 
with its political environment. The repressive measures undertaken by the Cardoso 
administration were partly the consequence of radical tendencies within the MST and 
immediately provoked a reduction in activism, but also a crucial readjustment of tactical 
repertoires, as the following section shows. Temporally, the MST experienced a decline, but 
its solid mobilisation structures as well as international linkage enabled it to sustain its 
organisation. Yet, it needs to be argued that without Lula becoming president in 2002 and re-
opening political access points, the MST might have seen its demise. The Lula government 
however continues to usher the creative political tension that has empowered the MST since 
its inception and has contributed to its renewed and expanded activism since 2002.  
 
4.3.2 Resource mobilisation: Adjustments, diversifications and internationalisation 
As already discussed briefly, resource mobilisation underwent some changes between 2000 
and 2009. Mobilisation structures and tactical repertoires did take on new forms, but an 
intensification of existing practices also took place. The situation in the countryside saw some 
positive economic shifts. Contrary to the general economy, commercial agriculture 
experienced a boom between 2000 and 2005. But the size and composition of farm workers 
did not change much throughout Brazil, indicating the inability of the agriculture sector to 
absorb labour. Poverty and the underlining demand for land continued to exist and 
landlessness remained a widespread problem (Ondetti, 2008:193). Nevertheless, the MST 
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experienced a decline in occupation activity in 2000 to 2002. Overall, land occupations 
decreased by 52% relative to the previous three-year period (Nucleo de Estudos, Pesquisas e 
Projetos de Reforma Agraria, 2007:8). This decline was observable across the country.35 As 
mentioned, this decline is attributable to the changed political opportunity structure of the late 
Cardoso years. The provisional measures that made land occupation essentially ineffective 
caused many landless people to refrain from such activities. It is arguably harder to motivate 
people to engage in land occupations if the chances for success are very low. Hence, the 
benefits did no longer outweigh the costs and occupation activity dwindled. Yet, it is 
interesting to note that the MST’s share of land occupation rose in this period to 48.9% of 
total occupations (Ondetti, 2008:191). This reflects the MST’s greater capability and 
willingness to actually challenge Cardoso’s measures. This defiance was largely based on the 
MST’s ability to maintain its close cooperation with established settlements, serving as 
reception camps for evicted occupiers as well as resource bases.   
 The increasing political repression came in response to growing ruthlessness of the MST 
in the late 1990s and early 2000. In April 2000, the MST launched a ‘day of struggle’, which 
involved land occupations, demonstrations and other protest actions. The MST engaged in 
some of its most controversial campaigns, including the destruction of the Para state 
secretariat of security and the occupation of a sugarcane plantation that had already been 
transferred to CONTAG. In May 2000, the MST invaded federal buildings in 13 state 
capitals, including the capital Brasilia. More than 30 000 people participated and in some 
cases damage was caused to properties. The occupiers refused to leave the buildings until 
President Cardoso himself or one of his economic ministers would agree to talk to them and 
make concessions. Military police attempting to stop the MST from entering the state building 
in Brasilia killed one settler (Ondetti, 2008:195). Ultimately, the MST withdrew from its 
occupations given President Cardoso’s determination not to enter into any negotiations.  
 The growing boldness in activism can be traced to tactical decisions made by the MST 
leadership in those years. They were fuelled by an overestimation of the MST’s political 
invulnerability, as the early Cardoso years had brought the MST widespread publicity and 
public support for land occupations. It can be argued that the inclusion of bolder tactics in 
their tactical repertories avoided the slipping into the adaption and acceptance of given land-
reform measures. On the other hand, however, some initiatives certainly did not further 
                                               
35 Decline in land occupations in percentage: centre-west: 58.1; north: 32.8; northeast: 50.3; south: 76.7; 
southeast: 40.3.  
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agrarian reform policy, but only undermined their image as a rural movement. This process of 
changing public perceptions is addressed below.     
 The ruthlessness of activities became less evident with Lula entering the government, 
although the MST did not refrain from using protest tactics to pressure President Lula as his 
conservative policy turn became more evident. The relationship with President Lula remained 
ambivalent. While many MST members are loyal to President Lula and exercise a certain 
restraint in criticising the government, others are expressing their anger about the slow pace of 
land reform and lobbying for overt protest actions (Kenfield, 2007). The first term of 
President Lula (2002–2006) saw clear signs of restraint in protest tactics. While occupation 
activities increased between 2002 and 2005 by 41% compared to the previous three-year 
period, MST protest actions sustained a more engaging quality (Nucleo de Estudos, Pesquisas 
e Projetos de Reforma Agraria, 2007:8). In 2005, the single most ambitious campaign of the 
MST was a 17-day march to Brasilia with 12 000 activists participating. In Brasilia they met 
with the President and obtained some settlement concessions (Branford, 2005). In their march 
to the capital, the MST leaders were determined not to enter into quarrels with the police. In a 
public statement in 2005, Stedile, a well-known MST leader, announced the start of protest 
actions, but also cautiously pointed out that actions were not aimed “against the government, 
but to force the government to change its economic policy” (Machado, 2005).  
 This restraint in protest actions has however seen a gradual decline in recent years. In 
particular, since President Lula’s re-election in 2006, the MST has returned to controversial 
protest actions such as the destruction of genetically modified crops, the occupation of state 
offices, theft of tractors and raiding of police stations (Karriem, 2008:7; Tilly et al., 2009). In 
particular, the occupation of INCRA offices has increased during the last two years, judging 
from news reports in the two major newspapers Folha de Sao Paulo and Veja. At the time of 
writing this thesis, the MST had launched major occupation campaigns of the INCRA offices 
in Porto Alegre, Sao Paulo and Recife in order to pressure the government to update 
productivity criteria (Mendes, 2009, Ogliari, 2009).   
 Recent years have also seen a diversification and internationalisation of MST activism. 
While organising occupations and protest actions remain the core of the MST’s tactical 
repertoire, the MST has taken on new tasks such as the introduction of agro-ecological 
methods in its MST settlements and the widespread lobbying thereof. In 2004, it founded its 
own seeds cooperative, Bionature, which supplies its settlements with organic seeds (Karriem, 
2008:7). The adoption of agro-ecological practices is part of the MST’s emerging extended 
injustice frame, which not only focuses on land inequality in Brazil, but also on the practices, 
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politics and relations that constitute the whole agrarian production system. Arguing that 
modern commercialised agriculture harms nature and the health of human beings, the MST 
has adapted a strong stance against agribusinesses, genetically modified crops and “the 
commodification of nature by capital” in general (Karriem, 2008:7).  
 The global debate on climate change has in recent years turned the focus on Brazil’s 
biofuel production and the need to protect the Amazon forest as carbon storage. Brazil has 
become the leading supplier of sugarcane-based ethanol, which requires large-scale 
commercial plantations. This has come at the expense of small-scale farmers in the south and 
the rain forest in the Amazon Basin. The ongoing deforestation of the Amazon has further 
been aggravated by large soybean plantations and the uncontrolled encroachment of landless 
people into the rain forests (Tilly et al., 2009). As an organisation that relies on land 
occupations and the settlement of people, the MST needs to address the tactical dilemma 
emerging in the Amazon region. Being known for supporting and motivating land invasion 
for the sake of land redistribution, the MST is accused of having popularised occupations in 
Brazil, which now also affect the Amazon.  
 The MST, as the biggest social movement in Brazil, has joined national and international 
discussions on these topics and thereby substantially broadened the scope of its activism by 
organising numerous conferences, workshops and cross-country cooperation. In 2002 it 
organised a national plebiscite against the Free Trade Agreement (FTAA) with more than 
90% voting against the FTAA. The MST is also a regular guest at the World Social Forums 
and an important contributor to the international peasant movement La Via Campesina 
(Borras, 2008). It furthermore maintains more or less strong ties to other international landless 
movements36 (the NLC and LPM used to be two of them) and organises exchange and study 
programmes for members (Wolford et al., 2008). Consequently, the MST has become an 
internationally active movement whose organisational structure and tactical repertoires extend 
far beyond its traditional land occupations. Whether this diversification and 
internationalisation of activities is in fact detrimental to its core strategy, as it may divert 
attention and resources away from the actual occupations and settlements, remains to be seen 
in the next years.  
 
                                               
36 For instance, the Movimiento Campesino Paraguayo, the Indonesian Peasant Union, the Kilusang Magbubukid 
ng Pilipinas and the Vietnamese National Farmers Union. 
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4.3.3 Framing processes: Alternative framing and demonisation 
As outlined above, the recent years have seen a broadening of the MST’s agenda, reflecting 
on the one hand the MST’s organisational capacity and influence and on the other hand the 
diverse political and economic meaning that land has attained in Brazil. The MST’s collective 
action frame has consequently experienced a very broad extension to issues and goals, which 
were originally not part of the action frame. The extension of the collective action frame has 
enabled the organisation to become an internationally known rural movement, because 
organisations, donors and individuals with a diverse background can identify with the MST’s 
broad collective action frame.   
 In particular, the diagnostic framing element has been extended over the last years. The 
MST moved away from seeing the government and the existing land distribution in Brazil as 
the sole reason for landlessness and poverty. Today, the diagnostic analysis includes the 
global agricultural system as the ultimate source for inequality and deprivation: “… we work 
from the perspective of confronting the current agricultural model imposed by the 
multinationals” (MST activists, cited in Karriem, 2008:7). The MST argues that the current 
model, which includes agribusinesses, the global food chain and the commercialisation of 
food, undermines rural livelihood in Brazil and all over the world. It claims that this 
“commodification of nature by capital” displaces workers from their land, prioritises export 
crops over stable food, further concentrates land and income and is detrimental to the 
environment (Karriem, 2008:7). In this regard, the MST concludes that the current economic 
system has lost its ‘social function’. An MST activist stated the following:  
[The MST] go[es] beyond the economic vision of productivity that the legislation talks about. 
We ask ‘what productivity is of interest to society’? From the point of view of social gain and 
from the point of view of necessity, the public interest should be above purely economic 
interests” (cited in Wittman, 2009:123). 
Its diagnostic analysis therefore goes far beyond the initial national analysis and touches upon 
deeply entrenched economic structures in the present world, namely free-market principles, 
the right to private property and profit as the overriding goal of production. It can be argued 
that this broadening causes the injustice frame to become very diffuse and aimless. It is 
difficult for the MST to point to one specific ‘enemy’ today and to explain these complex 
economic structures to the people on the ground.  
 This diffuse ‘enemy picture’ also applies to the current administration. As mentioned 
before, the MST’s relationship with the Lula government remains ambivalent. MST organiser 
Jonas da Silva, for instance, claimed: “We campaign for Lula even though we are critical of 
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him for shaping his discourse for the middle class” (cited in Tilly et al., 2009). This statement 
also illustrates that the MST, unlike South Africa’s NLC and LPM, makes a more pronounced 
distinction between its president and his policy. While President Lula is seldom attacked 
personally, his policy receives harsh criticism by the MST. It appears as if the MST portrays 
President Lula as the ‘lesser evil’, since they do not agree with his policy, yet are afraid of 
someone else in stark opposition to the MST.  
 The prognostic frame has consequently also experienced an extension. The MST is known 
today as an organisation that lobbies for an alternative approach to agriculture and rural 
livelihood. MST leader Stedile details the MST’s conception of a future agrarian model as 
follows:    
We want an agrarian practice that transforms farmers into guardians of the land, and a different 
way of farming, that ensures an ecological equilibrium emphasis on the environmental and 
social function of land and also guarantees that land is not seen as private property (cited in 
Karriem, 2008:8).  
Yet, its current prognostic frame goes beyond the sketching of an alternative land sector 
and includes a wide spectrum of rights and duties. The following quote from an MST 
activist enumerates some of them: 
The right to participate, the right to leisure, schools, health, roads … all the public goods that 
citizens have a right to. [It is a land relation that] respects labor rights … a healthy 
environment preserved for future generations, and democratizes access to land (cited in 
Wittman, 2009: 123). 
Its current prognostic frame is therefore highly inclusive, as it incorporates essentially all 
grassroots demands for a ‘better life for all’. By offering such a wide collective action frame, 
which essentially portrays an alternative society based on a sustainable and equalised land 
sector, the MST offers ideological access points for a variety of contemporary movements, 
lobbying for a ‘better world’. In this regard, it has been argued that the MST has become an 
anti-systemic movement, as it criticises the current neoliberal order and envisages an 
alternative system (Karriem, 2008; Petras & Veltmeyer, 2006).  
 It however needs to be pointed out that the MST’s prognostic framing suffers from the 
same vagueness as its diagnostic analysis. Due to its ambitious and highly inclusive counter-
framing, objectives have become less tangible for the ordinary landless person. The core 
strategy of the MST, namely land settlements, has enabled the MST to present a concrete 
alternative approach to commercialised, large-scale agriculture. Land is a very tangible fact 
and if political opportunities and resource mobilisation are favourable, it can easily be used to 
frame ‘change’ and ‘betterment’, as outlined in the previous Sections. On the other hand, 
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democratic rights, sustainability, environmental protection or the right to leisure, to name but 
a few, are arguably more abstract ideas and therefore much more difficult to translate into 
concrete results, which then may serve as springboard to perpetuate the counter-frame. 
Overall, the MST, as many other anti-systemic movements, lacks a concrete alternative 
blueprint in its efforts to extend its prognostic frame.  
 The extension of the collective action frame is also evident in its motivational component. 
As outlined previously, the MST has experienced an intensification of non-occupational 
tactics, which at times have become comparatively ruthless. This turn is a reflection of its 
extended diagnostic and prognostic frame. Since the MST essentially portrays the entire 
economic system as its ‘modern enemy’, attacks against the ‘system’ are exercised for the 
sake of a ‘better world’ and are therefore perceived as legitimate. Nonetheless, this kind of 
motivational interpretation is still controversial within the MST and it remains to be seen 
whether it may lead to a spin-off movement that adheres to either more moderate or radical 
methods.  
 The internal controversy was also sparked due to a public image change that the MST 
underwent. From about 1999 onwards, the then Cardoso government and Brazilian media, 
which despite thousands of radio stations and hundreds of TV channels remains highly 
concentrated, begun to disseminate an image of the MST as a terroristic and criminal 
organisation. The media coverage of the MST generally “underscored the growing threat the 
MST poses to ‘democracy’ and the ‘rule of law’ and applauded the fact that Cardoso was 
‘finally’ getting tough on the MST’s unruly tactics” (Ondetti, 2008:186). In 2000, an issue of 
the Veja was titled as follows: “The tactic of troublemaking: The MST uses the pretext of 
agrarian reform to preach socialist revolution” (A tactica da baderna, 2000; Ondetti, 
2008:186). In its effort to condemn the MST, the media was joined by a number of prominent 
intellectuals. José de Souza Martins, the country’s best-known rural sociologist, branded the 
MST as luddites. Zander Navarro, an acclaimed sociologist and former MST supporter, stated 
that the MST is “propelled by the ‘childish Leninist’ ideas of a small revolutionary cadre” 
(cited in Carter, 2009:2–3).  
 During the last decade this public condemnation has diminished national popularity of the 
MST to a point were only 30% of Brazilians are in favour of land occupations37 (Ondetti, 
2008:187). The public framing of the MST as an “autocratic, violent, shady and revolutionary 
organization” will be detrimental over the longer term as it causes political allies such as the 
                                               
37 The poll was taken in 2000 in the city of Sao Paulo by the conservatively rated newspaper Folha de Sao 
Paulo. Hence, results might be biased as more urban, white-collar workers were interviewed. 
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PT to withdraw their support for the sake of preserving their electorate from the centre 
(Carter, 2009: 3). On the other hand, it needs to be pointed out that the MST has clearly 
maintained its independent voice in Brazil and the world by engaging in discussions about an 
alternative agrarian model across the board and by actively extending its land occupation 
strategy through the inclusion of ecological principles. This dissident thinking and practice 
continue to be resonant among the Brazilian landless and urban poor, as the MST presents a 
vital institutional and ideological alternative to the repetitively disappointing Brazilian state. 
Brazilian academics, professionals, foreign organisations and individuals are however also 
among the MST’s sympathisers and supporters, valuing the maintenance of diversity as one 
way to progress.   
 
4.3.4 Summary 
The period from 1999 to 2009 saw interesting movement dynamics for the MST. The 
movement experienced a temporary decline, but also a quick revival lasting to this day. This 
trajectory is the result of the interrelatedness of political opportunities, mobilising structures 
and framing processes. Overall, the political opportunity structure remained ambivalent, 
which translated into the possibility for the MST to continue its traditional activism and to 
include new tactical repertoires. Based on its solid mobilising structures and collective action 
frame, the MST was also able to sustain the last two repressive years of the Cardoso 
administration. With the advent of President Lula’s reign, the political structure was re-
opening again, yet remained partially hostile to the MST, which to some degree was due to 
the MST’s increasing boldness in protest actions and broadening of its collective action 
frame. Except for the two last Cardoso years, the political opportunity structure in Brazil 
between 1999 and 2009 therefore maintained its creative political tension, keeping the MST 
somewhat distant from the government, yet enabling the MST to mobilise around the legal 
and financial access points the administration offers.  
 Current land measures, in this regard, point to a continuance of this political ambivalence. 
The recently implemented land law for the Amazon Basin has led to new controversies 
around the occupation methods used by the MST as well as to an unlinking of MST 
membership and land transfers in this region. On the other hand, the Lula government is 
showing political will to update productivity criteria, which would greatly enhance the MST’s 
activities. Yet, at the same time, the bancada ruralista continue to obstruct and delay land-
reform measures in Congress as well as on the ground via their political and economic 
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leverage. Thereby they contribute in an odd way to the sustainability of the MST, since they 
‘create’ an enemy picture and organisational difficulties that motivate and direct the struggle.   
 In South Africa, the political structure between 1999 and 2009 presents yet again very 
different opportunities. In essence, it was a continuance of the transitional period 1990 to 
1999, yet it showed an amplification of existing constraints. The ANC remained the ruling 
party in South Africa and with it the state-directed activism, already identified in the previous 
period. However, the advent of President Mbeki in 1999 meant the start of a period with 
increasingly closed political access points in terms of recognition of rural interests and the 
NLC. While the NLC continued to be part of governmental structures through municipality 
work, its voice as the representative of the landless was disregarded amid the consolidation of 
elite interests. Land reform itself stagnated and the Mbeki government did not show political 
will to adjust land policy or to open alternative channels of activism. Land occupations, for 
instance, remained a strict taboo, in particular after the invasions of productive farms in 
Zimbabwe, which instilled horrendous fears into the government and the public.  
 The NLC therefore acted in a political environment characterised by artificial access 
points. Whereas the MST was able to exploit legal and financial opportunities that were 
functional and responding to its activism in Brazil, the NLC essentially campaigned in an 
environment that did not offer effective support for alternative activism, as this was not in line 
with government policy. Furthermore, the NLC itself continued to adapt to the few access 
points that were offered and did not challenge the course of the government. This is a direct 
result of its institutionalisation of mobilising structures and its integration into the national 
master frame during the transitional period. Interestingly though, there has been the desire by 
some NLC members to embrace a more radical approach, drawing their inspiration in fact 
from the MST in Brazil. Yet, as it was outlined in detail, their ambitions to construct a similar 
rural movement were not met with the required dynamics to sustain the movement as the very 
same constraints that choked the NLC also restrained the LPM. The LPM remained overly 
dependent on the NLC and thereby indirectly on the government. Its organisational structure 
remained a generated national committee and lacked appropriate grassroots structures. Its 
tactical repertoire was tightly constrained by firstly the active suppression by the government 
and secondly the implicit reluctance of landless people to actually carry through with land 
occupations and strikes, whereby the national master frame effectively tied most landless to 
the ANC government and their proposed policies. Lastly, land ownership, as mentioned 
before, did not attain the same meaning in South Africa as in Brazil. It remained one of many 
items on the ‘racial redress agenda’, along with education, health, houses and employment. In 
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this regard it was argued that the landless themselves do not link land to personal prosperity 
and freedom as strongly as the sem terra in Brazil do. Consequently, land never attained the 
same urgent social and political status in South Africa as it did in Brazil, affecting framing 
and mobilising efforts of the NLC and the LPM.  
 Recent mobilising and framing processes in Brazil have also seen a diversification of the 
land question and a divergence of its original narrow meaning. These changes were largely 
initiated by a changing political and economic significance of land in Brazil due to its 
increased ethanol production, ongoing environmental destruction, particularly in the Amazon 
forest, and the related global climate talks. Being a well-established and resourceful 
organisation, the MST took up these matters and included them in its campaigning repertoire 
and collective action frame. The land question is today regarded by the MST as much more 
than only a national distribution problem; it is seen as a global issue that affects every country 
and every part of a person’s life. While on the one hand it means an extension of issues and 
thereby a wider recognition of the MST nationally and internationally, it may on the other 
hand also lead to a similar tendency as in South Africa, namely the divergence away from the 
root problem, the distribution of land. However, one can argue that the MST started with a 
very narrow and tangible action frame and mobilised successfully around it amid ambivalent 
political opportunities. Therefore, the MST enjoyed and still enjoys a solid grassroots 
foundation with people ideologically and practically connected to land and its associated 
issues. In this way, the MST might be able to handle a broadening of its agenda as a critical 
and proactive rural grassroots is ever present. The NLC, on the other hand, could never build 
onto such a national grassroots with precise goals and concrete ‘enemies’. Its action frame and 
mobilising structures were from the outset characterised by interpretational and structural 
broadness that inhibited the formation of a cohesive idea of landlessness and landownership 
in South Africa. The national master frame in this regard substantially contributed to the 
shifting of responsibility for land reform to the government, whereby land distribution 
gradually lost its social and political urgency.       
 Whether the new Zuma government will offer a changed political opportunity structure in 
South Africa remains doubtful. Although Zuma rhetorically brought the land question back to 
national attention by proposing some controversial measures, land reform will remain a top-
down affair and simply another item on the agenda, since there is presently no capable 
national representation of the landless in South Africa that could articulate urgency and 
precise demands. The election of Zuma might, despite his overt pledges for cooperation and 
rhetorical promises to work for the people, represent a step back in terms of movement 
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dynamics in South Africa. President Zuma greatly re-evoked old feelings of a benevolent 
state, which South Africans need to respect and serve and thereby he corroborated the national 
master frame. A significant grassroots mobilisation and counter-framing are therefore not to 
be expected.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have sought to present an explanation for varying rural activism in South 
Africa and Brazil. The guiding question was why two countries with similar rural disparities 
experienced a very different outcome of rural mobilisation. I have focused on tracing the 
protest cycles of the South African NLC and the Brazilian MST, namely the emerging phase, 
the period of stabilisation and the period of decline and resurgence. In this analysis, I have 
been guided by the three widely acknowledged perspectives on social movements, namely 
political opportunities, resource mobilisation and framing processes. In particular, I have tried 
to demonstrate the interrelatedness of these dynamics and how grievances weave into them. In 
this concluding chapter I briefly review the key findings of the preceding chapters by 
addressing each movement dynamic, and subsequently arrive at an overall conclusion.  
 The NLC faced from the outset a very different political opportunity structure compared 
to the MST. None of South Africa’s political systems were conducive to rural activism. The 
critical feature of South Africa’s political systems has been and still is the question of race 
and the fight for equal representation and recognition of both black and white people in 
politics and the economy. In this regard, South Africa’s political systems have been 
characterised by ethnic power blocks that were either overly exclusive or overly inclusive 
towards rural activism. Apartheid politically, economically and socially excluded the majority 
of black South Africans in order to ensure the consolidation and stabilisation of white 
minority rule. Rural activism favouring black rural workers and farmers was essentially not 
feasible, as political participation and the establishment of organisations were prohibited 
through a highly discriminating political and legal system. Illegal alignments among and with 
white sympathisers were an option and utilised, in particular towards the end of apartheid, to 
establish a network of rural organisations. Yet, despite this slight window of opportunity, the 
system remained overly repressive and discriminating in all aspects of people’s life and 
triggered the emergence of an all-embracing African party promising general redress. The 
post-apartheid period constituted the complete opposite of apartheid and was a comparatively 
quick change from utter exclusion to extensive inclusion of activism. The ANC, being the 
legitimate new government for all South Africans and for all problems, absorbed activists, 
resources and project work, thereby draining civil society from it mobilisation and framing 
capacity. This over-inclusion was ultimately detrimental to the NLC, because land reform, 
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despite a favourable legal framework, became the sole responsibility of the ANC-led 
government and thereby an entirely bureaucratic process. In terms of political opportunities 
for rural activism, the relative quick change from exclusion to inclusion brought about by a 
widely acclaimed liberation movement had a demobilising effect in the long term.  
 Brazil, on the other hand, has shown throughout its history an ambivalent political 
opportunity structure. Compared to South Africa, power blocks based on ethnicity did not 
exist. In Brazil, politics was and is characterised by a multi-racial elite that historically 
attained its status through large landholdings and an extensive system of patronage. 
Therefore, compared to South Africa, Brazil’s politics and party system have a much more 
direct emphasis on class issues, wealth and power imbalance. These matters are not leveraged 
against race as much as in South Africa, where the black-white dichotomy has constrained 
political life to evolve around substantive matters. In South Africa, party affiliation has not 
been and is still not based on programmatic agendas as in Brazil, but on race and narratives of 
domination and dispossession. The majority of South Africans do not directly identify with a 
class, a profession or an ideological background, but with their historically assigned racial 
category and the attached burden. Although the race/class distinction is slowly being blurred 
as South Africa’s middle class becomes more multiracial; race continues to remain a salient 
identity marker. Therefore, developmental issues such as education, health, employment and 
land are not sufficiently singled out as vantage points for competitive party and politics 
formation as in Brazil, where a multitude of left-, centre- and right-wing parties exist. A 
resulting consequence is that legitimate land ownership in South Africa remains linked to race 
and not to social productivity criterions as it is the case in Brazil. In South Africa, social and 
economic issues are bundled in a coherent ‘redress package’ that needs to be delivered by the 
‘appropriately racially mixed’ government. Brazil’s political system has various parties with 
programmatic agendas, competing for votes in a stratified, but racially more heterogeneous 
society which is not burdened as explicitly as the post-apartheid society by a recent history of 
excessive segregation. 
 In Brazil, politics has therefore been more of a balancing act between the interests of a 
wealthy elite, the urban middle class and the poor, often rural, population. Although the elite, 
in particular the landholders, known as the bancada ruralista, has dominated politics, there 
was and is a need to forge coalitions and therefore to make strategic compromises. As yet, this 
has repeatedly resulted in favourable political access points for rural movements, yet without 
becoming overly inclusive, as conservative forces have generally maintained the upper hand. 
This characteristic of Brazil’s government was less accentuated during the military 
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dictatorship. Yet, compared to South Africa, it was a regime that suppressed its entire 
population on ideological grounds for fear of communism and kept certain channels open, 
such as Christian-based communities. The military regime also passed and extended the Land 
Statute and thereby laid the legal foundation for land reform. Above all, no political system in 
Brazil had eroded small-scale farming as systematically as the apartheid regime did with the 
African farming communities by forcing them into wage labour and work migration. While 
local policies in Brazil have been rather unfavourable for small-scale farmers, the country’s 
government never employed the institutionalised displacement tactics of the apartheid regime.  
 With the turn to democracy in Brazil, political opportunities opened up for rural 
mobilisation, yet never as wide-ranging as in South Africa. The rather fragile and 
conservative coalition governments of the democracy never attained the same symbolic and 
political acceptance as the ANC did in South Africa, which left considerable mobilising and 
framing space for the MST and other oppositional forces. Brazil’s democratic governments 
were however never able to completely ignore the ensuing land demand from the MST, as the 
legal framework presented a detailed and extensive agrarian legislation that emphasised the 
social function of land. Numerous political allies, such as the PT, labour unions and 
legislators, which remain in opposition, supported their struggle for land. In contrast, 
landowners, politicians and other conservative sectors have demonstrated a vigorous will and 
power to prevent or slow down land-reform implementation.  
 Overall, Brazil’s political opportunity structure has been consistently ambivalent 
compared to South Africa’s change from utter exclusion to over-inclusion. As resource 
mobilisation and framing processes illustrate further, an ambivalent political structure was 
comparatively more conducive to long-term powerful rural activism than opportunity 
extremes, since it provided just enough legal and political loopholes to make activism 
partially successful – a precondition to persistently motivate people. But it also presented 
activists with tangible constraints that required ongoing mobilisation 
 Accordingly, resource mobilisation as one movement dynamic has shown substantial 
differences between South Africa and Brazil. The key finding of the MST’s success was its 
adaption of land occupations as a major tactical repertoire across Brazil. It is a tangible 
protest action, which after years of mutually shared deprivation, brings material success to the 
community and thereby stimulates a sense of belonging. This tactical repertoire was possible 
in Brazil because of three major reasons. Firstly, there were political opportunities that 
allowed expropriation based on the social function of land as well as political allies that 
financially and ideologically supported land occupations. Secondly, the MST could build onto 
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an existing grassroots structure of small-scale farmers or their relatives, in particular in the 
southern states. CEBs had substantially instilled a sense of community, but also an idea of 
rural prosperity and independence. With the democratic opening of Brazil, middle-class 
intellectuals started to support the movement at the grassroots level as well, thereby providing 
the MST with legal expertise and leadership skills. The third key reason for the feasibility of 
land occupations is the historically grown conviction of land distribution being the ultimate 
source of power imbalance and poverty in Brazil. This conviction was early on reflected in 
the legal framework and later on politically embodied by INCRA. The MST has certainly 
contributed to this prioritising of the land question, yet latifúndios owners have been regarded 
as corrupt and unproductive landlords hindering economic and social development in Brazil 
before the emergence of the MST. To a greater or lesser extent, land occupations were 
therefore considered a legitimate method to alter social injustice in Brazil, in particular in 
view of a political body largely unwilling to implement land reform. 
 In South Africa, resource mobilisation never had the same influential intensity. Compared 
to the MST, the resource-mobilisation capacity of the NLC was characterised by weak 
grassroots structures and an overly bureaucratic tactical repertoire. Two of the three major 
reasons, summarised above, which facilitated land occupations in Brazil, were not present in 
South Africa. With regard to political opportunities, it can be argued that South Africa 
possesses an agrarian legislation, which in theory supports expropriation in the public interest 
and for an equitable access of South Africa’s resources. The NLC has furthermore cooperated 
extensively with political allies and received substantial amounts of state assistance, yet this 
political alignment took place in a very different manner compared to the MST. As 
aforementioned, the NLC was absorbed into the government, thereby adapting its projects and 
policy agendas. In contrast, the MST aligned itself with forces from the political and civil 
society opposition, which remained comparatively vivid and influential in democratic Brazil 
and maintained an alternative agenda to the government, thereby approving rebellious actions.  
 The presence of a small but coherent grassroots structure of small-scale farmers that 
shared a common idea of agricultural prosperity and thereby served as the mobilising nucleus 
for the MST, did not exist in South Africa. The black rural population of South Africa was 
and partially still is today a diverse mix of farm dwellers, wage tenants, migrant workers and 
subsistence farmers in the former homelands, all of which had from the start very different 
ideas of land reform and its associated service deliveries. There were no comparable 
Christian-based communities in the South African countryside to reach out to the poorest of 
the poor and unite them around their common grievances. Such institutions would have 
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profoundly undermined apartheid’s goal of black subordination and dependency. Hence, the 
NLC’s work was limited to localised support of displaced communities and assistance to 
individuals and families. As essentially a part of the post-apartheid government, the NLC 
became an institutionalised entity carrying out administrative tasks and joining policy 
discussions. The landless were encouraged to be patient receivers of land reform’s slow 
output instead of active demanders. Land occupations were and are seen as an unnecessary 
disturbance of the national effort to address apartheid legacies collectively and coherently. In 
this regard, the last important reason for the acceptability of land occupations in Brazil was 
also not present in South Africa. While land distribution is seen as an important agenda item, 
it is only one task of the ‘redress package’. Apartheid left South Africa with so many 
substantial disparities affecting people’s lives that land distribution is not regarded as the 
primary problem, as is the case in Brazil. In this regard South Africa’s landless do not link 
land to personal prosperity and freedom as strongly as the sem terra in Brazil do. Land 
occupations were therefore not seen as a legitimate way to solve social injustices in South 
Africa, even more so as the government seemed to offer suitable channels for land reform.  
 Overall, the resource mobilisation of the MST showed that the possession and feasibility 
of a tactical repertoire, which maintains ties to the grassroots and at the same time necessitates 
substantial interaction with the political elite, contributed to its movement strengths. In stark 
contrast, the NLC lost its tactical independence and connection to the landless in the post-
apartheid period and predominately engaged with political actors. The resulting unwillingness 
and inability to carry out land occupations in South Africa, as compared to the MST, 
contributed to the demobilisation of the NLC.     
 Framing processes as an important movement dynamic that provides the struggle with 
meaning and thereby may activate people if the frame is sufficiently resonant, have seen 
different characteristics in the MST and NLC. Overall, the MST constructed a very resonant 
collective action frame, which started with a very narrow, but highly resonant interpretation of 
the struggle and then gradually broadened as the MST grew and attained international 
recognition. Its initial high resonance can be explained by the match between existing 
grassroots structures in the southern states of Brazil and the relatively straightforward 
explanation of their common grievances offered by first CEB and later MST activists. In this 
way, the MST focused early on land issues at the local level and amplified the notion of land 
ownership as being a way out of poverty. It directly involved the landless and small-scale 
farmers with their narratives, religious beliefs and customs in the framing process. The 
communities started to see themselves as sem terra, and through ongoing mobilisation and 
 146 
 
framing processes in the camps and settlements a strong association between being sem terra 
and being an MST member was established. Based on general awareness of land issues in 
Brazil, this frame also received recognition by the Brazilian public and the media, at least 
during the 1990s, and thereby corroborated the MST’s collective action frame. Throughout 
the MST’s existence, its collective action frame represented an alternative model of 
agricultural livelihood nationally and internationally.  
 In South Africa, the NLC did not start off with a narrow and straightforward collective 
action frame at the local level. Having emerged amid the anti-apartheid movement, its frame 
was intertwined with the national injustice frame of the civil-rights movement, which broadly 
interpreted grievances and focused on the apartheid regime as the source of all problems. 
While this frame facilitated a national anti-apartheid movement, it oversimplified rural 
problems and attained an urban bias, as the shared ideas of benevolent urban middle-class 
people were the dominate drivers of the collective action frame. This lack of a unifying and 
coherent idea of landlessness driven by the rural population resulted in a post-apartheid 
vacuum regarding visions and actions for the rural sector. The existing broadly resonant 
national master frame quickly filled this gap and was augmented with ideas of rural 
development theory by the World Bank. Therefore, unlike to the MST in Brazil, the NLC did 
not actively construct a counter-frame to defend alternative notions of land reform and 
landlessness. Its incorporation into governmental structures and its initial unconditional 
support of the ANC government caused the NLC to fully identify with the national master 
frame. It accordingly became the official rural representation of the national development 
project of the new government. As parts of the NLC showed signs of disagreement and 
encouraged a stronger grassroots structure in the form of the LPM, this was met with strong 
resistance by NLC members as well as by the government. The rejection and ultimate failure 
of the LPM was underpinned by a rural population which, unlike that of Brazil, identified 
with the government and its national master frame and therefore for the most part refrained 
from rebellious actions. In South Africa, land reform therefore took the form of an inclusive 
national project, whereas in Brazil land reform remained a populist project given that the 
national and local administrations were perceived as overall hostile.  
 Framing processes have therefore been dominated by the national master frame in South 
Africa. Attempts to construct a counter-frame have been undertaken, yet existing rural 
movement constraints are too entrenched in South Africa to allow for the sustainment of a 
nationally organised rural movement based on oppositional grassroots structures. In contrast, 
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the MST established and subsequently broadened a collective action frame that unifies at the 
grassroots and is in opposition to state policy, thereby having a strong mobilising dynamic.  
 Overall, the two case studies have provided an empirical example for the interrelated 
importance of movement dynamics to sustain power and mobilisation of movements over 
time. An ambivalent political opportunity structure proved more conducive to activism than 
an overly inclusive one as resource mobilisation and framing processes tend to maintain their 
independence and thus mobilising momentum amid an ambivalent structure. A tactical 
repertoire overly characterised by bureaucratic structures appears to be particularly 
detrimental for rural activism as the movement loses touch with the affected rural population 
and engages in a kind of fabricated rural activism. Collective action frames which are in 
opposition to the prevailing land policy and construct mutually shared ideas of landlessness 
and landownership are specifically powerful in maintaining motivation for rural activism.   
 With reference to the initial question of why rural activism differs substantially in South 
Africa and Brazil despite similar land and poverty disparities, the study has shown that there 
is certainly no straightforward answer. The study points to a complex network of cause and 
effect. In an attempt to reduce the outcome of the study to a more tangible conclusion, the 
differing level of rural activism in South Africa is due to an overall demobilising constellation 
of important movement dynamics. Political opportunities changed from overly exclusive to 
overly inclusive and thereby amplified the chain of demobilising dynamics. Due to the 
inclusive nature of the political system, resource mobilisation became narrowly 
institutionalised, containing most oppositional forces at the national and local level. This 
development was underpinned by a missing coherent rural African population with a strong 
independent farming background. The exclusive-inclusive dichotomy of the South African 
society with its strong racial overtones led to a national master frame interpreting land reform 
as an exclusive state affair and merging land with the broad context of social injustice in 
South Africa. Accordingly, this study concludes with the awareness that the historically 
constructed and contemporarily continued racial dichotomy of South Africa’s society has 
hampered rural movement dynamics. Perhaps only a new generation, unburdened by the 
direct experiences and narratives of the past, may gradually diffuse a new sense of equality 
and a constructive critical approach to politics.   
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